¹ Departmental Ditties and Other Verses, Lahore, 1886.Google Scholar

² L/p & S/20: B311 Military Report on the Country Between the Kabul and Kurram Rivers 1908 p. 136/7. For reasons of space citations of documents in the India Office (IO) and Foreign Office (FO) archives have been given in a condensed from but the author will be happy to provide full details on request. The following abbreviations have been used: Adm. = Admiralty, C. in C. =Commander in Chief East Indies Squadron, D.G. = Director General of Persion Gulf Telegraphsm, G.I = Government of India, N.W.F.P. = North-West Frontier Province, P.R. = British Polotical Resident in the Persian Gulf, S.N.O. = British Senior Frontier Memoranda, V. = Viceroy. Transcripts of unpublished Crown Copyright material appear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. I would like to thank Mrs p. Tuson of the IOLR for her help in locating some files and all the members of the staff there for the traditional courtesy and efficiency which they showed to me. I am also very gratefule to south-eastern Persia have been transliterted, in other cases the standard English from, e.g. Muscat, Tehran, Kabul has been adopted.

³ FO 60: 603 IO to FO 3rd March 1898. The rifles cost 300 rupes each. Afridi tribesmen had used similar weapons against a British expeditionary force that year. T.F.M. December 1897. Technical Specifications of most of the rifles mentioned in this article can be found in Treatise on Military Small Arms and Ammunition, London, HMSO 1888.Google Scholar

⁴ For details of such losses see contemporary issues of the T.F.M. and Administration Reports of the N.W.F.P.

⁵ L/P & S/18: C18 Report on the Trade in Arms with the Persian Gulf June 1898.

⁶ FO 60: 603 Memorandum on the Arms Trade in Persia January 1898.

⁷ Lorimer, J. G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf …, Calcutta, 1915 1/2, 2559.Google Scholar

⁸ The irony of handing over confiscated cargoes to those most active in the illicit trade wasnot lost on local British officials. The text of the 1897 agreement is in L/P & S/18: B175.

⁹ The three agreements were between the Sultan and the USA, 21 March 1833, France, 17 November 1844 and Holland, 27 August 1877. The texts are in Aitchison, C. U., A Collection oftreaties, engagements …, Delhi, 1933 xi.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Text of the agreement is in L/P & S/18: B175.

¹¹ On the origins and complexities of the ‘French Flag issue ’ seeBusch, B. C., Britain andthe Persian Gulf 1894–1914, Berkeley, 1967, chapter VI. The arms trade is discussed in chapter IX of that book.Google Scholar

¹² For a summary of those powers see L/P & S/18: B175.

¹³ Lorimer, 1/2, 2574 and Davies, C. Collin, The problem of the North West Frontier 1890–1908, cambridge,1932, ch. vii.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Aitchison, xi.

¹⁵ See, for example, Khyber Diary 13 January 1906 and Peshawar Diary 31 January 1906. In December 1905 an official of the Khyber Agency purchased a Martini Henry rifle at Kurram, it was later tested at the Directorate General of Indian Ordnance where it was found to be ‘aserviceable weapon’ though not very accurate at ranges of over 500 yards L/p & S/10: 101.

¹⁶ L/P & S/10: 101 Grant Duff to FO, 31 December 1905.

¹⁷ L/P & S/10: 101 Belgian Director of Customs to Political Agent 18 February 1906.

¹⁸ Somerville's report is in L/P & S/10: 101.

¹⁹ L/P & S/10: 101 New to D. G., Karachi, 21 December 1905.

²⁰ The document, known rather grandiosely as the Karwan Arms Agreement, is in L/P & S/18: B175.

²¹ L/P & S/10: 101 McConaghey to Benn, 15 June 1906.

²² L/P & S/10: 101 McConaghey to Benn, 15 June 1906. Relatively small amounts of ammunition were imported compared with the number of weapons because it was the local practice to recover cartridge cases and to re-fill them, often seven or eight times, see N.W.F.P. Diary no. 25 1912.

