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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2016
Debate about the strategic importance of Cyprus to Britain during and immediately after World War I has been overlooked by historians. During this period several key departments, politicians and officials argued strongly and in a concerted way for British retention of the island. This article investigates their reasoning and the arguments of those who championed its cession to Greece. Particular attention is given to the opinions of Lord Curzon, whose career was steeped in long-standing Anglo-Russian rivalries in Asia and the strategic doctrines which underpinned it. Reference is also made to the political, diplomatic and strategic context in which Curzon and his colleagues debated the issue.
1. Curzon to Grey, 3 February, 1916, 3 Carlton House Terrace, S.W., Grey Papers, Foreign Office Papers FO 800/106 folio 526 (P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], London).
2. Crewe to Curzon, 4 December 1914, Crewe Papers I/20 (Cambridge University Library).
3. See, for example, Biddulph to Kimberley, 12 April, 1881, no. 72; Kimberley to Biddulph, 13 April, 1881, no. 73; Biddulph to Kimberley, Nicosia, 14 April, 1881, and enclosure in Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Cyprus, HMSO, 1881, FO 78/3374. A review of the precise circumstances of the offer, which I do not intend to discuss here, may be found in ‘Memorandum by Mr. Headlam-Morley and Mr. W.J. Childs Respecting Cyprus’, 18 December, 1924, draft, FO 370/300 folio 389ff. When questioned on the matter in 1925, Lord Robert Cecil, who as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs played an important role in the affair, apparently confirmed the interpretation provided in the memorandum: Robert Cecil to Headlam-Morley, 13 November, 1925, Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, SW1, Headlam-Morley Papers ACC 727/39 (Churchill College, Cambridge). A summarised version of this memorandum, which Headlam-Morley claimed to be a joint effort with Childs, is reproduced in Headlam-Morley’s Studies in Diplomatic History (London 1930) 193-211. Headlam-Morley was Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. When the memorandum was produced Childs worked under him producing special historical memoranda relating to the Middle East.
4. Ibid. Headlam-Morley/Childs memorandum, 19.
5. Record of a conversation with Balfour on 14 April, 1916, Bertie Papers, Add. Ms 63040 (B[ritish] L[ibrary]). Bertie was British Ambassador in Paris.
6. See note 1, Curzon to Grey, 3 February, 1916. An Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 led to the cession to Germany of Heligoland in exchange for the extension of British influence in East Africa and the incorporation into her protectorate of Zanzibar. The constitutional and, more especially, the strategic parallels with the proposed cession of Cyprus, were frequently noted. For a comparative essay see Piggott, F.T., ‘The Integrity of the Empire: The Offer of Cyprus to Greece’, in The Nineteenth Century and After 79 (January 1916) 240-52Google Scholar. According to Piggott, the offer ‘sent a wave of apprehension through the country’.
7. For interesting commentaries on the origins of Disraeli’s and Salisbury’s annexationist policy, see Lee, D.E., ‘Memorandum Concerning Cyprus’, Journal of Modern History 3 (June 1931) 235-41CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and articles by Temperley, Harold, ‘Disraeli and Cyprus’, and ‘Further Evidence on Disraeli and Cyprus’, in English Historical Review 46 (April and July 1931) 274-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 457-60. In their memorandum, Headlam-Morley and Childs appeared to agree that the policy, one of ‘strength and insight’, was attributable to both men. On the general issue of Sykes-Picot, see the following by the author: Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916 to 1919 (Frank Cass, 1999); ‘“The Safety of Our Indian Empire”: Lord Curzon and British Predominance in the Arabian Peninsula’, Middle Eastern Studies 33 (July 1997) 494-520; ‘“On the Glacis of India”: Lord Curzon and British Policy in the Caucasus, 1919’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 8 (July 1997) 50-82; ‘Syria and Mesopotamia in British Middle Eastern Policy During 1919’, MES 34 (April 1998) 129-70.
8. The expression was Disraeli’s. For an excellent recent overview of British strategic policy in this period see Neilson, K. ‘For Diplomatic, Economic, Strategic and Telegraphic reasons: British imperial defence, the Middle East and India, 1914-18’, in Far Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman, edited by Kennedy, G. and Neilson, K. (London/Portland 1997) 103-23Google Scholar.
9. In particular, on this issue see Galbraith, J.S., ‘British War Aims in World War I: A Commentary On “Statesmanship”’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13 (1984-85) 25–45 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Such also is my reading of the final meetings of the Eastern Committee: See Fisher, Curzon and British Imperialism, ch. 6.
