¹ By a Diplomatist [Einstein, Lewis], American Foreign Policy (Boston and New York, 1909), pp. 146–147, 155–156Google Scholar; Rippy, J. Fred, The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York, 1940), p. 135Google Scholar; Campbell, Charles S. Jr., Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven, 1951)Google Scholar, Chap. I (“The Bogey of the Surplus”). As early as the 1880's, prominent Americans thought Latin America might serve as a market for industrial surpluses of the United States. See Bastert, Russell H., “James G. Blaine and the Origins of the First International American Conference” (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1952), Chap. 8.Google Scholar

² Gordon, Leland J., American Relations with Turkey, 1830–1930: An Economic Interpretation (Philadelphia, 1932), pp. 221–251Google Scholar; Sousa, Nasim, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: Its History, Origins, and Nature (Baltimore, 1933), Chap. 7.Google Scholar

³ Askew, William C. and Rippy, J. Fred, “The United States and Europe's Strife, 1908–1913,” Journal of Politics, Vol. IV (Feb., 1942), pp. 68–69, 73–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morison, Samuel E., The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783–1860 (Boston and New York, 1921), pp. 181, 277, 291–293Google Scholar; Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, Chaps. 3 and 4; Sousa, The Capitulatory Régime, pp. 252–253; Pepper, Charles M., Report on Trade Conditions in Asiatic Turkey (Washington, 1907)Google Scholar, passim, especially p. 28. Pepper was a special agent of the Department of Commerce and Labor.

⁴ [Philander C. Knox], Memorandum on the State Department [March, 1909], Philander C. Knox MSS (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress), Vol. VI, p. 949. See also copy of an address given in Baltimore by Huntington Wilson on Dollar Diplomacy, May 4, 1911, Knox MSS, Vol. XIV, pp. 2, 313–2, 315, and Pringle, Henry, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, A Biography (2 vols.; New York and Toronto, 1939), Vol. II, pp. 678–699Google Scholar, passim. The dual nature of Dollar Diplomacy is stressed in Pratt, Julius W., America's Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire (New York, 1950), pp. 131–132.Google Scholar See also Rippy, Caribbean Danger Zone, pp. 134–136.

⁵ Ramsaur, Ernest E. Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, 1957), pp. 140–143Google Scholar; Earle, Edward Mead, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (New York, 1923)Google Scholar, passim, especially pp. 3–8, Chaps. 2 and 9.

⁶ Milo A. Jewett (Consul at Trebizond, Turkey) to the Assistant Secretary of State, April 10, 1909; Jewett (on leave in Washington) to Assistant Secretary of State, June 23, 1909, both Department of State Archives (National Archives, Washington, D. C), file 5012/16–18 and /19–20; Lewis Einstein (Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople), to Knox, No. 1045, confidential, July 15, 1909, Department of State Archives, file 20784/–; Einstein to Knox, No. 1065, very confidential, July 29, 1909, file 5012/21. Hereafter, all citations to the Department of State Archives will be designated “DS” followed by the file number. All Department of State records cited are in Record Group 59. See also Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, pp. 252–256, 264; Earle, The Bagdad Railway, pp. 13, 19.

⁷ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901 (Washington, 1902), pp. 514–515; Wescott, Allan, “Colby Mitchell Chester,” in Johnson, Allenet al. (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols.; New York, 1944–1958), Vol. XXI, p. 171Google Scholar; Griscom, Lloyd C., Diplomatically Speaking (Boston, 1940), pp. 169–173.Google Scholar

⁸ Mayo, Laurence Shaw, “The Chester Concession under Fire,” Asia, Vol. XXIII (July, 1923), p. 521.Google Scholar The elder Chester had retired from the Navy as a Rear Admiral in 1906.

⁹ James M. Laidlaw to Knox, Nov. 24, 1909, DS 5012/31–32. Arthur Chester retired from the Navy in 1905.

¹⁰ The business records of the Chester syndicate are in the possession of Mr. Henry Woodhouse of New York City, but he has not made them available to scholars. (Correspondence of the writer with Mr. Woodhouse between 1952 and 1957 and an interview in 1955.)

