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Al-Bīrūnī's Arabic Version of Patanjali's Yogasūtra:
A Translation Of His First Chapter And A Comparison With Related Sanskrit Texts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 December 2009
Extract
The first text of al-Bīrūnī (A.D. 973-C. 1050) published in Europe which contains a reference to his translation of Patañjali's Yogasūtra is his Risāla fī fihrist kutub Muḥammad ibn Zakarīya' al-Rāzī, the relevant part of which was published by E. Sachau, Leipzig, 1876ndash;8.1 In his list of his own works, which is included in this Risāla, al-Bīrūnī states that this list comprises the works he has written up to the end of 427/1037.2 Several years later Sachau published al-Bīrūnī's India (London, 1887), in which al-Bīrūnī not only refers to his having translated this work of Patañjali, 3 but also quotes from it copiously.4
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , June 1966 , pp. 302 - 325
- Copyright
- Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 1966
References
1 In his introduction to his edition of al-Bīrūnī' (Chronologie orientalisch, er Völker von Albêûnî, reprinted, Leipzig, 1923Google Scholar). The text in question is referred to on p. xxxv as
‘the translation of Patañjali's book on the liberation from the entanglement’ (see below, p. 308, n. 51). The whole text of this Risāla was published by Kraus, P., Epître de Bērūnī contenant le répertoire des ouvrages de Muḥammad b. Zakarīyā ar-Rāzī, Paris, 1936Google Scholar. The relevant portion of the Risāla was translated by Wiedermann, E., Beiträge zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, LX (Sitzungsberichte der Physikalisch-Medicinischen Sozietät in Erlangen, LII-LIII), 1920–1921, 66 seq. Al-Bīrūnī's translation of Patañjali's Yogasūtra is mentioned once again in an appendix to this Risāla, the author of which is Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Ghaḍanfar al-Tibrīzī. According to Sachau (op. cit., p. xv) al-Ghaḍanfar states inter alia that he attempted to read a portion of Patañjali's book translated by al-Bīrūnī but could not understand it.Google Scholar
2 P. Kraus, op. cit., 29; cf. Sachau, op. cit., p. xiii.
3 cf. Kitāb fī taḥqīq mā li' l-Hind or al-Bīrūni's India (Arabic text), Hyderabad, 1958 (henceforth abbreviated as India, Hyd.), 6.Google Scholar
4 cf. Sachau, E. C. (tr.), Alberuni's India, London, 1910, reprinted, Delhi, 1964 (henceforth abbreviated as Sachau), index I s.v. Patañjali.Google Scholar
5 Sachau, I, 264 (annotations).
6 Dasgupta, S. N., Yoga philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought, Calcutta, 1930, 64.Google Scholar
7 Köprülü 1589, fols. 412a-419a. See Massignon, L., Essai cur les origins du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane, Paris, 1922, 79; second ed., Paris, 1954, 97.Google Scholar
8 Garbe, R., Sāṃkhya und Yoga, Strassburg, 1896, 41.Google Scholar
9 Garbe, R., Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie, Leipzig, 1894, 63.Google Scholar
10 Garbe, R., Sāṃkhya und Yoga, 41.Google Scholar
11 Ritter, H., ‘Übersetzung des Yoga-Sūtra des Patañjali’, Oriens, IX, 2, 1956, 165ndash;200 (henceforth abbreviated as R).Google Scholar
12 R, 168 (1. 2).
13 R, 199 (11. 1ndash;2).
14 See p. 303, n. 8, above.
15 Filliozat, J. in Renou, L. and Filliozat, J., L'Inde classique, II, Paris, 1953, 46.Google Scholar
16 R, 185 (1. 16), 188 (I. 3); cf. India, Hyd., 191, 192, 194, 196, 205 (Sachau, 1, 232, 234, 236, 238, 248).
17 R, 185 (1. 16).
18 Thus at least 18 times (e.g. India, Hyd., 102, 104).
19 R, 188 (1. 2 et seq.).
20 R, 185 (1. 16 et seq.).
21 Veda-vyāsa's Yogabhāṣya (henceforth abbreviated as V) on sūtra 3.26.
22 cf. Dasgupta, S. N., op. cit., 63–4.Google Scholar
23 Sūtras refer to the edition of Dhundirāj, Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 85, 1931.
24 cf. Eliade, M., Yoga: immortality and freedom, London, 1958, 75.Google Scholar
25 Sūtra 4.34: … kaivalyaṃ svarūpa-pratisṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti.
26 R, 199 (l. 1); cf. R, 197 (l. 20). Cf. India, Hyd., 61 (ll. 7ndash;8), 66 (l. 17), 102 (ll. 3ndash;4).
27 cf. Eliade, M., op. cit., 75.Google Scholar
28 R, 167 (l. 10).
29 India, Hyd., 18 ( = Sachau, I, 24).
30 R, 171 (l. 11).
31 R, 182 (l. 14). Perhaps al-Bīrūnī read here bodhane for bādhane.
32 R, 182 (ll. 15ndash;16).
33 R, 181 (l. 20).
34 ‘Vikalpa is the existence of abstract imagination on the basis of language symbols, as when we say “the intelligence of the purusha” though we know that the purusha has no other essence than pure intelligence. Without such characteristic mode of chitta transformation abstract thinking would be impossible’ (S. N. Dasgupta, op. cit., 276).