²³ L/P & S/10: 101 Kandahar Diary, 31 July 1906.

²⁴ L/P & S/10: 101 Agent to the Governor General of the N.W.F.P. to G.I., 30 July 1906.

²⁵ As footnote 21.

²⁶ L/P & S/10: 101, Ogilvie to Consul, Kerman, 1 August 1906.

²⁷ L/P & S/10: 101, Benn to Consul, Kerman, 8 February 1907. This file contains reports from other local British officials about the possible routes used by the arms smugglers.

²⁸ Webb Ware's reports on these incidents are in L/P & S/10: 116.

²⁹ L/P & S/10: 101, McMahon to G.I., 2 September 1907. Similar rifles were on sale at Ghazni and in the Khyber during the summer of 1907, T.P.M., September 1907.

³⁰ L/P & S/10: 101, McMahon to G.I., 26 July 1907.

³¹ L/P & S/10: 101, Kennion to G.I., 19 September 1907. This despatch too has many details on the routes used.

³² L/P & S/10: 101, G.I. to McMahon, 28 August 1907. The Anglo-Russian Treaty was not published until three days later.

³³ L/PWD/ 7/152: 623, New to D.G., Karachi, 17 August 1907.

³⁴ In order to allay local suspicions about the patrols, New announced that they were to permit repairs on the line to be made with greater speed. In the first five months of operations the chief line guard travelled over 2,000 miles on camel patrol. New to D.G., Karachi, 1 June 1908, L/PWD/7/152: 623.

³⁵ L/PWD/7/152: 623, New to D.G., Karachi, 1 June 1908. New's original proposal of August 1907 had included the recommendation that the Political Agent should recruit a number of fishermen in the harbour at Muscat to provide information about the movements of vessels used by the smugglers.

³⁶ L/P & S/10: 116, Commander HMS Proserpine to C. in C., 20 April 1908.

³⁷ L/PWD/7/152: 623 New to D.G., Karachi, 13 June 1908.

³⁸ Cox had recommended the despatch of troops to Persia several times during the past 18 months. For his detailed proposal see L/P & S/10: 102, Cox to G.I., 21 November 1908.

³⁹ L/P & S/10: 102, Chief of Staff to Officer Commanding Quetta Division, 28 March 1908.

⁴⁰ L/P & S/10: 102, Kennion to G.I., 13 April 1908.

⁴¹ L/P & S/10: 113, McMahon to G.I., 24 October 1908,

⁴² L/P & S/10: 101, S.N.O. to C. in C, 10 June 1908. There had been several earlier complaints from naval officers about the ease with which smugglers could elude their patrols.

⁴³ L/P & S/10: 110, British India Steam Navigation Company to I.O., 28 February 1908. The ban was entirely ineffective for the Afghans either used the alternative service provided by the Bombay Persian Steam Navigation Company, or they took B.I.S.N. vessels to other ports in the Gulf and transferred there to local craft for Muscat.

⁴⁴ The final report, drawn up by the Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, is the source of much of the information in the next two pages of this article. There is a copy of the report in L/P & S/10: 102.

⁴⁵ Over 40 types of modern weapon were available in Muscat and one agent reported t h a t as many as 250,000 rifles were in store there.

⁴⁶ A favourite gathering place was at Zāvarāt, some 30 miles north west of Jāask. An advanced scouting parting usually rode four days ahead of t h e main caravan and t h e latter was sometimes guarded by up to 800 armed men.

⁴⁷ Secret agents joined several returning caravans in t h e 1908–9 season and i t was not infrequent for guns to be on sale in Kabul some nine weeks after they were landed on t h e Makran coast. The t o t a l cost of t h a t overland transport was p u t a t approximately 20 rupees per rifle.