10. Record by Bertie of a conversation with Curzon, 12 April, 1916, Bertie Papers Add. Ms 63040 folio 193; quoted with original emphasis.
11. Crewe to Curzon, 7 January, 1916, Crewe House, Curzon Street, Curzon Papers F112/116 folio 53, Oriental and India Office Collections, London; see D. Gilmour, Curzon, 449.
12. See note five. In 1924 the Colonial Office claimed that it knew nothing of the offer before it had been made. See letter from unknown author to Headlam-Morley, Colonial Office, 26 November, 1924, Headlam-Morley Papers ACC 727/39. It seems that Grey, like Balfour later in the war, had been willing to cede Cyprus to Greece if a solid Balkan alliance could be attained thereby. See Grey to Kitchener, 19 January, 1915, private, Kitchener Papers PRO 30/57/77 (PRO).
13. Memorandum by A.J. Balfour, ‘Some Notes on Peace Arrangements: The Balkans’, G.T. 2957, Curzon Papers, Ms Eur F112/269; also at Cabinet Office Papers CAB 24/35 (PRO).
14. Curzon to Balfour, 24 March, 1918, Balfour Papers Add Ms 49734 (BL).
15. Curzon to Asquith, 10 August, 1915, Curzon Papers F112/114a, folio 30.
16. See Ronaldshay, , Life of Curzon, 3 vols., vol. 3 (London 1928) 122 Google Scholar.
17. Imperial War Cabinet, Committee on Terms of Peace, Territorial Desiderata, third meeting, 19 April, 1917, CAB 21/77; the report of the committee may also be found there. Besides Curzon, the Committee was attended by Walter Long, Hazen, Massey, Smuts, Sir E. Morris, Sir S. Sinha, G.R. Clerk, and H. Lambert.
18. Memorandum by Curzon, ‘The Future of Cyprus’, 3 January, 1919, P.86, CAB 29/2. Unless otherwise stated the remaining material relates to this memorandum. This may also be seen at FO 371/3582/143399.
19. Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 16 December, 1918, secret, CAB 27/24.
20. See note eighteen, appendix 1.
21. Sykes to Curzon, 27 December, 1917, Sledmere, Curzon Papers, F112/269 folio 24.
22. The original note may be seen at ibid., folio 20.
23. See Montagu to Balfour, 20 December, 1918, FO 800/215; see Galbraith, JICH 13, n. 2.
24. Long to Curzon, 3 January, 1919, Curzon Papers F112/212b. In fact, not only had Long produced a memorandum on this very subject, dated 23 December (in Long to Balfour, 6 January, 191 [9], Curzon Papers F112/269) but he had also requested the opinion of the Admiralty. As Georghallides notes, the Colonial Office had apparently telegraphed the High Commissioner in Cyprus on 13 November requesting a list of reasons for British retention of the island. Georghallides, G.S., A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918 to 1926 with a survey of the foundations of British Rule, Cyprus Research Centre, Texts and Studies in the History of Cyprus (Nicosia 1979) 117 Google Scholar. Possibly Long felt unsure of his ground and/or he had not written the paper himself. It is also conceivable that he did not wish to become associated in the minds of too many of his colleagues with a controversial cause when events might suddenly offer opportunities for advancement. As Colonial Secretary since December 1916, Long may have wished to avoid criticism for the lack of development in the island; something which had been noted for some time. The Admiralty, it seems, was also instrumental in enlisting the support of the Air Ministry: see minute of 30 December, 1918, by unknown official, DOD(F), ADM 1/8547/339 (PRO). The message was reinforced by the Colonial Office. See Fiddes to Robinson, 3 January, 1919, confidential, copy, CO 537/694 (PRO).
25. Long to Balfour, 6 January, 191 [9], enclosing memorandum by Long, 23 December, 1918, and Admiralty to U/S of State, 1 January, 1919, ibid., Curzon Papers F112/269. Long’s memorandum of 23 December may also be seen at FO 371/3582/143399.
26. Memorandum by Mr. Long, ‘The Future of Cyprus’, 9 January, 1919, P.90, CAB 29/2, with appended notes by the Admiralty, n.d., and the Chief of the Air Staff, 9 January, 1919. This memorandum may also be seen at CO 67/194/55205. The most thorough analysis of the origins of Greek Cypriot agitation was provided by Mr. R.L. Mitchell, former Commissioner of Limassol, in Journal of the Central Asian Society (1920) 66-68.
