Between 1973 and 2002, three of Australia's largest multinational companies exited from postcolonial Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Although neither host government wished the companies to leave, the tensions that arose during the course of decolonization made their departure inevitable. Prior to independence, conflicts between Fijians and Indians and decisions about grants of land and mineral rights to foreign firms had been mediated by colonial administrators. After independence, these contentious issues were resolved through domestic political processes. Ultimately, the companies were unable to overcome the limitations of their shared administrative heritage, based on nationalistic chauvinism, that desensitized them to the importance of race relations and communal rights to land within their host countries.

This study traces the origins of the twentieth-century Greek shipping tycoons and their global business to the nineteenth-century Greek diaspora traders. It examines the distinct characteristics of a diaspora firm, which can be treated partially as a multinational or “free standing firm” with distinctive features. Based in the main European financial centers, diaspora traders were international operators who developed ethnic-religious networks with their own unofficial international market, enabling them to operate independently of the countries or states in which they were established. The Vagliano house is a prime example of a diaspora trading house that transformed itself into a major shipping and ship-management firm, paving the way for the global success of twentieth-century Greek-owned shipping. The Vagliano network integrated the Greek shipping sector into the international shipping production system by creating an institutional framework based on trust that minimized transaction costs and entrepreneurial risk and provided information flow.

This article examines how the human-relations managerial techniques of the 1950s prepared large companies for the mandated racial integration required by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) after 1964. Drawing from management's “howto” publications, as well as archival materials from the Lukens Steel Company and the Du Pont Corporation, the article expands on recent work that has emphasized the importance of internal labor markets, training programs, and managerial policies in determining the shape and pace of integration.

This paper builds on recent conceptual work about associations that is drawn from the new institutional economics. It uses evidence from New Zealand wool broking to indicate the circumstances in which industry associations can operate effectively and in the broader public interest. Through their strong associative capacity and effective specialization of function, wool-broking industry associations developed flexible routines for managing wool auctions, mediated disputes, mitigated opportunism, addressed major market disruptions, and served as a communication channel with government. External pressures and monitoring from other business interests, governments, and a competitive wool market constrained rent-seeking behavior, preventing members from benefiting at the expense of others.