⁴⁸ L/P & S/10: 158, V. to S.S.I., 2 February 1908. A discussion of t h e Brussels Conference l and the later negotiations with France lies outside the scope of this article. The relevant papers can be found in L/P & S/10: 158, 159 and 235 to 240. The G.I. considered several concessions to the French Government if it would agree to rescind freedom to trade in arms at Muscat. These Included the possibility of ceding certain villages and land near Pondicherry, but Lord Morley viewed ‘the handing over of British subjects to France with extreme distaste’ (L/P & S/10: 236). Paris also made various suggestions concerning gestures that might persuade it to terminate f the operations of the two French arms firms in Muscat—one of which was the cession to France of the British colony of Gambia. See Buseh, op. cit., 280–88.

⁴⁹ L/P & S/10: 216, V. to S.S.I., 2 September 1909. The plan was based on earlier suggestions made by the C. in C. (C. in C. to Adm., 7 May 1909, L/P & S/10: 113).

⁵⁰ L/P & S/10: 113, adm. to 10, 2 December 1909.

⁵¹ The contemporary L/P & S/10 series files contain many papers on this dispute over payment. By October 1911 the blockade had cost over £327,000, G.I. Finance Department report, 12 October 1911 in L/P & S/10: 13. Another source of financial dispute arose when the Admiralty insisted that prize money should be paid for all the arms and ammunition seized. The G.I. conceded the point with great reluctance and then insisted that the valuation should be n an ‘unserviceable and scrap-only’ basis of approximately 3 rupees per rifle. The Admiralty retorted that if the weapons were of such poor quality it failed to see why so many efforts were being made to eliminate the trade.

⁵² L/P & S/10: 113, C. in C. to G.I., 19 November 1909. It is likely that Cox had again been the source of this suggestion, see Hirtsel (IO) to Ritchie (FO) 13 November 1909, L/P & S/10: 113.

⁵³ For an interesting firsthand account of the composition and activities of the force, see Kennion, H. E., ‘Mountain artillery on the Mekran coast in 1910’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution of India, XL, 1911, 385–92.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ L/P & S/10: 113, Chief Commissioner of N.W.F.P. Police to G.I., 7 November 1909.

⁵⁵ R/15/6/510 Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Residency 1910. For a full list of arms captures to May 1910 see L/P & S/18: B175.

⁵⁶ FO 367: 264, Barclay to FO, 4 November 1909.

⁵⁷ FO 371: 952, Barclay to FO, 29 January 1910.

⁵⁸ L/P & S/10: 113, V. to S.S.I., 1 February 1910.

⁵⁹ L/P & S/10: 113, V. to S.S.I., 7 June 1910.

⁶⁰ L/P & S/10: 113, G.I. to C. in C, 24 November 1910.

⁶¹ L/PWD/7/152: 623 New to P.R., 8 January 1911. The disposal of arms which had been seized was a continuing source of dispute. In the early actions against the smugglers the weapons and ammunition were usually dumped overboard at the point of capture, but it was later discovered local divers were being employed to recover them. Other weapons were returned to the custody of the Sultan in Muscat, but they often found their way back onto the market. Dumping in deep water was the usual method of disposal from 1910.

⁶² T.F.M., February 1911 and FO 367: 264, C. in C. to G.I., 25 February 1911.

⁶³ L/P & S/10: 115, G.I. to PR., 8 April 1911.

⁶⁴ FO 367: 264, FO to Barclay, 22 March 1911.

⁶⁵ The Honourable Arnold Keppel, who was to accompany the expedition to Persia, had proposed to send despatches to The Times via the Persian Gulf Telegraph line. The Government of India was quick to state that those facilities should not be afforded to him as ‘it was undesirable that Press correspondents should accompany the Mekran force’, G.I. to D.G., Karachi, 18 April 1911 L/P & S/10: 115. Keppel did supply reports to The Times and these were later amplified in a book, Gun running and the North-West Frontier, London, 1911. For another first hand account, see Austin, H. H, Gun running in the Gulf, London 1926.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ The assembling of the force in Bombay was reported by The Times on March 29, 1911.

⁶⁷ FO 367: 264, FO minute no. 12461. On that same day the British Minister in St. Petersburg was instructed to inform the Russian Government that troops were being sent for possible use on Persian territory. FO to Buchanan, 4 April 1911, FO 367: 264.