27. See my article On the Glacis of India’, D&S 8 (July 1997) 77-9.
28. See, especially, the minutes of the Imperial War Cabinet of 20 December, 1918, IWC 44, CAB 23/42.
29. Milner to Fiddes, ?(17) January, 1919, Curzon Papers F112/269.
30. Curzon to Balfour, 18 January, 1919, Balfour Papers, Add Ms. 49751 pt. 2 folio 59; ibid., Balfour to Curzon, 21 January, 1919, folio 60; ibid., Curzon to Balfour, 22 January, 1919; Milner to Curzon, 25 January, 1919, enclosing Balfour to Curzon, 21 January, 1919, Curzon Papers F112/269.
31. See, for example, article by SirRamsay, W., ‘The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia’, Quarterly Review 229 (January 1918) 49–72 Google Scholar; Article by R.L. Mitchell, CMG, in the British Empire Review, December 1918. The ‘Mediterranean Notes’ in the BRE were a source of much detailed information on the infrastructure and development of the island. Orr himself had also commented upon the ‘centralized nest of bureaucracy’ of Cyprus long before this. See Orr to Leviseur, 8 April, 1912, Shepherds Hotel, Cairo, Orr-Leviseur Correspondence Add Ms 65100 (BL).
32. Memorandum by Armitage Smith on the Financial objections to the cession by Great Britain of Cyprus to Greece, 16 January, 1919, with reference to G.T. 8090, circulated to the Cabinet by Austin Chamberlain, 17 September, 1919, Treasury, S.W., G.T. 8169, secret, CAB 24/88. According to Mitchell, op. cit., 64-5, as regards the islands’ development under British guidance, ‘a complete transformation [had] been effected’, but this development never had a chance of reaching its full potential.
33. Curzon to Balfour, 22 January, 1919, confidential, Balfour Papers, Add Ms 49751 pt. 2, folio 62. Balfour was apparently hamstrung, conscious of the great emotive power of the island in the English psyche and unable therefore to refute the ‘consensus of responsible advice’ referred to by Crowe. When, however, soon afterwards Balfour admitted to colleagues in Paris that the island was under discussion, he suggested that it might be entrusted to the League of Nations. Minutes by Crowe, 20 January 1919, Balfour, n.d., FO 608/33 pp. 350-51; and Balfour, n.d. (c 4 February 1919) ibid. Crowe had apparently spoken to Herbert Read of the Colonial Office, who previously sat on Curzon’s Territorial Committee, who passed the information to the Foreign Office. Crowe, who opposed cession, was nonetheless pragmatic in his views; suggesting, in December 1918, that Britain might use Cyprus to coerce Italy into ceding the Dodecanese to Greece. Lord Hardinge agreed. See minutes by Crowe, 11 December 1918, and Hardinge, n.d., FO 371/3147/176514.
34. Curzon to Balfour, 24 June, 1919, Foreign Office, copy, Balfour Papers, FO 800/217; Balfour to Curzon, 25 June, 1919, copy, ibid; the original of Balfour’s letter and a copy of another letter from Curzon, dated 10 June, in which the latter expressed his suspicions that the Cyprus issue was again about to be discussed, may be seen in Add Ms 49751 pt. 2. The Cabinet had, in fact, discussed Cyprus on 29 July and resolved that, in the event of further questions in Parliament, it should be stated that the decision would not be taken without allowing Parliament to express its views; Cabinet minutes, 23 November 1919, WC 601, CAB 23/11.
35. Fisher’s memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet as G.T. 8090 and is reproduced in Georghallides, History of Cyprus 133. Fisher’s involvement in the Cyprus debate did not merit inclusion in his diaries. As Georghallides states, the Colonial Office, in the person of the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir George Fiddes, was not impressed by Fisher’s arguments. Minutes by Sir George Fiddes, 25 September, 1919; Georghallides, op. cit., 134. For Fisher’s views as expressed at the War Cabinet, see WC 599, 25 July 1919, CAB 23/11. However, Fisher was by no means alone in holding these views. For a brief outline of the Liberal Party and British possession of Cyprus from 1878, see Reddaway, J., Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection (London 1986) 9–10 Google Scholar. Captain Aubrey Herbert, another prominent philhellenist, felt that Britain should give Cyprus to Greece as ‘an earnest of our good faith and high-mindedness’. See Diaries of Lord Robert Cecil, Chelwood Papers, entry of 30 January, 1919, Add. Ms 51131 (BL).
