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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
President Jimmy Carter twice attempted to enact major reforms of the US welfare system. Using archival material from the Carter Presidential Library, this article argues that one major reason for the failure of both initiatives was the persistence of regional divisions between representatives from the north and south in the Congress. This factor is as germane to the welfare failure as poor presidential-congressional relations and changes to the committee seniority system in the Congress. American welfare programmes were institutionalized in such a way that, from the 1930s, building a coalition across sectional interests (as represented by members of the Congress) was nearly impossible: gains to one region constituted losses to the other. The consequence of the way Carter pursued and failed to achieve welfare reform was to enhance the priorities, particularly ‘working for welfare’, exploited by Reagan in the final year of his administration when the Family Support Act was enacted.
1 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (hereafter JCPL), White House Central File (hereafter WHCF), Box WE-12, Folder: WE 10 1/20/77–4/30/77, Memorandum from Watson, Jack and Parham, Jim. to Carter, , 15 04 1977, p. 1.Google Scholar
2 For example, see Davis, Eric L., ‘Legislative Reform and the Decline of Presidential Influence on Capitol Hill’, British Journal of Political Science, 9 (1979), 465–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peterson, M. P., Legislating Together (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 19–20Google Scholar; Jones, C. O., The Trusteeship Presidency (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), chap. 3Google Scholar; and the essays in Davidson, R. H., ed., The Postreform Congress (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992)Google Scholar especially Pfiffner, J. P., ‘The President and the Postreform Congress’, pp. 211–32.Google Scholar
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4 Davis, ‘Legislative Reform and the Decline of Presidential Influence’, p. 474.Google Scholar
5 Davis, ‘Legislative Reform and the Decline of Presidential Influence’, p. 472.Google Scholar
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7 For details see ‘Welfare Reform: Congress is Skeptical’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, no. 39, 35 (24 09 1977), p. 2013Google Scholar. O'Neill had also formed, with similar results, a special ad hoc committee in the House for the passage of the president's complex energy programme. The failure of this presidential initiative and O'Neill's frustration with the White House's ineptitude in its dealings with Congress cannot have warmed the Speaker's support for later initiatives. See O'Neill, Tip, Man of the House (London: Bodley Head, 1987), especially pp. 310, 320Google Scholar. O'Neill records his poor treatment by Carter's aide, Hamilton Jordan, on the night before the president was sworn in at the gala at the Kennedy Center, see pp. 310–11.
8 For an analysis of Long's influence see Ehrenhalt, A., ‘Senate Finance: The Fiefdom of Russell Long’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, no. 37, 35 (10 09 1977), pp. 1905–15.Google Scholar
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10 See Kellerman, , The Political Presidency, chap. 10Google Scholar; and Jones, , The Trusteeship Presidency, chap. 5.Google Scholar
11 O'Neill, , Man of the House, p. 323Google Scholar. Elsewhere O'Neill asks rhetorically: ‘Did he still think he was dealing with the Georgia legislature?’, p. 320Google Scholar. See also, Jones, Charles O., ‘Carter and Congress: From the Outside In,’ British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 269–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 In his study Charles O. Jones succeeds admirably in reconstructing the work of this Office from interviews: see The Trusteeship Presidency.
13 O'Neill, , Man of the House (London: Bodley Head, 1987).Google Scholar
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15 See also Hargrove, E. C., Jimmy Carter as President (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), pp. 59–60Google Scholar, whose assessment is not dissimilar to mine.
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29 For a summary and formulation of Carter's thinking on welfare before entering the White House see the statement in JCPL WHCF, Memo from Watson, Jack and Parham, Jim to Carter, , 15 04 1977, pp. 1–3Google Scholar, in which twelve points are documented.
30 JCPL WHCF, Labor–Management Relations, Box LA2 File: LA2 1/20/77–3/20/77, Address by JC to Congress, 31 July 1977, p. 5.
31 Quoted in Gest, ‘Welfare Reform’, pp. 792–3.Google Scholar
32 JCPL DPS–Eizenstat, Box 319, Folder: Welfare Reform Proposal report, Summary, March 1977.
33 JCPL DPS–Eizenstat, Box 318, Folder: Welfare Reform, 8/77 [O/A 6347][1], Memorandum: Briefing Paper on Moynihan/Cranston/Long Bill, 12 July 1978.