35 R, 178 (1. 13).
36 Mahābhārata, v.17 ff., XII. 342 ff., and with some variations XIII. 99 tr. (Referred to, summarized), and discussed by Jacoby in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, s.v. ‘Agastya’.
37 cf. India, Hyd., 72: ‘ … the class of deva whom we have explained as angels’ (Sachau, I, 95); cf. R, 168 (l. 7). In translating the term for gods by
‘angels’, al-Bīrūnī follows a long-established usage of translators of Greek texts into Arabic.
38 R, 179 (ll. 15ndash;16).
39 cf. V on sūtra 21.2.
40 R, 173 (ll. 13ndash;14).
41 R, 176 (11. 11ndash;12).
42 R, 178 (ll. 11ndash;12).
43 R, 176 (ll. 3ndash;4); cf. R, 185 (l. 11).
44 R, 178 (l. 14); cf. 11, 197 (l. 5 et seq.).
45 R, 177 (l. 20); cf. R, 167 (l. 2).
46 R, 192 (l. 20).
47 R, 181 (l. 7).
48 R, 185 (l. 7).
49 R, 183 (l. 18).
50 The Arabic transliteration is which may also stand for the adjectival form pātañjala; cf. India, Hyd., 6, 102 ( = Sachau, I, 8, 132). However, in all probability al-Bīrūnī lengthened the first vowel in order to ensure an approximately correct pronunciation of the foreign name. Both in his present translation and in his India, he sometimes uses this method of transliterating a short Sanskrit a by an Arabic alif indicative of a long ā, e.g.
—brahman (R, 175 (l. 3)) (but
—brahmāṇḍa, R, 187 (l.2);
—brahma-loka, India, Hyd., 191 (l. 1)). Cf. Sachau, I, 257 (annotations).
51 The printed text has The emendation
(lit. ‘weights, burdens’) is based on R, 177 (l. 20), where this word corresponds to kleśa in sūtra 2.2. For other descriptions by al-Bīrūnī of Patañjali's treatise cf. p. 302, n. 1 (cf. R, 179 (l. 17), 180 (l. 9), 181 (l. 14), 189 (l. 4); India, Hyd., 61 (l. 12) for the expression
; India, Hyd., 6,
‘(a book) on the liberation of the soul from the fetters of the body’ (cf. Sachau, I 8); India, Hyd., 102,
‘(the book of) Patañjali on seeking liberation and union of the soul with its intellectum(i.e. object of meditation)’. There is a possibility that the original title was
‘liberation from entanglement’, in which the last word was corrupted into
52 More literally ‘Whoever is in a different position’.
53 Or ‘astrologers’. The text has
54 Or ‘came upon’.
55 Or ‘philosophy’.
56 may also have the meaning ‘to seek’.
57 Lit. ‘from which one is informed’.
58 For cf. below R, 193 (l. 16); R, 175 (I. 18) (Ans. to Q 20). In the language of the theologians and the Ṣūfīs this word may refer to the indwelling of God or of a spirit in a body.
59 cf. R, 199 (l. 1); cf. also India, Hyd., 102 (quoted in p. 308, n. 51), ; India, Hyd., 55,
‘seeking liberation and addressing himself single-mindedly to (the achievement of) absolute unity’ (cf. Sachau, I, 73).
60 Lit. ‘law’.
61 The printed text has The translation follows an alternative reading
mentioned by Ritter in his critical apparatus.
62 Lit. ‘according to what it is’.
63 The name of the commentator is not mentioned. For reference by al-Bīrūnī to ‘the commentator’() cf. R, 185 (l. 16), 188 (l. 2); India, Hyd., 191 (1. 1), 192 (l. 6), 194 (l. 6), 196 (l. 15), 205 (l. 14) (= Sachau, I, 232, 234, 236, 238, 248).
64 Lit. ‘the speech’.
65 The Arabic has ‘question and answer’ in the singular.
66 Probably owing to a printing error the diacritical dot over the nūn in is missing in the printed text.
67 Lit. ‘then’.
68 i.e. gods (deva). See above, p. 307, n. 37; cf. R, 172 (l. 17), 173 (l. 3), 192 (l. 2). Also cf. India, Hyd., 68 (1. 17), ‘the deva or angels ’(Sachau, I, 91).
69 cf. R, 172 (1. 14). For a description of ‘angels’ (deva) as a subclass of ‘spiritual beings’ see India, Hyd., 68 (cf. Sachau, i, 91). Sachau's identification of the latter term with deva (loc. cit.) appears to be erroneous.