¹¹ C. A. Moore (President of Manning, Maxwell, and Moore) to Secretary of State Elihu Root, Oct. 14, 1908; Root to V. H. Metcalf (Secretary of the Navy), Oct. 20, 1908; both DS 16251/–; Robert Bacon to Diplomatic Officers of the United States in Europe, April 8, 1908, DS 2793/I1A.

¹² Lewis Einstein (Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople) to Knox. No. 1045, July 15, 1909, DS 20784/–.

¹³ During the course of protracted negotiations wtih Turkish officials the exact lines to be included in the Chester Project underwent frequent revision. Henry Janes (Chargé in Constantinople) to Knox, No. 126, April 1, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/13. Russia objected to the invasion of her sphere in northern Anatolia by the Sivas-Samsun branch, which the Ottoman government eventually withdrew from the Chester Project. There was extended controversy over the Mediterranean terminal with the syndicate insisting on Suediah, while the Turks held out for Alexandretta or Yourmoutalik on the opposite side of the bay.

¹⁴ Einstein to Knox, No. 1106, Aug. 27, 1909, DS 5012/25–26; Straus to Knox, No. 2, Sept. 23, 1909, DS 5012/29; A. Rustem Bey (Ottoman Chargé in Washington) to Knox, No. 50, Dec. 21, 1909, DS 5012/39.

¹⁵ Lewis Einstein (Chargé at Constantinople) to the Secretary of State No. 1045, July 15, 1909, DS 20784/–; Einstein to Secretary of State, No. 1065, July 29, 1909, DS 5012/21.

¹⁶ Ibid.; Einstein to Knox, No. 1081, Aug. 5, 1909, DS 20784/1; Einstein to Knox, No. 1106, Aug. 27, 1909, DS 5012/25–26.

¹⁷ To his father he wrote: “I hate to think what I will do if I am not backed at home. I have staked my honor on our desire to take this option. …” Chester would have to bury himself “on a lonely island away from mankind” if he was not backed. “I absolutely have to carry this through. There is no turning back.” Arthur Chester to Admiral Colby M. Chester, Aug. 29, 1909, Chester Family Papers through the courtesy of Colby M. Chester, Jr.

¹⁸ Straus to Knox, No. 2, Sept. 23, 1909, DS 5012/29.

¹⁹ Einstein to Knox, No. 1045, July 15, 1909, DS 20784/–; Einstein to Knox, No. 1065, July 29, 1909; Einstein to Knox, No. 1106, Aug. 27, 1909, DS 5012/21 and /25–26.

²⁰ Ibid.; Einstein to Knox, No. 1124, Sept. 16, 1909, DS 5012/28.

²¹ Constantinople had been raised to an embassy in 1906. Prior to this Straus had twice been American Minister to Turkey.

²² Straus to Knox, No. 2, Sept. 23, 1909, DS 5012/39.

²³ Straus to Knox, No. 46, Nov. 25, 1909, DS 5012/34. Knox evaded Straus' proposals for departmental screening by merely stating that the general policy of the department was to afford opportunities equally to reputable American concerns for submitting proposals to foreign governments. Knox to Straus, No. 24, Nov. 1, 1909, Foreign Relations, 1909 (Washington, 1914), pp. 595–596.

²⁴ Einstein to Knox, No. 1081, Aug. 5, 1909, DS 20784/1/; Einstein to Knox, No. 1106, Aug. 27, 1909, DS 5012/25–26; Straus to Knox, No. 2, Sept. 23, 1909, DS 5012/29.

²⁵ Straus to Knox, No. 2, Sept. 23, 1909; Straus to Knox, No. 4, Sept. 24, 1909, DS 5012/29 and /30. For further details on Straus' difficulties with concession-seekers, see Straus to Knox, No. 24, Oct. 27, 1909, DS 20784/5–6.

²⁶ The Chester interests had from the inception of their more modest proposals concentrated efforts on high officials in Washington. C. A. Moore to Elihu Root, Oct. 14, 1908; Root to V. H. Metcalf (Secretary of the Navy), Oct. 20, 1908; Metcalf to Root, Oct. 22, 1908, all DS 16251/– and/1. As late as the summer and fall of 1909 the embassy reported knowing little firsthand of the burgeoning Chester plans. Einstein to Knox, Aug. 27, 1909; Straus to Knox, Sept. 23, 1909, DS 5012/25–26 and /29.

