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The Politics of When: Redistribution, Investment and Policy Making for the Long Term

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2008

ALAN M. JACOBS
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia

Abstract

Why do some elected governments impose short-term costs to invest in solving long-term social problems while others delay or merely redistribute the pain? This article addresses that question by examining the politics of pension reform in Britain and the United States. It first reframes the conventional view of the outcomes – centred on cross-sectional distribution – demonstrating that the politicians who enacted the least radical redistribution enacted the most dramatic intertemporal tradeoffs. To explain this pattern, the article develops and tests a theory of policy choice in which organized interests struggle for long-term advantage under institutional constraints. The argument points to major analytical advantages to studying governments' policy choices in intertemporal terms, for both the identification of comparative puzzles and their explanation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
2008 Cambridge University Press

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