70 In Vācaspati-miśra's subcommentary Tattvavaiśāradī (henceforth abbreviated as Vāc.), under sūtra l.l, the following statement is quoted from the Yogiyājnavalkyasmṛti: ‘Hiraṇyagarbha and no other of ancient days is he who gave utterance (vaktā) to Yoga’ (Woods, J. H., The Yoga system of Patañjali, with Veda-vyāsa's YogabhāṢya and Vācaspati-miśra's Tattvavaiśāradī, Cambridge, Mass., 1927Google Scholar (henceforth abbreviated as Woods), 5). According to the interpretation of Vāc. this implies that Hiranyagarbha preceded Patañjali. For a similar argument Mādhava invokes in his Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, ch. Patañjali-darśana, the above-mentioned quotation (misleadingly abbreviating the name of its source as ‘Yājñavalkyasmṛti’). Cf. Vāc./c under sūtra 1.25 and Vācaspati-miśra's Bhāintatī under Brahmasūtra 2.2.37. Also cf. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī's Maṇiprabhā (c. A.D. 1592) on sūtra 1.1: ‘Although an authoritative book was made by Hiraṇyagarbha, still since that was deemed too extended, an authoritative work conforming to that (book) is begun’ (Woods's, J. H. translation in JAOS, XXXIV, 1915Google Scholar, 1 et seq.). According to the Manhābhārata (Mbh., XII.349.65, quoted by Deussen, P., Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. I, Abt. 3, Leipzig, 1908, p. 17, n), Yoga was introduced by Hiraṇyagarbha, whereas Kapila is designated as the founder of Sāṅkhya. Elsewhere too there is reference to a connexion between Yoga and Hiraṇyagarbha (Mbh., XII.342.95, referred to by Deussen, op. cit., 17). See op. cit. for further references to Hiraṇyagarbha. Also see R. Garbe, Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie, 27 et. seq.Google Scholar
71 Lit. ‘mention’.
72 The four objectives referred to in the text are the well-known ‘aims of life’ (puruṢāirtha), namely: dharma ‘law’, artha ‘economic and political power‘, kāma ‘pleasure’, and mokṢa ‘liberation’.
73 Ritter's text has In the Arabic script there is not much difference between
and
which means religious tradition. Possibly al-Bīrūnī had in mind the word
In India the meaning of dharma is uniformly expressed by
‘religion’. Cf. India, Hyd., 102,
‘the word dharma means “reward” but in general it is used for “religion”’ (Sachau, I, 132).
74 For the inclusion of ease within the concept of artha cf. Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra, 6.2.1ndash;3: ‘Peace and activity (śama-vyāyāmau) constitute the source of acquisition and security (yoga-kṢemayor yoni). Activity is that which brings about the accomplishment of works undertaken. Peace is that which brings about security of enjoyment of the fruits of works (karmaphalopabhogānāṃ kṢemārādhanaḥ śamaḥ)’ (Kangle, R. P., The Kauṭilīya Arthaśātra, I, Bombay, 1960, 165; II, Bombay, 1963, 368). Elsewhere the word
is used synonymously with
to refer to the concept of sukha ‘ease’, as opposed to duḥkha ‘sorrow’ (R, 189 (1. 7); cf. 180 (1. 10)).Google Scholar
75 In his India al-Bīrūnī also uses the Sanskrit term mokṢa, e.g. India, Hyd., 53, ‘they call its (the soul's) liberation in the Indian language mokṢa’ (cf. Sachau, I, 70).
76 Ritter's text has Emendation proposed:
The translation conforms to this emendation.
77 The usual meaning of ‘causes’.
78 All those who have not attained liberation are thought to be in a state of bondage.
79 For the present discussion of causes of non-perception cf. Iśvara-kṛṢṇa's Sāṅkhya-kārikā, kārikā 7: atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriya-ghātān mano-'navasthānāt/saukṢmyād vyavadhānād abhibhavāt samānābhihihārāc ca (anupalabdhiḥ) ‘(non-perception may be) due to excessive distance, (excessive) proximity, damage to the sense-organs, unsteadiness of mind, minuteness (of the object), the intervening (of another object), being outshone (by another object), and the mingling (of the object) with like objects’. Also cf. V on sūtra 1.49.
80 Read instead of Ritter's
This Arabic word has the primary meaning ‘grains of dust’. Cf. Vācaspati-miśra's Tattva-kaumuclī, on Sāṅkhya-kārikā, kārikā 7 (quoted in the preceding note): saukṢmyāt—yathendriya-sannikṛṢṭaṃ paramāmnvādi praṇihita-manā api na paśyati ‘“due to minuteness”—as for instance (the case of an object) such as an atom, which (although) connected with one's sense (of sight), even one whose mind is fixed (on it) cannot see’.
81 The Arabic has the singular.
82 For the example of the fence cf. e.g. Jānakīnātha's Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, Banaras, 1916, 40.Google Scholar
83 Probably the humours of the body are meant. Cf. Fākihat al-bustān, 1358:
84 The MS may be read In the translation Ritter's emendation
instead of
has been adopted. If the reading
(instead of
translated in the text) is adopted, the meaning would be ‘prognostication from voices (of birds ?)’.
85
86 , lit. ‘speech, discourse’.
87 lit. ‘go, proceed to’.
88 This corresponds to in the printed text. As Ritter points out, the word can also be read
is differentiated'. A further possibility is
‘are modified’.
89 is an expression frequently used in Arabic philosophical texts which are translated or adapted from the Greek.
90 —the ‘aims of life’ (puruṢārtha) referred to above; cf. p. 311, n. 72.
91 Lit. ‘for him who reads it’.
92 ‘Jungles’ corresponds to occurring in Ritter's text. If the reading
suggested by Ritter in his critical apparatus, is adopted, the meaning would be ‘deserts’ or ‘waste lands’.
93 A primary meaning of is ‘comparison, analogy’. It may be used in the sense of syllogism or reasoning.
94
95 The translation conforms to Ritter's reading Ritter's critical apparatus has
96 cf. India (quoted by R, p. 169, n. 10); (cf. Sachau, I, 76 et seq.).