²⁷ The company reported that its authorized capitalization was $100,000, fully subscribed, with 10 per cent paid in. James M. Laidlaw to Knox, enclosed in C. A. Moore to Knox, both Nov. 24, 1909, DS 5012/31–32; Reports for Mr. Carr of the State Department by R. G. Dun and Co. (“The Mercantile Agency”), Dec. 23 and Dec. 28, 1909, DS 5012/39.

²⁸ Laidlaw (president of the Ottoman-American Development Company) to Knox, Nov. 24, 1909, DS 5012/31–32. In addition to Arthur Chester, James W. Colt, a railway construction engineer, was also to represent the company.

²⁹ Moore to Knox, Nov. 24, 1909, enclosed in Laidlaw to Knox, Nov. 24, 1909, DS 5012/31–32. Copies of these letters were sent to Ambassador Straus for his information and to allay his fears that Chester was inadequately backed. Knox to Straus, No. 43, Dec. 8, 1909, same file.

³⁰ Established policy “would not permit the Ambassador to request the granting of the concession to the company which must rely on its own efforts and merits to obtain this.” Knox to Moore, Dec. 8, 1909; Knox to Straus, No. 43, Dec. 8, 1909, both DS 5012/31–32.

³¹ A. Rustem Bey to Knox, No. 50, Dec. 20, 1909, DS 5012/39.

³² Before replying to Rustem Bey, the department had made some effort to ascertain the financial soundness of the company. Asst. Secy, of State (Huntington Wilson) to C. A. Moore, telegram, Dec. 23, 1909; Moore to Wilson, telegram, Dec. 23, 1909; M. S. Clayton to Wilson, Dec. 23, 1909; Report for Mr. Carr of the State Dept. by R. G. Dun and Co. (“The Mercantile Agency”), Dec. 23, 1909, DS 5012/39–41.

³³ Those listed by Knox were W. E. Corey, president of the United States Steel Corporation; Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co.; D. E. Pomeroy, vice president of the Bankers' Trust Company; Thomas Cochran, Jr., vice president of the Astor Trust Company; S. H. Miller, cashier of the Chase National Bank; Paul Morton, formerly Secretary of the Navy and now president of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States; Alvin W. Krech, president of the Equitable Trust Company of New York; F. A. Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank, and formerly Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Gilbert G. Thome, vice president of the National City Bank; James J. Hill, president of the Great Northern Railway; and others.

³⁴ Knox to A. Rustem Bey, No. 27, Dec. 27, 1909, DS 5012/39.

³⁵ Admiral Chester to Huntington Wilson, Jan. 25, 1909, DS 5012/43; Laidlaw to Wilson, March 8, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/1; Henry Janes (Chargé in Constantinople) to Knox, No. 24, telegram, March 26, 1910; Janes to Knox, April 1, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/6 and /13.

³⁶ Straus to Knox, No. 20, telegram 12 noon, March 7, 1910; Admiral Chester to Wilson, March 15, 1910; Janes to Knox, April 1, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/–, /7, and /13.

³⁷ Wilson to American Embassy, Constantinople, March 12, 1910, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/–. Turkey had requested in Jan., 1910, that the United States sell her a warship to counteract an addition to the Greek navy. This could not have been done without special authorization from Congress, which the department was unwilling to seek. Straus to Knox, No. 14, telegram, strictly confidential, Jan. 19, 1910; Wilson to the Secretary of the Navy, confidential, Jan. 20, 1910; Secretary of the Navy to Wilson, confidential, Jan. 20, 1910; Knox to Straus, telegram, Feb. 1, 1910, all DS 23186/1 and /2.

³⁸ Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, pp. 190–199; A. Rustem Bey to Knox, Dec. 21, 1909, DS 5012/39.

³⁹ Earle, The Bagdad Railway, pp. 224–226; Straus to Knox, May 12, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/15.