⁶⁸ L/P & S/10: 115, Grey to Mirza Mehdi Khan, 13 April 1911.

⁶⁹ L/P & S/10: 115 V. to S.S.I. Telegraphic 20 and 24 April 1911. Messages from the force marching inland were sent to the coast by heliograph, from there wireless communication was possible.

⁷⁰ FO 367: 265 Barclay to FO, 28 April 1911.

⁷¹ L/P & S/10: 115, Papers prepared for parliamentary question to Grey.

⁷² L/P & S/10: 115, S.S.I, to V., 28 April 1911.

⁷³ L/PWD/7/1522: 623, New to P.R. 1 January 1910. Mīr Barkat's success as a smuggler was believed to have been assisted by his marriage to the daughter of the head of the Persian Customs Service at Jāsk. Local British officials had earlier suggested that Mīr Barkat should be paid a small pension and sent in exile to the Andaman islands.

⁷⁴ See L/P & S/18: B175 p. 35 and L/P & S/18: B196 p. 7.

⁷⁵ L/PWD/7/152: 623, New to P.R., 8 January 1911.

⁷⁶ L/P & S/10: 113, Cox to G.I. 27 September 1910.

⁷⁷ L/P & S/10: 115, V. to S.S.I., 1 May 1911 and Report on the Makran Field Force by S. G. Craufurd R/15/5/391.

⁷⁸ L/P & S/10: 115, V. to S.S.I., 1 May 1911.

⁷⁹ L/P & S/10: 115, V. to S.S.I., 9 May 1911.

⁸⁰ L/P & S/10: 115, S.S.I, to V., 2 June 1911. The Admiralty was proud of its activity against the gun runners and believed the events were worthy of public recognition in the form of a Blue Book. (FO 367: 265 Adm. to F.O. 23 August 1911). The Foreign Office was horrified by the proposal and it was quickly abandoned. There had been an unfortunate incident at Kunarak on 6 March when two innocent Baluch tribesmen were mistaken for Afghan smugglers and were killed by British troops.

⁸¹ The Khyber Agency reported that the price of a Martini Metford rifle rose from 250 to 350 rupees in 1911 because the trade from the Gulf was practically at a halt. Statement of the fighting strengths and armaments of the independent tribes of the North West Frontier 1 April 1912 L/P & S/12: 2176. In the Sarhad region the price of ammunition doubled between 1910 and 1911. T.F.M. May 1911 and November 1911.

⁸² The papers concerning the warehouse scheme are in L/P & S/10: 235 to 240. The official announcement in Muscat stated that the warehouse was being opened because the conditions under which arms and ammunition were currently being kept were highly dangerous and that all imports after 1 September 1912 would have to be consigned to the official government store. The local merchants protested that the new godown was unlikely to be less dangerous than their premises as it consisted of the ground floor of a house inhabited by a large family. L/P & S/10: 235.

⁸³ The stocks held by the two French arms dealers in Muscat were, after many negotiations, bought in their entirety by the British Government. Some of the weapons were later distributed to ‘friendly’ local tribal leaders including Shaykh Khaz'al of Muhammerah. L/P & S/10: 240.

⁸⁴ L/P & S/10: 114, C. in C. to G.I., 18 March and 12 May 1912. The degree of success achieved by the blockade can be seen in the fact that in January 1913 nakhudas on the Makrān coast were demanding 30 rupees per rifle from the Afghans for the risks which they now ran in attempting to bring arms across from Muscat. In 1908 the price had been approximately 1 rupee per rifle. R/15/5/391.

⁸⁵ V/10/370, Administration Report on the North-West Frontier Province 1912/13, p. 2. See also Statement of fighting strengths and armaments of the independent tribes of the North- West Frontier 1st April 1913 L/P & S/12: 2176. Another ironic measure of success was that the number of rifle thefts from army depots in India began to increase sharply. R/15/5/391.