97
98 (R, 183 (l. 167)) corresponding to pratyāhāra (sūtra 2.54).
99 This expression corresponds to the term vṛtti of the sūtras (e.g. 1.2).
100 The translation conforms to the reading ; cf. R, 170 (l. 8). Ritter's text has
.
101 cf. sūtra 1.2: yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ ‘Yoga is the suppression of the modes of functioning of the mind’.
102
103 Lit. ‘towards’.
104 cf. V introducing sūtra 1.3: tad-avasthe cetasi viṢayābhātvād, buddhi-bodhātmā puruṢaḥ kiṃsvabhāvaḥ, ‘Since there is no object when the mind is in this state, what will be the character of the self which consists of intellected and intellection?’
105 Ritter's text has here . The translation conforms to the reading
suggested by Ritter in his critical apparatus. Cf. R, 176 (1. 8). A possible but not very plausible emendation of the former reading would be
namely: social ties.
106
107 cf. India, Hyd., 62 (quoted by R, p. 170, n. 4): … (cf. Sachau, T, 82).
108 cf. sūtra 1.3: tadā draṢṭuḥ svarūpe 'vasthanam ‘Then the seer (that is, the self) retains its own form’.
100
110 Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.3: ‘Never does the energy of the mind, (in that it is) absolutely eternal, deviate from itself. Accordingly, as (it is) in restriction, just so (is it) in emergence also. Assuredly, the actual form (svarūpa) of the mother-of-pearl does not suffer increase or decrease of being, no matter whether the perception (jñāna) which refers to it (gocara) be the source of correct knowledge (pramāṇa) or (the source) of misconception’ (Woods, 14).
111 Ritter's printed text has . The translation conforms to the alternative reading suggested by Ritter's critical apparatus:
This probably corresponds to ākāśa ‘ether’. Cf. R, 190 (I. 8 and 1. 10) (corresponding to sūtras 1.41 and 42 respectively).
112
113 Ritter puts a question mark after In all probability the word should be read
deriving from the root
114 cf. sūtra 1.4.: vṛtti-sārūpyam itaratra ‘At other times it (the self) takes the same form as the modes of functioning (of the mind)’.
115 Or ‘that which encompassed him’.
116 cf. V on sūtra 1.3: svarūpa-pratiṢṭhā tadāiniṃ eiti-śaktir yathā kaivalye; vyutthāna-citte tu sati tathāpi bhavanti na tathā ‘At that time the energy of the mind is established in its own form, as in the state of kaivalya. But when the mind is in its emergent state, (the energy of the mind), although really the same, (does) not (seem) so’ and cf. Vāc. ad loc.
117 cf. sūtra 1.5: vṛttayaḥ panñcatayyaḥ … ‘The modes of functioning (of the mind) are of five kinds …’.
118 Cf. pramāṇa in sūtra 1.6: pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ ‘Modes of correct knowledge, incorrect knowledge, comprehension of words, sleep, and memory’.
119
120 cf. pratyakṢa in sūtra 1.7: pratyakṢānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni ‘The modes of correct knowledge are perceptual, inferential, and linguistic’.
121 Ritter's text has here with a question mark. In all probability the word should be read
Cf. anumāna of the corresponding sūtra 1.7.
122
123 Cf. āgama in sūtra 1.7.
124
125 Cf. viparyaya in sūtra 1.8: viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atadrūpa-pratiṢṭham ‘Incorrect knowledge is false cognition which takes a form other than that of the object’.
126 Cf. vikalpa in sūtra 1.9: śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-śūnyo vikcapaḥ ‘Conception based on communication lacks a (corresponding) object and results from perception of words’.
127 Ritter's text has here with the remark that the MS appears to have
The word should probably be read
Cf. V on sūtra 1.9: tad yathā caitanyaṃ puruṢasya svarūpam iti yadā citir eva puruṢaḥ tadā kim atra kena vyapadiśyate, bhavati ca vyapadśe vṛttir yathā caitrasya gauḥ ‘Thus when, since “the self is in the form of intelligence”, (we say that) the self is nothing but intellect, then how can it have attribute or designation? Furthermore, it is to the designation that (attributive, etc.) relationships are imputed, as for instance (in the case of) “Caitra's cow”’.
128
129 Cf. nidrā ‘sleep’ in sūtra 1.10: a-bhāiva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā. This sūtra is translated by Woods: ‘Sleep is a fluctuation (of mind-stuff) supported by the cause (pratyaya, that is tames) of the (transient) negation (of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations)’. Deussen, however, translates it: ‘Die nicht auf einer realen Vorstellung fussende Funktion ist der Schlaf’ (Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. I, Abt. 3, 512). Like al-Bīrūnī and unlike Woods, Deussen takes the negating particle a in the beginning of the sūtra as applying to the compound as a whole and not as applying to bhāva. Accordingly he construes the definition in the sūtra like al-Bīrūnī. The latter, however, misunderstood this definition as applying to dream.