⁴⁰ Straus to Knox, No. 20, March 7, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/–.

⁴¹ Knox to Rustem Bey, No. 35, March 15, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/4A. “Favorable action on this concession would be considered by this Government as showing a sincere desire on the part of your Government to further these [commercial] relations. As giving to the United States a reality of actual material interest in Ottoman dominions it would also justify a more advanced position on the part of this Government in furthering various measures by the speedy consummation of which the present enlightened Ottoman Government so naturally and properly sets great store.”

⁴² Ibid.; Wilson to American Embassy, Constantinople, March 20, 1910, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/–.

⁴³ See footnote 37.

⁴⁴ Straus to Knox, No. 167, May 12, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/15.

⁴⁵ Laidlaw to Wilson, March 8, 1910; Janes to Knox, March 26, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/1 and /6.

⁴⁶ G. B. Ravndal (Consul-General, Beirut) to the Assistant Secretary of State, No. 316, Nov. 23, 1909, DS 5012/35.

⁴⁷ John R. MacArthur to Wilson, April 6, 1910, telegram; MacArthur to Wilson, April 6, 1910; Wilson to MacArthur, April 7, 1910, telegram; Wilson to American Embassy, Constantinople, April 9, 1910, telegram, all DS 867.602 Ot 81/9, /8, /9, and /10A, respectively. Rustem's reaction to the rumors led MacArthur and Moore (the trouble shooters for the company on this occasion) to think that official circles in Constantinople might be attaching real importance to the German charges. See MacArthur to Chief of the Near Eastern Division (Evan Young), April 9, 1910; Laidlaw to Wilson, April 13, 1910; Wilson to Laidlaw, April 15, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/67 and /12.

⁴⁸ Straus to Knox, May 12, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/15.

⁴⁹ Straus to Knox, May 12, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/15. The published British, German, and French documents reveal little bearing directly on the Chester Project, but they are instructive of the interests and rivalries of the European Powers in the Near East. See Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, Harold V. (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (11 Vols.; London, 1922–1927), Vols. V and IXGoogle Scholar; Lepsius, Johannes, Bartholdy, Albrecht Mendelssohn, and Thimme, Friedrich (eds.), Die grosse Politik der europdischen Kabinette, 1871–1914 (40 Vols.; Berlin, 1922–1927), Vols. XXVII, XXVIII, XXXI, XXXIIIGoogle Scholar; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents diplomatiques français, 1871–1914, 2d series, 1901–1911 (Paris, 1930–1955)Google Scholar, Vols. XII and XIII; 3d Series, 1911–1914 (Paris, 1929–1936), passim.

⁵⁰ Knox to Hill, telegram, June 3, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/18.

⁵¹ Knox to American Embassy, Berlin, June 11, 1910, telegram; Knox to American Embassy, Paris, June 11, 1910, telegram, both DS 867.602 Ot 81/118; Laidlaw to Knox, June 14, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/23. Straus considered Marschall von Bieberstein the ablest ambassador in Constantinople. Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey, 1909–1910”, p. 10, Oscar S. Straus Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 11. See also the appraisal in Earle, The Bagdad Railway, p. 43.

⁵² Hill to Knox, confidential, June 13, 1910, telegram; Bacon (in Paris) to Knox, June 15, 1910, telegram; Reid (in London) to Knox, June 16, 1910, telegram; Leishman (in Rome) to Knox, June 22, 1910, telegram; Leishman to Knox, June 26, 1910, telegram; Post-Wheeler (in St. Petersburg) to Knox, June 29, 1910, all DS 867.602 Ot 81/22, /25, /26, /39, /29, and /36, respectively.

⁵³ By the time Hill sent his dispatch he had already been visited unofficially by Arthur von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank of Constantinople, who had indicated on maps where, in his view, the American project invaded rights already held by the Baghdad and Anatolian railway concessions. He too complained that the American plan was not one “for bona fide railroad development but a scheme for controlling certain undeveloped oil fields in order to keep their product out of the market.” Hill to Knox, confidential, June 13, 1910, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/22.