34 At HEW Califano was assisted principally by former Brookings member Henry Aaron, assistant secretary for planning and evaluation. Aaron chaired the consulting group convened by Califano to advise on the welfare reform. Aaron defined the problem in terms which reflected the agreed initiative: ‘it is how to unite the almost universal desire to enable those with low income to earn enough to support themselves with the inevitable fact that many people will require cash assistance.’ (See Gest, , ‘Welfare Reform’, p. 792).Google Scholar
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36 JCPL DSP–Eizenstat, Box 317, Folder: Welfare Reform 5/77, Memo from Secretary Califano to Carter, 19 May 1977, p. 2.
37 JCPL WHCF Welfare Box WE-13, Folder: WE10 8/1/77–12/31/77, Carter's speech to Congress, 6 August 1977, p. 1.
38 Richard Nixon, after six months in office, also proposed a significant reform of the US welfare system known as the family assistance plan (FAP). It constituted a basic income scheme, guaranteeing to each family of four an income of $ 1,600 per year, a $750 per year (or $60 per month) earned income disregard (that is, not liable to taxation), and a reduction rate of 50 per cent on additional earned income. This proposal was work-orientated but it included no public job creation programme.
For accounts, see Mead, L., Beyond Entitlement (New York: Free Press, 1985) especially chap. 5Google Scholar; Moynihan, D. P., The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan (New York: Random House, 1973)Google Scholar; and Quadagno, Jill, ‘Race, Class and Gender in the US Welfare State: Nixon's Failed Family Assistance Plan’, American Sociological Review, 55 (1990), 11–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
39 Eisenstat was a key official throughout the Carter administration. For a profile see Bonatede, D., ‘Stuart Eizenstat – Carter's Right-hand Man’, National Journal, 9 06 1979.Google Scholar
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41 These included: (1) simplify administration and introduce efficient systems management by consolidating in one cash assistance program: SSI, AFDC, food stamps, ‘Section 8’ housing, earned income tax credit, extended unemployment benefits (26 to 39 weeks); (2) redirect CETA public service employment and training to jobs for the poorest people who can work; (3) freeze the state supplement to AFDC and SSI at current level; (4) provide a universal minimum federal benefit, with some variation to reflect different community costs of living; (5) no non-working family will have a higher income than a comparable working family; (6) provide special health, education and training programmes to those who need them to be prepared for redirected CETA jobs; (7) set up priorities for CETA jobs; (8) provide maximum incentive to work; (9) place as many incentives as possible for keeping the family together and eliminate all incentives for breaking up the family (JCPL WHCF, Welfare Box WE-12, Folder: WE10 1/20/77–4/30/77, Memo from Califano, to Carter, , 11 04 1977, pp. 1–2).Google Scholar
42 JCPL WHCF, Box WE-12, Folder: WE 10 1/20/77–4/30/77, Memo from Marshall to Carter, 13 April 1977: ‘although I agree with the general principles stated by Joe Califano I think it is too early in the program design to set specific details in concrete’.
43 This was at the request of the president: see JCPL WHCF, Box WE-12, Folder: WE10 1/20/77–4/30/77, Memo from Califano to Carter, 5 February 1977. This pre-legislative consultation rather undercuts the view that Carter failed to consult widely in formulating his domestic agenda.
44 JCPL WHCF, Box WE-12, Folder: WE10 1/20/77–1/20/81, Memo from Califano, to Carter, , 28 11 28 1978, p. 1.Google Scholar
45 JCPL WHCF, Memo from Califano, to Carter, , 28 11 1978, p. 1.Google Scholar
46 Quoted in ‘House Passes Welfare Reform Bill 222–184’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, no. 45, 37 (10 11 1979), p. 2534.Google Scholar He added: ‘This bill fails the test’, a judgement which correctly anticipated the bill's failure to be enacted.