130 Cf. smṛti ‘memory’ in sūtra l.11: anubhūta-viṢayāsaṃpramoṢaḥ smṛtiḥ. Woods, following the interpretation of Vāc. ad loc. translates this sūtra: ‘Memory (smṛti) is not-adding. surreptitiously (asaṃpramoṢa) to a once experienced object’. Deussen, however, translates it: ‘Das Nicht-abhandenkommen eines Objectes, dessen man inne ward, ist die Erinnerung’ (op. cit., 512). Cf. Ballantyne's, J. R. translation (Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali, reprinted, Calcutta, 1960, 14Google Scholar). The latter two, like al-Bīrūnī and unlike Woods, take asaṃpramoṢa to mean ‘lack of loss, not letting drop (as from memory)’. For this meaning of the term cf. the Sanskrit dictionaries of Monier-Williams, and Böhtlingk, , and Wogihara, U., The Sanskrit-Chinese dictionary of Buddhist technical terms, based on the Mahāvyutpatti, reprinted, Tokyo, 1959, 109.13.Google Scholar
131 Cf. R, 169 (11. 18 and 19), 170 (1. 4).
132 Cf. abhyāsa ‘repeated practice, training’ in sūtra 1.12: abhyāsa-vairāgyāhyāṃ tan-nirodhaḥ ‘The suppression of those (vṛttis is attained) by repeated practice and detachment’.
133
134 Ritter gives the Arabic word as and states that the MS is not clearly legible here.
The correct reading appears to be
135 Cf. sūtra 1.13: tatra sthitau yatno 'bhyāsaḥ ‘Of these. repeated practice is the effort to remain in the state (of suppressed vṛttis)’; and sutra 1.14: sa tu dīrgha-Kāla-nairantaryasatkara-sevito dṛḍha-bhūmiḥ This (effort), however, is consolidated (lit. ‘possesses solid ground’), when it is well attended to for a long time and without interruption’.
136 Cf. V on sūtra 1.12. In the corresponding quotation in India, (R, p. 172, n. 1 ? Hyd., 60 ? Sachau, I 79) this word is corrupted into
(Sachau: ‘renunciation’, ‘via omissionis’).
137 —a term referring to a way of life characterized by abstinence as practised by the Ṣufis. Cf. vairāgya ‘detachment, passionlessness, renunciation’ in sūtra 1.15: dṛṢṭānuśravikaviṢaya-vitṛṢṇasya vaśīkāra-saṃjñā-ui vairāgyam ‘Detachment is the consciousness of (self-) control on the part of one who is no longer thirsting for objects that are perceivable or promised by scriptures (lit. ‘heard’)’.
138 —a regular Ṣūfī term denoting non-discursive intuitive knowledge of the mystic.
136 The translation follows Ritter's reading here, He, however, states that he is not sure of this reading. An alternative reading may be suggested:
‘free from’. Cf. Vāc. on sūtra 1.16: ‘For nothing alive is ever free from connexion with bondage to birth and death’ (Woods, 39).
140
141 i.e. the three guṇas. Cf. sūtra 1.16: tat-paraṃ purusa-khyāter guṇa-vaitṛṢṇyam ‘The nolonger-thirsting for the guṇas that results from the knowledge of the self is superior to that detachment’.
142 Lit. ‘on one side’.
143 Lit. ‘on the other side’.
144 Replace original for Ritter's emendation
Cf. R, 181 (ll. 7ndash;8).
145 cf. India, Hyd., 30ndash;1: ‘… three powers … which are called sattva, rajas, and tamas. … The first power is rest and goodness, and hence come existing and growing. The second is exertion and fatigue, and hence come firmness and duration. The third is languor and irresolution, and hence come ruin and perishing’ (Sachau, I, 40ndash;1). For the equation of the three guṇas (qualities, constituents of Nature) with the three aspects or forms conceived in the doctrine of the trimūrti, the Hindu trinity, cf. e.g. Kālidāsa's Kumārasaṃbhava, 2.4: mamas trimüartaye tubhyaṃ prāk sṛṢṭeḥ kevalātmane/guṇa-traya-vibhāgāya paścād bhedam upeyuṢe ‘Salutations to you, O Trinity, one before creation, afterwards divided for the sake of the division of the three qualities’. Also cf. Kirfel, W., Symbolik des Hinduismus and des Jinismus, Stuttgart, 1959, 44Google Scholar; Gonda, J., Die Religionen Indiens, Stuttgart, 1963, 65.Google Scholar
146
147
148
149 cf. sūtra 1.17ndash;18: vitarka-vicārcnandāsmit-rūpānugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ ‘The self becomes fully aware of objects by assuming the form of deliberation, reflection, joy, and egoism’; viramapratyayābhyāsa-pūrvakaḥ, saṃskāra-śeṢo 'nyaḥ ‘By constantly dwelling on cessation until only the residual impressions remain in awareness, the self attains a different state’.
150 The answer to this question and a further question answered by the following appear to be lacking.
151 . probably meaning here ‘incorporeal’.
152 cf. sūtra 1.19: bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām ‘Those who experience the absorption-into-prakṛti characteristic of “videhas” (lit. ‘the bodiless’) attain the self which is aware of existence’.
153 may alternatively be read as
, i.e. ‘the last’.
154 may refer to one kind of concentration, or alternatively to a kind of men or spiritual beings.
155 cf. sūtra 1.20: śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā-pūrvaka itareṢām ‘Others attain this only after (developing) faith, energy (i.e. firmness of will), mindfulness, concentration, and insight’.
156 See p. 307, n. 37 above.
157 may alternatively be read as
, i.e. ‘the latter=.