⁵⁴ A few days later Hill forwarded an article from the Berliner Lokal-Anzieger of June 21, 1910, which used in a sensational way the same arguments von Gwinner had used on Hill. The article, called “American Artful Dodgers,” ran in part as follows: “The general public did not know and does not yet know today just what this Mr. Chester, a straw man of the Standard Oil Company and of the financial groups allied with it, was really after.” The article then comments that the concession proposed would give the Americans 16 months in which to lay pre-emptive claims to all minerals in the area which would give them first chance at these resources. The parting sentence reads that “The Turks were on the point of becoming dupes of Rockerfeller's [sic] genius, and while they were unsuspecting enough yesterday, today they have something of the feeling of having had a very narrow escape.” Translation enclosed in Hill to Knox, June 22, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/34.

⁵⁵ Laidlaw to Knox, June 14, 1910; Straus to Knox, June 27, 1910, telegram; both DS 867.602 Ot 81/23 and /30; Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, pp. 260–261.

⁵⁶ Straus to Knox, telegram undated, received June 2, 1910; Straus to Knox, undated, received June 3, 1910, both DS 867.602 Ot 81/17 and /18. Von Bieberstein then attacked the project directly, protesting that it conflicted with the mining law of 1907 passed as one condition for German consent to an earlier increase in customs duties. As a result of the German attack, the project was sent to a board of Turkish legal advisers for review. Straus to Knox, telegram, undated, received June 18, 1910, 6 p.m., DS 867.602 Ot 81/27.

⁵⁷ Knox to Straus, June 18, 1910, telegram; Straus to Knox, telegram, undated (received June 18, 1910, 6 p.m.); Laidlaw to Wilson, June 23, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/24, /27, and /43, respectively. Laidlaw quoted a dispatch from a company agent: “Grand Vizier openly in opposition to mining feature of our proposition. Will do all in our power and the necessary plans are now being made but result is in doubt.”

⁵⁸ Straus to Knox, undated, received, June 21, 1910, 8:45 a.m., DS 867.602 Ot 81/28. Two men on the four-man legal board had turned in reports holding that the concession did not conflict with the 1907 mining law.

⁵⁹ Straus to Knox, June 27, 1910, telegram; Laidlaw to Wilson, June 28, 1910, both DS 867.602 Ot 81/30 and /33. The exact scope of the amendments suggested is not clear. Among other changes the government apparently was proposing the elimination of the Samsun-Sivas line. Adee to Wilson, Nov. 4, 1910, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/56.

⁶⁰ Straus to Knox, No. 208, June 29, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/37.

⁶¹ Ibid.; Straus to Knox, June 27, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/30.

⁶² Yellow memorandum by EEY [Evan E. Young] to Wilson, attached to letter from Laidlaw (see footnote 59). Wilson pencilled “a good idea” on Young's memorandum.

⁶³ The department took the initiative in recommending that during the interim until the Ottoman parliament should meet again in November, 1910, the company should try to reach an understanding with the complaining German interests. Before this strategy could be implemented, the department abandoned the idea, although why is not clear. The sole clue is a memorandum by Evan Young stating that a departmental conference had decided it was not an opportune time to make overtures to the German groups concerned. David J. Hill to Knox, No. 728, June 22, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/34. Evan Young attached a memorandum (undated, but probably after the Turkish parliament had adjourned) suggesting that “after a very careful consideration of this matter” he believed the department should recommend that the company send one of its Constantinople representatives to Berlin “for the purpose of conferring with the German group.” Same file. MacArthur to Knox, July 28, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/41. Evan Young, undated, probably Aug. 2, 1910, same file. During the summer, talks with Russian diplomatic officials showed that accommodation of American and Russian interests could probably be achieved. DS 867.602 Ot 81/38, /40, /42, /44, and /45.

⁶⁴ Straus to Knox, No. 223, Aug. 4, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/46. See also Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey, 1909–1910,” pp. 74–75, 98–99, 133–141, Straus Papers, Boxes IV and XI.

⁶⁵ Straus, Oscar S., Under Four Administrations (New York and Boston, 1922), pp. 296–298.Google Scholar See also Straus to Taft, Aug. 27, 1910, Box IV, 1909–1919, and Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey, 1909–1910,” pp. 104–105, Box XI, Straus Papers.

