Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-m9pkr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-11T16:19:48.406Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Programme Approach to the Growth of Government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Richard Rose
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In order to understand the dynamics of contemporary government, we must consider what government does as well as why it grows. This is true whether theories seek to explain past growth or are hypotheses about future developments. Political science has a unique responsibility to address this problem, because it is the discipline for which government is central. Whereas economists and sociologists can produce models that treat political change as epiphenomenal, political scientists must identify what it is that changes when government changes.

Type
Research Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , January 1985 , pp. 1 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Poggi, G., The Development of the Modern State (London: Hutchinson, 1978)Google Scholar; Dyson, Kenneth, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).Google Scholar

2 Rose, Richard, ‘The Welfare State in the Mixed Society’ (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, a Tri-Continental Conference on the Welfare State and the Future, 08 1983).Google Scholar

3 Larkey, Patrick D., Stolp, Chandler and Winer, Mark, ‘Theorizing About the Growth of Government’, Journal of Public Policy, I (1981), 157–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Rose, Richard, Understanding Big Government (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 24–8.Google Scholar

5 Rose, Richard, ‘What if Anything is Wrong With Big Government?’, Journal of Public Policy, I (1981), 5–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).Google Scholar

7 Huntington, Samuel P., ‘Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?’, Comparative Politics, VI (1974), 163–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 See Rose, Richard, ‘Misperceiving Public Expenditure: Feelings about Cuts’ in Levine, C. and Rubin, I., eds, Fiscal Stress and Public Policy (London: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 203–30.Google Scholar

9 Tarschys, Daniel, ‘The Growth of Public Expenditures: Nine Modes of Explanation’, Scandinavian Political Studies Yearbook, X (1975), 9–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Larkey, et al. , ‘Theorizing About the Growth of Government’, pp. 157–220.Google Scholar

11 Dahl, Robert A. and Tufte, E., Size and Democracy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 135.Google Scholar

12 Rose, Richard, ‘England: A Traditionally Modern Political Culture’, in Pye, Lucian W. and Verba, Sidney, eds, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 83–129.Google Scholar

13 OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960–1980 (Paris: OECD, 1982), Tables 6.2, 6.3.Google Scholar

14 Heller, Peter S., ‘Diverging Trends in the Shares of Nominal and Real Government Expenditures in GDP’, National Tax Journal, XXXIV (1981), 61–74.Google Scholar

15 Wilensky, Harold, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Flora, Peter and Heidenheimer, A. J., eds, The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981).Google Scholar

16 Simon, Herbert A., The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 73f. and 99ff.Google Scholar

17 Rose, , Understanding Big Government, Table 6.2.Google Scholar

18 Rose, , Understanding Big Government, Chapters 1 and 7Google Scholar

19 Larkey, et al. , ‘Theorizing About the Growth of Government’, p. 203.Google Scholar

20 Page, Edward, ‘Laws and Orders in Central-Local Government Relations’ (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 102, 1982)Google Scholar; Rose, Richard, ‘The Influence of Laws upon the Growth of Government’ (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 124)Google Scholar; Mechelen, Denis Van, ‘Has There Been a Growth in Legislation in Britain Since 1945? An Empirical Inquiry’ (Glasgow: University of Strathyclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 123. 1984).Google Scholar

21 Treasury, H. M., The Government's Expenditure Plans, 1983–1984 to 1985–1986 (London: HMSO, Cmnd. 8789, Vol. II, 1983), p. 45Google Scholar, and Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), Chapters 8 and 9.Google Scholar

22 Chenery, Hollis and Syrquin, Moses, Patterns of Development: 1950–1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Taylor, Charles L., ‘Limits to Governmental Growth’, in Merritt, R. L. and Russett, B. M., eds, From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honour of Karl W. Deutsch (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 96–114.Google Scholar

23 OECD is not always able to provide data for all member nations, and especially for programme expenditure; this accounts for the differences in the numbers of nations covered from table to table. Cf. OECD National Accounts, Vol. 2 (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1983)Google Scholar, especially references to Table 3a at p. 6 and Annex 1.

24 To increase similarity, data from countries that have only recently introduced free elections or joined OECD, such as Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia, are consistently omitted.