158 Lit. ‘purity’.
159 cf. viśeṢa in sūtra 1.22 (next footnote).
160 cf. sūtra 1.22: mṛdu-madhyādhimātratvāt tato 'pi viśeṢaḥ. (This sūtra appears to be an interpolation reading tatrāpi, subsequently assimilated to sūtra 1.23 by reading tato 'pi.) ‘There are grades of propinquity, according as the fervour is weak, moderate, or excessive.’
161 cf. sūtra 1.21: tivra-saṃvegānām āsannaḥ, ‘Those whose fervour is intense attain the self which is near the goal’.
162 ‘devoted’, or alternatively
‘conducive to emancipation’.
163 Cf. pranidhāna in sutra 1.23: īśvara-pranidhānād vā ‘Or (the self near the goal) is attained by devotion to the īśvara’.
164 Amend
165 —a Ṣūfī term. Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.23: ‘By devotion (that is) by a special kind of adoration either mental or verbal or bodily’ (Woods, 49).
166 For this question and the answer to it cf. India, Hyd., 30 (= Sachau, I, 27ndash;8), referred to by R, p. 173, n. 4.
167 … Cf. karma-vipāka in sūtra 1.24: kleśa-karma-vipākāśayair aparāmṛṢṭaḥ puruṢa-viśeṢa īśvaraḥ 'īśvara is the supreme state of the self, having no contact with the substrata of the fruition of works (karma) based on the afflictions (klehśa)’.
168 For the idea of this expression cf. the term dvandva ‘pair of opposites’, e.g. sūtra 2.48; Bhagavadgīta 2.45, 7.27. Cf. Sachau, I, 263 (annotations). Also cf. V on sūtra 1.24: tasyāiśvaryaṃ sāmyātiśaya-vinirmuktam ‘His pre-eminence is altogether without anything equal to it or excelling it’ (Woods, 50).
269 cf. sūtra 1.25: tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajña-bījam ‘In that state there is the unexcelled germ of the omniscient.’
170 This question and the answer to it bear a resemblance to V on sūtra 1.24. Cf. also V on sūtra 1.26.
171 The word is blurred in the MS.
172 cf. India (quoted by R, p. 174, n. 1).
173 ‘Future’ is designated by two words:
174 cf. kālenānavacchedāt in sūtra 1, 26: sa pūrveṢām api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt ‘He is also the teacher of the ancients, for He is not limited by time’.
175 For questions 14ndash;18 and the answers to them cf. India, Hyd., 20 et seq. (= Sachau, I, 28 et seq.), referred to by R. p. 174, n. 4 et seq.).
176 Al-Bīrünī uses here expressions deriving from Greek philosophical texts translated into Arabic.
177 cf. sūtra 1.25.
178 cf. sūtra 1.27: tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ, ‘The word expressing Him is the sacred syllable “Om”’ Al-Bīrūnī may have understood vācaka here as referring to speech as an attribute of God (tasya) and not to the sacred syllable ‘Om’ (praṇava in the sūtra) as expressive of God. In his translation al-Bīrūnī omits any reference to this sacred syllable.
179 The word occurring in the MS, which Ritter has replaced by
was pretty certainly an Arabic transcription of the Sanskrit name Kapila. Al-Bīrūnī probably transcribed it
or alternatively he might have used the Persian character for ‘p’, in which case the transcription was
Cf. India, Hyd., 102. Also cf. India, Hyd., 54,
‘the sage Kapila, for he was born knowing and wise’ (Sachau. I, 72). According to Vāc. under sūtra 1.25 the earlier commentator Pancaśikha described Kapila as the ‘first knower’. Kapila is the well-known name of a celebrated ancient sage. Cf. R. Garbe, Die SamkhyaPhilosophie, 24 et seq.
180 cf. India, Hyd., 71: ‘ṛṢis are the sages who, though they are only human beings, excel the angels on account of their knowledge. Therefore the angels learn from them, and above them there is none but Brahman’ (Sachau, I, 93).
181 cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.26. is a translation of pūrveṢūm occurring in sūtra 1.26. The difference between īśvara and Brahma is mentioned in Vāc. under sūtra 1.26. The way the Arabic version defines the difference between God and the ancient sages derives from sūtra 1.26, the commentaries on it, and probably also from the commentaries on sūtra 1.25.
182 is probably a misreading of
which occurs in a parallel passage in India (R, p. 174, n. 9). The misreading may be due to the influence of the last part of the preceding name
183 cf. V on sūtra 1.24 and Vāc. under sūtras 1.24ndash;5 with regard to īśvara as the author of the Veda. With regard to īśvara as the knower cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.24 and sūtra 1.25 itself. Cf. India, Hyd., 21 (= Sachau, I, 29).
184 cf. sūtra 1.27. Also cf. V and Vāc. on the same sūtra with regard to a name as proof for the existence of the object named.
185 Lit. ‘absent’.
186 According to a parallel quotation in India (R, p. 175, n. 3): ‘felicity is achieved’.
187 cf. R, 171 (ll. 15 and 19). With regard to verbal and mental habituation cf. sūtra 1.28: taj-japas tad-artha-bhavanam ‘Utterance of it serves to reveal its meaning’.