47 See Donnelly, H., ‘Scaled-Down Carter Welfare Plan Announced’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, no. 21, 37 (26 05 1979), pp. 1013–14.Google Scholar
48 JCPL WHCF Labor–Management Relations Box LA-4, Folder: LA2 5/1/79–6/30/79, President's Address to Congress, 24 May 1979, p. 1.
49 JCPL WHCF, President's Address to Congress, 24 May 1979, p. 1. Emphasis added.
50 JCPL WHCF, President's Address to Congress, 24 May 1979, p. 3.
51 The Senate Finance committee began hearings on 7 February 1978 but the bill did not go to the floor.
52 See ‘Welfare Bill Pronounced Dead’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, no. 25, 36 (24 06 1978), p. 1602.Google Scholar House Speaker Tip O'Neill ruled out major welfare reform in the current session of Congress.
53 See ‘House Passes Welfare Reform Bill 222–184’, p. 2534.Google Scholar
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56 See ‘Senate Votes Changes in Welfare Programs’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, no. 43, 35 (22 10 1977), p. 2243.Google Scholar
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60 Ehrenhalt, , ‘Senate Finance’, p. 1905.Google Scholar
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63 Quoted in Gest, K. W., ‘Carter, Congress and Welfare: A Long Road’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, no. 33, 35 (13 08 1977), p. 1701.Google Scholar
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68 JCPL DPS–Eizenstat, Briefing Paper on Moynihan/Cranston/Long Bill, 12 July 1978, p. 3.
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70 It is, of course, difficult to acquire an adequate picture of this Office's work in the absence of archival records. Two accounts based on interviews are provided by Bowles, N. in The White House and Capitol Hill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), chap. 8, especially pp. 203–8Google Scholar, and Jones, , The Trusteeship Presidency, especially chap. 5.Google Scholar
71 Quoted in Donnelly, , ‘Scaled-Down Carter Welfare Plan Announced’, p. 1013.Google Scholar
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74 Quoted in Gest, ‘Welfare Reform’, p. 793.Google Scholar
75 Quoted in Gest, , ‘Carter, Congress and Welfare’, pp. 1699–701.Google Scholar
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77 Some of these objections were shared by the state governors and the American Public Welfare Association of administrators.
78 Quoted in Gest, ‘Carter, Congress and Welfare’, p. 1699.Google Scholar
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83 JCPL WHCF, Welfare Box WE-13, Folder: WE10 1/1/79–6/30/79. In an internal memorandum (9 February 1979) from Roger Altman to Secretary Blumenthal, Altman noted that ‘last fall, Moynihan, Cranston and Long co-sponsored a ‘no-frills’ welfare reform proposal, consisting only of fiscal relief to States. Moynihan's view is that Congress will not pass any major reform of the benefit structure – at least any reform involving new spending’, p. 1.
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88 Bensel, , Sectionalism and American Political Development 1880–1980, pp. 309–10Google Scholar. Bensel attributes importance also to party allegiance, but this approach seems less convincing.
89 JCPL DPS–Eizenstat, Box 317 Folder: Welfare Reform [CF O/A 732][1], Memo from Mongan, Jim and Prioleau, Florence to Eizenstat, Stu, ‘Background Briefing for your February 4th Meeting with Senator Moynihan on Welfare Reform’, 2 02 1980, p. 1.Google Scholar
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103 This proposal reflected trade unionists hostility to FAP because of its implications for the minimum wage if low-wage workers had to be found jobs. See Quadagno, , The Color of Welfare, chap. 5.Google Scholar
104 Hearings lasted two days. The bill was returned to the White House by Chairman Long. A revised plan was given hearings in July 1970 when Long postponed consideration until after the November elections. A tentative vote on the proposal in October was defeated 14–1 (all Republicans voting against) and in October another vote defeated the bill 10–6. The liberal from Minnesota, Eugene McCarthy, scheduled an unofficial hearing of the Committee in November 1970 at which the National Women's Rights Organization opposed the programme. Three of the Committee's six liberal members voted against FAP and one abstained.
105 Moynihan, , The Politics of a Guaranteed Income, p. 500.Google Scholar
106 In the Senate by fifty-two votes to thirty-four.
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