⁶⁶ The company had deposited 20,000 pounds Turkish in the British bank in Constantinople in 1909.

⁶⁷ Philip to Knox, No. 257, confidential, Oct. 14, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/53.

⁶⁸ C. M. Chester, Jr., Secretary, Ottoman-American Development Company to the State Department, Nov. 1, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/55.

⁶⁹ Wilson, F. M. Huntington, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat (Boston, 1945), p. 223.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Wilson was astonished to find that on the day he arrived in Constantinople, Arthur Chester had departed for Vienna. The company had assured the department that both the Admiral and Arthur Chester would be in Constantinople throughout Wilson's visit. Wilson to Knox, telegram, Nov. 2, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/56.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat, p. 227.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 227–228. Straus had presented essentially these same ideas to Secretary Knox on Oct. 25, 1910, after the former's return to the United States. Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey, 1909–1910,” pp. 137–138, Straus Papers.

⁷⁴ Adee to Wilson, Nov. 4, 1910, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/56. Adee told Wilson that the company was ordering Arthur Chester back to Constantinople, although Chester did not return for more than a month, that is, until a few days after Colt had arrived from the United States.

⁷⁵ At the time of Huntington Wilson's special mission to Constantinople, the department did not want the embassy in the hands of a Chargé. Carter was transferred from Bucharest to be temporary Minister. Adee for Knox to Carter, Oct. 20, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/59A.

⁷⁶ Carter to Knox, Dec. 19, 1910, telegram; Carter to Knox, No. 294, Dec. 20, 1910, DS 867.602 Ot 81/61 and /62. “Although the controversy between the Governments of the United States and the Ottoman Empire over the interpretation of article 4 of the treaty of 1830 is of long standing, but few cases calling for the application of the provision of that article have actually occurred, and therefore under present conditions the question is perhaps academic rather than practical. It is clearly recognized, however, that the granting of the railway concession will bring about such a change in the existing conditions as to render very desirable a more definite and mutual understanding in regard to this matter, and when the necessity for such an understanding thus becomes evident this Government will be glad at once to enter into the negotiation of a convention which shall make appropriate concessions in the matter of the right of forum.” Knox to Carter, Dec. 22, 1910, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/61.

⁷⁷ Carter to Knox, confidential, Feb. 16, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/75. During this stage the disagreement over the Mediterranean terminal was in the foreground. Carter to Knox, Feb. 1, 1911, telegram; Knox to Carter, Feb. 4, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, Feb. 5, 1911, telegram, all DS 867.602 Ot 81/70; Evan Young, Memorandum for Wilson, Feb. 1, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/73.

⁷⁸ Carter to Knox, Feb. 1, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, Feb. 5, 1911, telegram, both DS 867.602 Ot 81/70. The Grand Vizier made the absurd claim that negotiations had been going on for only three months which prompted Carter to retort, more accurately, that they had been started more than two years earlier. Carter to Knox, confidential, No. 332, March 8, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/77.

⁷⁹ EEY [Evan Young] to Wilson, Memorandum, March 21, 1911; Wilson to embassy, Constantinople, March 21, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/77A.

⁸⁰ Carter's optimism was tempered by a closing observation that “in any other country I should say that the negotiations were practically finished, but my brief experience here has taught me that Turkey has very special methods of its own, so that I dare not be too sanguine.” Carter to Knox, No. 333, confidential, March 15, 1911, DS 867,602 Ot 81/79.

⁸¹ Carter to Knox, April 22, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/82; Wilson to Mac-Arthur, confidential, April 25, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/84; Carter to Knox, April 26, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/86.

⁸² Carter to Knox, May 6, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/87; Hoffman Philip to William W. Rockhffl, May 8, 1911, William W. Rockhill Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

⁸³ Carter to Knox, No. 348, confidential, May 12, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/100.

⁸⁴ Carter to Knox, May 14, 1911, telegram; Wilson to Carter, May 15, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, May 16, 1911, telegram; Knox to Carter, May 22, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, May 23, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, May 26, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, May 27, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, June 1, 1911, telegram; all DS 867.602 Ot 81/89, /89, /91, /91A, /93, /94, /96, and /99 respectively.