188 In Ṣūfī terminology
means God. With regard to ‘contraction’ and ‘obstacles’ here cf. sūtra 1.29: tataḥ pratyak-cetanadhiyamo 'py antarāyābhāvaś ca ‘From that comes knowledge of the intellect within and removal of obstacles’. Contraction seems to be the antithesis of vikṢepa ‘projection’ mentioned in sūtra 1.30.
189 The expression ‘attaining its own self’ is close in meaning to the expression svarūpa-darśanam apy asya bhavati ‘he gains insight into his own nature’ in V on sūtra 1.29.
190 cf. pramāda in sūtra 1.30: vyādhi-styāna-saṃśaya-pramādālasyāvirati-bhrāntidarśanālabdha-bhūmikatvānavasthitatvāni citta-vikṢepās te 'ntarāyāḥ ‘The obstacles are the distractions of the mind, i.e. error due to sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, and sensuality, also lack of an objective basis for perception, and instability of perception’.
191 cf. ālasya in sūtra 1.30.
192 Lit. ‘putting off till to-morrow’. Perhaps this is meant to render anavasthitatva ‘instability’ of sūtra 1.30.
193 cf. saṃśaya in sūtra 1.30.
194 cf. alabdha-bhūmikatva in sūtra 1.30.
195 cf. bhrānti-darśana in sūtra 1.30.
196 For the text up to the word ‘body’ cf. sūtra 1.31: duḥkha-daurmanasyāṅgamejayatvaśvāsa-praśvāsā vikśepa-sahabhuvaḥ ‘The companions of the distractions are pain, melancholy, trembling of the body, inhaling and exhaling’. Also cf. V on this sūtra.
797 corresponds to vikśepa in sūtra 1.31.
198 cf. adhibhautikam in V on sūtra 1.31.
199 See above, p. 309, n. 58.
200 cf. daurmanasya in sūtra 1.31.
201 cf. aṅgamejayatva in sūtra 1.31.
202 The three words that follow appear to be corrupt. Ritter notes that they are difficult to read in the MS. For the simile of the chariot cf. India (Sachau, I, 49): ‘The soul is in matter like the rider on a carriage
…’.
203 The meaning is not clear.
204 cf. pratiṢdha in sūtra 1.32 (see next footnote).
205 This is certainly meant to render sūtra 1.32, though the Sanskrit text here does not refer in any way to God: tat-pratiṢedhārtham eka-tattvābhyāsaḥ ‘Their removal is effected by repeated practice aimed at a single entity’. corresponds to eka-tattva here. For this answer cf. India (quoted in R, p. 176, n. I.).
206 For this answer cf. India (quoted by R, p. 176, n. 3).
207 Here corresponds to maitri in sūtra 1.33: maitri-karuṇā-muditopekṢānāṃ sukha-duḥkha-puṇyāpuṇya-viṢayānāṃ bhāvanātaś citta-prasādanam ‘By cultivation of affection for the pleasant, compassion for the unpleasant, delight at good, indifference to evil, calm of the mind is attained’.
corresponds to V ad loc.: sarva-prāṇiṢu;
to V ad loc.: sukha-saṃbhogāpanneṢu.
208 Here corresponds to karuṇa in sūtra 1.33;
duḥkhiteṢu in V ad loc.
209 corresponds to muditā in sūtra 1.33;
to puṇyātmakeṢu in V ad loc.
210 Here corresponds to upekṢā in sūtra 1.33;
to apuṇyātmakeṢu in V ad loc.
211 This possibly corresponds to citta-prasādam in sūtra 1.33.
212
213
214 If Ritter's suggestion is correct, a should probably be added:
215 Al-Bīrūnī seems to have run the two sūtras 1.33 and 1.34 together. The word corresponds to prāṇa in sūtra 1.34: pracchardana-vidharaṇābhyāṃ vā prāṇasya ‘Or (this isttained) by breathing out and holding of breath’. Here
corresponds to vidhāraṇa; and
to pracchardana.
216 For this answer cf. India (quoted by R, p. 176, n. 3).
217 This corresponds to sūtra 1.40: paramāṇu-parama-mahattvạnto 'sya vaśīkāraḥ ‘His control extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude’. For cf. vaśikāra. For
cf. paramāṇu here and V ad loc. For
cf. Maṇiprabhā ad loc. There seems to be no reference to sūtras 1.35ndash;9.
218 For the present sentence and the following one cf. sūtra 1.41: kṢīṇa-vṛtter abhijātasyeva maṇer grahītṛ-grahaṇa-grạhyeṢu tatstha-tad-añjanata samāpattiḥ ‘Samạpatti is the presence in all (small and large) and the encompassing of all (large and small) on the part of the mind which has abandoned the functions of knower, knowing, and known, as a good gem shines on all and bears the image of all’.
219 The word corresponds to abhijāto maṇiḥ in the sūtra and to sphaṭika in V ad loc. (where the whole illustration is used in a somewhat different way).
220 The Arabic may also mean: ‘that which he comprehends’. Cf. R, 170 (l. 19), 177 (l. 2).
221 The word may correspond to samāpatti ‘fusion’ in sūtra 1.41.
222 ‘Known’ is here in the plural in Arabic.
223 The terms and
as well as the terms
and
may correspond to grahṇa, grāhyūṇi, and grahītṛ (sūtra 1.41). The formula affirming the identity in one subject of the second triad of Arabic terms is often used by the Aristotelian philosophers, being applied to God.
