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Corporate Power Beyond the Political Arena: The case of the ‘Big Three’ and CAFE Standards

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 April 2017

Abstract

This article outlines the ways in which corporations are powerful and can realize their interests in society and policy, through a case study of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the U.S. It diverges from the main bodies of literature on corporate power—which focus more on corporate actions in the formal policy process (such as lobbying or campaign contributions) or on the structural dependence of the state on capital—by showing how corporate-led material and ideational societal change was key to the realization of corporate interests in formal policy, as corporate-led societal change reshaped the baseline from which policy was made. Additionally, through the case study, this article offers a new conceptual language for corporate power, and demonstrates how to approach and test power analysis with a sensitivity to both the temporal element of power and an understanding that power can operate beyond the formal political arena. This original case study, then, is significant in that it should encourage political economy scholars to adopt a broader societal focus, to work with a more comprehensive understanding of power, and to utilize longer study timeframes when seeking to assess corporate power.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2017 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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