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High technology and economic statecraft: the emergence of techno-economic statecraft in South Korea
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 February 2024
Abstract
This study identifies the core of Korea’s economic statecraft as (1) diversification of the supply chain of high-tech industries to proactively mitigate vulnerability to economic coercion, (2) the pursuit of technological sovereignty to increase self-sufficiency in advanced technologies, (3) governance reforms to strengthen supply chain resilience, and (4) industrial policies to enhance the competitiveness of advanced industries. The four strategies mentioned above all have in common that they are predicated on the strategic utilization of high technology. Based on these traits, I define Korea’s new economic security strategy as techno-economic statecraft. Korea’s techno-economic statecraft has two features. First, Korea utilizes high technology as a nexus between economy and security. Second, Korea uses high technology as a nexus to link domestic and foreign policies.
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- © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Vinod K. Aggarwal
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