224 cf. V on sūtra 1.46: sa caturdhopasaṅkhyätaḥ, samādhir iti ‘Thus concentration has been described according to its four subdivisions’. This refers to the kinds of concentration discussed in sūtras l.42ndash;4. For what follows cf. India, Hyd., 53 (quoted by R, 176, n. 3) = Sachau, I, 69ndash;70: ‘The Hindus say: “If a man has the faculty to perform these things, he can dispense with them, and will reach the goal by degrees, passing through several stages. (1) The knowledge of things as to their names and qualities and distinctions, which, however, does not yet afford the knowledge of definitions. (2) Such a knowledge of things as proceeds as far as the definitions by which particulars are classed under the category of universals, but regarding which a man must still practise distinction. (3) This distinction (viveka) disappears, and man comprehends things at once as a whole, but within time. (4) This kind of knowledge is raised above time, and he who has it can dispense with names and epithets, which are only instruments of human imperfection. In this stage the intellectus and the intelligens unite with the intellectum, so as to be one and the same thing”. This is what Patañjali says about the knowledge which liberates the soul’. Also cf. India, Hyd., 51ndash;2 (= Sachau, I, 68).
225 The reading of seems to be doubtful.
226 In the Arabic: ‘name’ in the singular.
227 ‘attribute’ in the singular.
228 Lit. ‘give’.
229 This has a slight correspondence to sūtra 1.42: tatra śabdārtha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ saṅkīrṇā savitarkā samāpattiḥ ‘Of these (i.e. within the category of samapatti)savitarka (the determinate). samdpatti is associated with concepts arising from the cognition of the meanings of words’ (tatra is absent in some versions). For cf. śabda in the sūtra. However, al-Bīrūnī seems to introduce here conceptions deriving from the epistemology of the Aristotelians. This also seems to be the case in what follows.
230 cf. sūtra 1.49: śrutānumāna-prajñādbhyaṃ sāmānya-viṢayā viśeṢārthatvāt. Woods's translation here is apparently based on the probably incorrect reading anya (cf. Deussen, op. cit., 518) instead of sāmānya ‘universal’ ‘has an object other than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences inasmuch as its intended-object is a particular’ (Woods, 94). Both ‘details’ and
‘particulars’ correspond semantically to viśeṢārtha here, whereas
‘universals’ corresponds to sāmānya. Al-Bīrūnī may have misconstrued the sūtra or the commentary on it.
231 This differs from the second kind in Patañjali's sūtra 1.43: smṛti-pariśuddhau svarūpaśūnyevārthamātra-nirbhāsā nirvitarkā ‘The nirvitarkā (non-determinate samāpatti) appears to consist of the object alone, as if it had relinquished its own nature, when memory is purified (i.e. done away with; or: ‘when mindfulness is perfected’)’.
232 For ‘when he apprehends things unified’ cf. V on sūtra 1.43: eka-buddhy-upakramaḥ ‘the formation of a single mental-act’ (Woods, 82).
233 Ritter indicates a lacuna here.
234 cf. sūtra 1.44: etayaiva savicārā nirvicārī ca sūkṢma-viṢayā vyākhyātā, ‘By this has been explained the savicārā and the nirvicārā samāpatti which has subtile objects’. (This translation is corroborated by V on sūtra 1.46. An alternative translation might be: ‘By this has been explained the savicārā samdpatti; whereas the nirvicārā samāpatti may be explained as having subtile objects’.) Cf. also sūtra 1.45: sūkṢma-viṢayatvaṃ cāliṅga-paryavasānam ‘These subtile objects include the uncharacterized’.
235 sometimes serves as a term designating ‘atom’; cf. p. 312, n. 80. This, however, is not the case in Kalām terminology.
236 cf. Bhoja on sūtra 1.49: asyāin hi prajñāyāṃ sūkṢma-vyavahita-viprakṛṢṭnām api viśeṢaḥ sphuṭenaiva rūpeṇa bhāsate ‘When this (yogic) knowledge (has been attained), then (any) particular, even if it be subtile, hidden, or distant, becomes distinctly manifest’.
237 may alternatively be rendered by ‘one who gives information’.
238 Lit. ‘cured’.
239 For cf. śruta, sūtra 1.49. The translation proposed in the Arabic text may require here the emendation of the second
in R, 177 (l. 7) into
This statement appears to refer to a discussion similar to that of V on sutra 1.49. Here
‘one who receives information’ may refer to āgama of V on sūtra 1.49, and
‘is hidden’ may refer to vyavahita ‘placed apart, hidden’.
240 For cf. śabda in V on sūtra 1.49.
241 The Arabic word is often used as a designation of persons venerated on religious grounds. Thus it is applied to Muliammad's friend and father-in-law, Abū Bakr, who was the first Caliph. The description of the last state by the word ‘truthful’ corresponds to that of sūtra 1.48: ṛtaṃbharā tatra prajñā In this (calm) the insight is truth-bearing ‘(Woods, 94). Cf. India, Hyd., 57 (1. 12):
‘though his degree be lower than that of the saints’ (Sachau, I, 76). Sūtras 1.46, 47, 50, 51 are not reflected in the Arabic text.
242 Lit. ‘fixed in one place‘. For here cf. R, 183 (1. 21), corresponding to sūtra 3.2.
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