⁸⁵ Carter to Knox, June 1, 1911, telegram; Carter to Knox, June 4, 1911, telegram; Admiral Chester to Evan E. Young, June 22, 1911, all DS 867.602 Ot 81/99, /101, and /104, respectively.

⁸⁶ Young to Chester, June 27, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/104.

⁸⁷ J. W. Colt to Wilson, Sept. 2, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/109.

⁸⁸ Knox to Hockhill, June 17, 1911 (carbon in DS 867.602 Ot 81/102A); Rockhill “Diary,” Vol. IV, May 2, May 4, Aug. 3, Aug. 6, Aug. 28, all 1911, Rockhill Papers.

⁸⁹ Rockhill to Knox, No. 16, Sept. 18, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/111.

⁹⁰ Ibid.; also Rockhill to Knox, Oct. 10, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/115.

⁹¹ MacMurray to Wilson, “Memorandum of a Conversation with Mr. Chester in regard to the Concession Sought by the Ottoman American Development Company,” Sept. 28, 1911; Adee to Rockhill, No. 24, Oct. 12, 1911; Knox to Rockhill, Oct. 18, 1911, telegram; Rockhill to Knox, Oct. 19, 1911, telegram; DS 867.602 Ot 81/110, /113, /117, and /118, respectively.

⁹² MacArthur brothers felt “that this was a very inopportune time to show a lack of confidence in Turkey's good faith or a feeling of insecurity with regard to the deposit of some $90,000 which the syndicate has in Turkey,” but they failed to convince their colleagues. C. W. Fowle to Adee, Oct. 4, 1911; John R. MacArthur (personally as a member of MacArthur Bros.) to Adee, Oct. 13, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/114 and /116. For further evidence of the opinion among some elements of the syndicate that the Cbesters had not been well suited for the negotiations and should have been withdrawn earlier, see J. C. A. Leishman (Ambassador to Italy) to Knox, Personal, Oct. 4, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/119.

⁹³ J. W. Colt to Knox, Oct. 18, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/117.

⁹⁴ The company expressed willingness to reopen negotiations on the basis it had originally suggested by which Turkey would grant either a ldlometric guarantee with mining privileges, such as other railway concessions had included, or some other form of subsidy. If the Turks did not want to proceed on these terms, the company proposed as an alternative that the concession contain a twelve-month option for preliminary reconnaissance and study of traffic and resources along the projected routes. If further work seemed warranted the company would deposit 30,000 pounds Turkish and proceed with the work, but if they were not satisfied after the survey they would surrender to the Turkish government the studies already made. The mining provisions must, of course, remain in the bill. Colt to Knox, Oct. 31, 1911; Adee to Rockhill, Nov. 2, 1911, telegram, confidential, DS 867.602 Ot 81/126 and /121.

⁹⁵ CWF (Charles W. Fowle) to Adee, Oct. 27, 1911, concerning conversation with Admiral Chester; Adee to Rockhill, confidential, Nov. 2, 1911, telegram; Knox (by Adee) to Rockhill, Nov. 10, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/120, /121, and /124.

⁹⁶ Rockhill to Knox (from Fasdermadjian for Colt), Nov. 7, 1911, telegram; DS 867.602 Ot 81/124.

⁹⁷ Rockhill to Knox, Nov. 18, 1911, telegram; MacArthur to Fowle, Dec. 4, 1911, DS 867.602 Ot 81/131 and /140.

⁹⁸ MacMurray to Wilson, “Memorandum,” Sept. 28, 1911; Adee to Knox, Memorandum, Sept. 30, 1911; Adee to Knox, Memorandum, Oct. 18, 1911; Knox to Rockhill, Oct. 18, 1911, telegram; Adee, acting, to Rockhill, No. 30, Oct. 20, 1911, all DS 867.602 Ot 81/110, /112, and /117.

