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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2012
Assuming that large concerns usually do pursue a common external “political” policy, the author examines the opportunities and eventual failure of such a policy in the first phase of the Hitler regime. His distinction between an independent and dependent “political” policy by business under a dictatorship may also be relevant for less developed countries with dictatorial governments.
1 The bulk of the captured German documents has been returned to Germany and is now located in the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. Microfilms of most of these documents, with the important exception of the files of the Reichskanzlei, are available in the National Archives, Washington, D. C. Several footnotes below refer to these films by folder, roll, and microcopy numbers and are further indicated by the suffix (NA).
2 Reichswirtschaftsministerium Files, box 391, folder 558a (Berlin Document Center).
3 Bracher, Karl D., Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Villingen, 1960), p. 429.Google Scholar
4 Schulthess Europäischer Geschichtskalender von 1931 (München, 1932), pp. 250–61.
5 Keppler testimony in the Flick trial, Trial of War Criminals before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals (15 vols., Washington, 1951–1952), vol. XLI, p. 623.Google Scholar
6 Document EC440, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (10 vols., Washington, 1946), suppl. A, pp. 1194–96Google Scholar.
7 Two business oriented newspapers, Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung and Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung recorded in detail this shift toward a political interpretation of the depression.
8 Documents presented in the Flick trial, Prosecution Volume VI, pp. 391–93 (Indiana University Law School Library).
9 NI-8367, T-301 (NA).
10 Records of the National Socialist German Labor Party, EAPa/14, roll 1, T-81 (NA).
11 NI-211 and 212, T-301 (NA).
12 See the report of von Schröder in NI-7990, T-301 (NA).
13 Ibid., p. 10 of the written report.
14 Affidavit of Schacht in NI-406, T-301 (NA).
15 D-203 and 204, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VI, pp. 1080–85.
16 NI-3243, T-301 (NA). The share of the Nazis exceeded their requirements by 600,000 marks but none of this was returned to the donors. Cf. Schacht, Hjalmar, 76 Jahre meines Lebens (Bad Wörishofen, 1953), p. 380.Google Scholar
17 Bracher, Karl D., Sauer, Wolfgang, and Schulz, Gerhard, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Köln, 1960), pp. 152 ff.Google Scholar
18 NI-946 and NI-754, T-301 (NA).
19 EC-371 (NA).
20 NIK-11727 and the memorandum of Thiele, Flottenindendant, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (42 vols., Nürnberg, 1947–1949), vol. XXXV, pp. 581 ff.Google Scholar
21 Secret memorandum of General Thomas, “Rüstung und Wirtschaft,” Wi/IF 5.383, roll 86, T-77 (NA).
22 NI-393 and NI-1017, T-301 (NA).
23 NI-903, T-301 (NA).
24 Wi/IF 5.1276, roll 266, T-77 (NA).
25 Reichskanzlei Files, 43 II/542 (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz).
26 NI-472 and NI-1568, T-301 (NA).
27 Reichswirtschaftsministerium Files, box 391, folder 564 (Berlin Document Center).
28 Billich, Carl, “Vier Jahre nationalsozialistischer Kartellpolitik,” Deutscher Volkswirt (September 24, 1937).Google Scholar
29 “Goerdelers Aufgaben,” Berliner Tageblatt (November 11, 1934).
30 Reichswirtschaftsministerium Files, box 391, folders 558 and 558a (Berlin Document Center).
31 For the details of this policy, its conflict with the interests and ideology of small business as well as of the Labor Front, and the dovetailing of economic, military, and political policies of the state with this policy of business see Schweitzer, Arthur, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, Ind., 1964).Google Scholar
32 Wi/IF 5.203, roll 35, T-77 (NA).
33 Wi/IF 5.641, roll 151, T-77 (NA).
34 Wi/IF 5.1504, roll 289, T-77 (NA)
35 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, p. 883.
36 Ibid., p. 871.
37 For particulars see Schweitzer, Arthur, “Foreign Exchange Crisis of 1936,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatsivissenschaft, vol. 118 (April, 1962), pp. 243–77.Google Scholar
38 NI-6766, T-301 (NA).
39 NI-881, T-301 (NA).
40 NI-9922, T-301 (NA).
41 NI-6767, T-301 (NA).
42 NI-7669, T-301 (NA).
43 Flick Kommanditgesellschaft, folder 129, roll 60, T-83 (NA).
44 NI-7767, T-301 (NA).
45 Flick Kommanditgesellschaft, folder 128, roll 59, T-83 (NA).
46 Ibid. and Wi/IF 5.1171, roll 228, T-77 (NA).
47 NI-9904, T-301 (Affidavit of Max Kügler) (NA).
48 NI-7241, T-301 (NA).
49 NI-7472, T-301 (NA).
50 NI-7241, T-301 (NA).
51 NI-8326, T-301 (NA).
52 Wi/IF 5.1171, roll 228, T-77 (NA).
53 Wi/IF 5.953, roll 198, T-77 (NA).
54 Cf. Schweitzer, Arthur, “Der ursprüngliche Vierjahresplan,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, vol. 168 (February, 1957), pp. 348–96.Google Scholar
55 On the concept of “historical significance” see Weber, Max, Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), pp. 164 ff.Google Scholar
56 For the role of these associations see my paper on “Business Power in the Nazi Regime,” Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, vol. XX (December, 1960), pp. 414–42.
57 It was because of this misplaced hope that some importers and exporters limited their opposition to the red tape of exchange control, whereas the very few opponents of the regime, such as Director Hermann Bücher of Allgemeine Elktrizitätswerke AG, rejected not only the policy of the businessmen but also all its economic, political, and military concomitancies.
58 Cf. Schweitzer, Arthur, “Der organisierte Kapitalismus,” Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik (Tuebingen, 1962).Google Scholar
59 It is possible that Krauch was not fully aware of the immensity of his task when he entered the Göring office in the summer of 1936, since his appointment was a result of a recommendation by Albert Vögler (N1–6767, T-301). A year later, however, this line of policy had been fully adopted which led to Krauch's appointment as plenipotentiary of the whole chemical sector.
