No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
The Politics of Coalition Building in Japan: The Case of the Katayama Government Formation in 1947
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
Extract
This Note examines the formation of the Socialist-led coalition government in Japan in 1947. Despite the recent expansion of positive research on coalition governments, the existing literature remains ‘European’ in its scope, leaving ambiguity as to whether the currently available models are truly general theoretical models, as some formal theorists seem to claim, or only applicable to a certain cultural and socio-political environment. The Japanese example presents an excellent vehicle, a hard case, with which to test contemporary coalition theories, because Japan is usually described as a country with a distinctive political culture and historical background.
- Type
- Notes and Comments
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994
References
1 In fact, in explaining this ‘Katayama government’, students of Japanese politics have often emphasized the unique historical circumstances under which this government was formed, such as the existence of transient consensus for social democracy within the American Occupation Forces and the politically immature Japanese public in the aftermath of the Second World War. See, for example, Otake, Hideo, Adenaua to Yoshida Shigeru (Tokyo: Chuo Koron-sha, 1986), especially pp. 226–9.Google Scholar
2 The Constitution was proclaimed in November 1946. American Occupation Forces ordered the Japanese government to hold national and local elections before the enactment of the Constitution (which was scheduled in May 1947) in order to establish the democratic polity and institutions.
3 The upper house Speakers were also elected at the same time.
4 One other portfolio was distributed to a member of Ryoku Hu Kai, an independent group in the upper house.
5 For a summary of theoretical models, see Laver, Michael and Schofield, Norman, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).Google Scholar
6 Riker, William, The Theory of Political Coalition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).Google Scholar
7 Laver, Michael and Shepsle, Kenneth, ‘Coalition and Cabinet Government’, American Political Scienc Review, 84 (1990), 873–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics’, British Journal of Political Science, 20 (1990), 489–507.Google Scholar Laver and Shepsle do not entirely ignore the office-seeking incentives. But, to borrow a phrase from Laver, and Schofield, , Multiparty GovernmentGoogle Scholar, they regard ‘office as a means to influence policy’. For an even more extreme example of the pure policy-driven model, see Baron, David, ‘A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems’, American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 137–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 Axelrod, Robert, Conflict of Interest (Chicago: Markham, 1970).Google Scholar
9 Axelrod's model is also persuasive in explaining the Communist party's unqualified support for the Socialists, which was expressed in the very early stage of coalition bargaining. The Communists' endorsement appeared puzzling, given that these two parties at that time were engaged in an intense battle for leadership in the evolving Japanese labour movement. In Axelrod's logic, however, the Communists' behaviour was nothing to be surprised about because the only scenario under which they would participate in a new government was to form a coalition with the Socialists.
10 Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey, ‘Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes’, American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 405–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
11 The present law, Shuugiin Kisoku (the Lower House Rule), which stipulates the procedure for a run-off election, was passed in June 1947, after the Katayama government was formed.
12 The only other alternative was to abstain. However, there was still a chance, albeit remote, of a grand coalition, and the Liberals had nothing to lose by voting for Katayama in this first round.
13 A huge volume ofliterature has been accumulated in this line of work especially by the students of US legislative politics. For a concise summary see Shepsle, Kenneth, ‘Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions’, in Weisberg, Herbert F., ed. Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986).Google Scholar
14 Laver, and Shepsle, , ‘Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics’.Google Scholar
15 See, for example, Otake, , Adenaua to Yoshida Shigeru.Google Scholar
16 For a criticism of the socio-ideological paradigm, see Kohno, Masaru, ‘Japan's One-Party Dominance: Its Origin and Development’ (mimeograph, Stanford University, California, 1993).Google Scholar