⁹⁹ Adee to Knox, Memorandum, Sept. 30, 1911; Adee, acting, to Rockhill, No. 24, Oct. 12, 1911; Adee to Knox, Memorandum, Oct. 18, 1911; Rockhill to Knox, Oct. 26, 1911, telegram; Charles W. Fowle to Adee, Memorandum, Oct. 27, 1911; Colt to Knox, Oct. 31, 1911; MacArthur to Fowle, Dec. 4, 1911, PS 867.602 Ot 81/112, /113, /117, /120, /126, and /140.

¹⁰⁰ Rockbill to Knox, Oct. 26, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/120. Early in November the Erzerum deputy, Pasdermadjian, urged the company to redeposit the cautionary money, and guaranteed acceptance of the project if this was done. Bockhill to Knox (from Pasdermadjian for Colt), Nov. 1, 1911, telegram, DS 867.602 Ot 81/121.

¹⁰¹ Contemporaneously, the department even discouraged suggestions that the United States offer its services as a mediator during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912 on grounds that the Middle East was a European question; it was argued that the United States should not irritate the European Powers by injecting itself into the situation, and no excuse should be given for European interference in the Western Hemisphere. Askew, William C., Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya (Durham, 1942), pp. 163–164, 241–242Google Scholar; Askew and Rippy, Journal of Politics, Vol. IV, pp. 73–74.

¹⁰² Knox to MacArthur, Dec. 7, 1911, telegram; Knox to Rockhill, Dec. 8, 1911, telegram, both DS 867.602 Ot 81/136; Rockhill, “Diary,” Vol. IV, Dec. 12, 1911, Rockhill Papers.

¹⁰³ Rockhill to MacMurray, Nov. 6, 1911, Rockhill Papers. “The Department is very anxious, I know, to extend our relations here; but how the devil are you going to do it if nobody in America, I mean in the business world is willing to give to the extension of our interests in this country either time or trouble or even to pledge to keep good faith with the people here in case something is given them. I trust that you, in your wisdom, will give me full instructions as to how I am to act here because I really don't see what we are to do in the matter of carrying out the wishes of our country.”

¹⁰⁴ MacMurray to Clark, Memorandum, Feb. 28, 1912; Wilson to Rockhill, No. 109, Feb. 29, 1912, DS 867.602 Ot 81/146.

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum by MacMurray, Feb. 29, 1912; Memorandum, MacMurray to Clark, Feb. 28, 1912; Wilson to Rockhill, No. 109, Feb. 29, 1912, DS 867.602 Ot 81/147, /146, and /146.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.; MacMurray to Rockhill, March 12, 1912, Rockhill Papers.

¹⁰⁷ Colt to Knox, June 7, 1912; Rockhill to Knox, No. 227, June 22, 1912, DS 867.602 Ot 81/149 and /152.

¹⁰⁸ Colt to Bryan, July 1, 1913; Colt to MacMurray, July 1, 1913, DS 867.602 Ot 81/154 and /153. The principals in the new company were MacArthur Brothers Company, C. M. Chester, Jr., H. C. Keith, and Colt. See also Moore to Colt, Nov. 21, 1913, and Colf to Moore, Dec. 9, 1913, DS 867.602 Ot 81/156 and /159.

¹⁰⁹ MacMurray to John Basse Moore, Memorandum, July 12, 1913, DS 867.602 Ot 81/154. Moore was in general agreement with this point of view. Moore to MacMurray, Memorandum, July 12, 1913, same file.

¹¹⁰ Moore to Hoffman Philip (Chargé d'Affaires), Constantinople, No. 261, July 24, 1913, DS 867.602 Ot 81/154.

¹¹¹ Moore to Colt, July 24, 1913; Colt to Moore, Nov. 15, 1913; Colt to Moore, Dec. 9, 1913, DS 867.602 Ot 81/154, /156, and /159.

¹¹² Moore to Colt, Jan. 15, 1914; Colt to Moore, Jan. 24, 1914, DS 867.602 Ot 81/160 and /161.

¹¹³ Moore to Colt, Feb. 3, 1914, DS 867.602 Ot 81/161.

¹¹⁴ For a detailed treatment of the postwar Chester Project, see DeNovo, John A., “Petroleum and American Diplomacy in the Near East, 1908–1928” (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1948), Chap. 8.Google Scholar