25 Economic incentives could be used instead of laws to regulate pollution. The fact that governments choose to use laws rather than money measures is a principal complaint in Schultze, Charles L., The Public Use of Private Interest (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977).Google Scholar

26 Rose, , The Influence of Laws Upon the Growth of Government.Google Scholar

27 Rose, Richard, ‘Maximizing Revenue and Minimizing Political Costs: A Comparative Dynamic Analysis’ (Salzburg: Annual ECPR Workshops, 1984).Google Scholar

28 Calculated from ‘Social Expenditure: Erosion or Evolution?’, OECD Observer, CXXVI (1984), Table 2Google Scholar. Unfortunately, the data are not further disaggregated. British data calculated from the Treasury, , The Government's Expenditure Plans, 1983–84 to 1985–86 Vol. I, p. 11Google Scholar; US data from United States Budget 1985, Summary Table 3.

29 Albers, Jens, ‘Government Responses to the Challenge of Unemployment: the Development of Unemployment Insurance in Western Europe’Google Scholar, in Flora, and Heidenheimer, , eds, The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, pp. 151–83Google Scholar; cf. Hogwood, Brian and Peters, B. Guy, Policy Succession (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982)Google Scholar; and the analysis in Rose, , Understanding Big Government, pp. 48ff. and 192.Google Scholar

30 Rose, , ‘Maximizing Revenue and Minimizing Political Costs’, Tables 7–10Google Scholar; for a more detailed within-nation analysis see Rose, Richard and Karran, Terence, ‘Increasing Taxes, Stable Taxes or Both? The Dynamics of United Kingdom Tax Revenues Since 1948’ (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 116, 1983).Google Scholar

31 OECD, ‘Social Expenditure: Erosion or Evolution?’, OECD Observer, CXXVI (1984), pp. 3–6.Google Scholar

32 Cf. OECD, Demographic Trends 1950–1990 (Paris: OECD, 1979).Google Scholar

33 OECD, Public Expenditure Trends (Paris: OECD Studies in Resource Allocation No. 5, 1978), Table 7.Google Scholar

34 OECD, ‘Social Expenditure: Erosion or Evolution?’, Table 1.Google Scholar

35 Keman, Hans, ‘Securing the Safety of the Nation-State’, in Castles, F. G., ed., The Impact of Parties (London: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 189ff.Google Scholar

36 Cf. Price, R. W. R. and Chouraqui, Jean-Claude, ‘Public Sector Deficits: Problems and Policy Implications’, OECD Economic Outlook (Occasional Studies, 06 1983), pp. 13–44.Google Scholar

37 For the author's view, stressing the long-term influence of inertia and passive non-decision making, see Rose, Richard and Karran, Terence, ‘Inertia or Incrementalism?’ (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy No. 126, 1984)Google Scholar. See also Castles, , ed., The Impact of Parties.Google Scholar

38 Heclo, Hugh, ‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment’, in King, A. S., ed., The New American Political System (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute), pp. 87–124.Google Scholar

39 Rose, Richard, ‘Government against Sub-Government: A European Perspective on Washington’, in Rose, R. and Suleiman, E., eds, Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 284–347.Google Scholar

40 Schmidt, Manfred G., Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik unter buergerlichen und sozial demokratischen Regierungen (Frankfurt: Campus, 1982Google Scholar; Mazmanian, Daniel and Sabatier, Paul, ‘A Multivariate Model of Public Policymaking’, American Journal of Political Science, XXIV (1980), 439–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

41 Cf. the approach in Dempster, M. A. H. and Wildavsky, Aaron, ‘On Change: Or, There is no Magic Size for an Increment’, Political Studies, XXVII (1979), 371–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rose, Richard and Page, Edward, ‘Chronic Instability in Fiscal Systems’, in Rose, and Page, , eds, Fiscal Stress in Cities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 198–245.Google Scholar

42 OECD, Demographic Trends 1950–1990.Google Scholar

43 OECD, Public Expenditure on Education (Paris: OECD Studies in Resource Allocation, No. 2, 1976).Google Scholar

44 Price, and Chouraqui, , ‘Public Sector Deficits’, Tables 2, 3.Google Scholar

45 Rose, , Understanding Big Government, Chapter 4.Google Scholar

46 Rose, , ‘Maximizing Revenue and Minimizing Political Costs’, especially part IV.Google Scholar

47 Heclo, , ‘Toward a New Welfare State’, p. 37.Google Scholar

48 See, for example, Posner, Michael, ed., Demand Management (London, Heinemann/ National Institute of Economic and Social Research Economic Policy Papers No. 1, 1978)Google Scholar and Ascher, William, ‘The Forecasting Potential of Complex Models’, Policy Science, XIII (1981), 247–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49 Rose, Richard and Peters, Guy, Can Government Go Bankrupt? (New York: Basic Books, 1978), pp. 149ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar