Many thanks to Alfred Marcus, Cathie Jo Martin, Dennis Quinn, Gordon Silverstein, and Duane Windsor for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Robert Westbrook and Scott Baggett provided invaluable assistance with the PLS modeling, Anson Asoka with data analysis, and Geoffrey Carson with research assistance. I am also appreciative of the support from the Statistical Computing Lab at Rice University. Any remaining errors are solely mine.

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