Does the cross-border strategic behavior of large firms reflect national differences? There is uncertainty about the ways in which expanding markets will influence the activities of large firms and national governments. Some theorists expect market forces to produce increasing pressure for uniform patterns of behavior, while others have argued that the national political economy is more resilient, and that corporate strategies remain identifiably national. Thus far the question, theoretically and empirically, has been posed in terms of economic behavior and consequences. We analyze the persistence of national practices in the political activities of large corporations using data on the Fortune 1000 industrial and service companies for 1988. To increase the sample of affiliates of foreign firms, we include firms in the Forbes ranking of largest U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. This source includes financial and service corporations as well as those in manufacturing industries. Overall, the findings suggest that, contrary to the national capitalism argument, firms adapt to the host political economy.

Formal regulatory parity can entail counterintuitive effects. In a series of state statutes, municipal governments have been directed to issue cable TV franchises to new competitors only after (a) formal hearings considering the ‘public interest’ in competition; and (b) imposing terms and conditions which are at least as burdensome as those contained in the incumbent's franchise. While billed as ‘level playing field’ laws, economic theory, an important case study in Connecticut, and a probit analysis of Ameritech's cable franchise acquisition strategy suggest that these statutes actually tilt the field against entrants.

The article discusses the political preferences of diversified business groups—or economic groups (EGs)—based on a case study of business political behavior in Colombia. EGs are groups of firms held together through ‘interlocking directorates, holding companies, crossfinancing, and often continued family ownership’, which dominate significant portions of the Latin American economies. The Colombian EGs supported president Ernesto Samper (1994–1998) amidst accusations that his campaign had been funded by drug traffickers, despite the prospect of U.S. sanctions and economic recession. The article suggests that a crucial factor shaping EG political preferences was their relationship of mutual dependence with the Colombian state, which is based on contracts, credit, and regulation. In contrast to expectations that privatization policies associated with the 1990s' economic reforms would weaken the business-state relationship, this case shows that these ties have been strengthened, making EGs stand out as winners of the reform process.

Between 1982 and 1994 all fifty states enacted new car warranty legislation commonly known as ‘lemon laws’. These statutes provide that a consumer who buys a lemon (defined as ‘a chronically defective new car that cannot be repaired with a reasonable effort’) is entitled to receive a replacement car or full refund from the car's manufacturer. We ask why these laws were enacted, exploring both economic and political rationales. The analysis demonstrates that reasonable economic arguments can be advanced for the legislation, both pro and con, and concludes that the legislation resulted most directly from an alliance of consumer advocates and automobile dealers at the expense of manufacturers. This case study illustrates the interplay of legal, political, and economic factors that shape consumer legislation generally.