36. Admiralty memorandum for the War Cabinet, ‘Proposal to Cede Cyprus to Greece’, W.H.L., 3 October, 1919, G.T. 8262, CAB 24/89.
37. Acting High Commissioner for Cyprus to S/S for the Colonies, 13 October, 1919, G.T. 8337, CAB 24/90.
38. Confidential Telegram from de Robeck, Mediterranean, no. (?)Z.554/6126, of 18 September, 1919, enclosed in notes by W.H.L., Admiralty Memorandum for the War Cabinet, ‘Proposal to Cede Cyprus to Greece’, 13 October, 1919, G.T. 8318, CAB 24/90. Similar views on the nationalist movement were expressed in an article in the Spectator 123 (30 August 1919) 269-70, by Percy White and by Sir R.L. Mitchell, JCAS, 81.
39. Unless otherwise stated the remaining material relates to the memorandum by Headlam-Morley and William Childs.
40. French strategic interests were reflected in the clause on Cyprus in Sykes-Picot. Italy had also attempted to gain a similar guarantee as a result of the Graeco-Italian Agreement of 29 July, 1919, whereby, in the event of Greece obtaining Cyprus, she would also receive the Dodecanese from Italy.
41. Copy of a report by Jellicoe, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, 12 October, 1917, for CIGS, secret, WO 106/723 (PRO). Admittedly Jellicoe considered Famagusta suitable only for a small operation but by 1919, when Fisher wrote, the estimation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of possible deep water harbour development on Cyprus had changed. Childs had traversed the region during the Kalo-Turkish war, recording his experiences in Across Asia Minor On Foot (Edinburgh/London 1917). He described the position of Cyprus in relation to Asia Minor as ‘a provision of Providence’ ibid., p. 444, and the proposal to cede it to Greece as ‘preposterous’. Childs was in no doubt that the Greeks were double dealing and opportunistic. See Childs to Blackwood, 30 October, 1916, Reigate Villa, Reigate Road, Leatherhead, Blackwood Ms 30173 (National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh).
42. Kitchener to Trelawny Saunders, 6 August, 188(?)5, Queen Anne’s Gate, Kitchener Papers, PRO 30/57/1. Kitchener had surveyed the island between 1878 and 1882. To Rider Haggard, registering his support for the announcement in The Times that Cyprus would not be handed to Greece, it appeared the ideal bolt-hole from a Bolshevik onslaught. Rider Haggard to Curzon, 25 July, 1919, 1 Carlton House Terrace, Ditchingham House, Norfolk, F112/269/69 and reply, ibid., 3 August, 1919.
43. Curzon to Montagu, 12 October, 1919, 1 Carlton House Terrace, Montagu Papers AS3/3/53 (Trinity College, Cambridge); ibid., Montagu to Curzon, 14 October, 1919, India Office, Whitehall, SW1, AS3/3/51 (this may also be seen at F112/213b/167-70); Note by Montagu, ‘The Future of Cyprus’, 15 October, 1919, G.T. 8357, CAB 24/90, secret.
44. See Earl Granville to Curzon, 17 December, 1919, Athens, no. 233, enc. Report on Greek Negotiations at Paris, Confidential, 1919, by Gerald F. Talbot, Commander, R.N.V.R., Naval Attaché, FO 421/278, cited in Georghallides, op. cit., p. 105. See also, ibid. p. 112.
45. Georghallides has not presented firm evidence that Lloyd George had, personally, committed Britain to the cession of Cyprus.
46. See Young, K., Arthur James Balfour (London, 1963) 45 Google Scholar.
47. Balfour was not alone in holding these views. E.S. Montagu, for one, agreed. For a more developed analysis of this strategic doctrine as applied to Cyprus, see article by Archibald Forbes, ‘The “Fiasco” In Cyprus’, Nineteenth Century 4 (October 1878) 609-26.
48. See Goldstein, E., Winning the Peace, British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference 1916 to 1920 (Oxford, 1991) 137 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Helmreich, P.C., From Paris To Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, 1974) 60 Google Scholar, n. 4; minute by H.G. Nicolson, 21 September, 1919, FO 371/3147/153245. Yet this was not invariably true. See, for example, memorandum by E.G. Forbes-Adam, 14 October, 1919, FO 371/3582/143399.
49. See JCAS (1920), 63. Of course, it may be that chastened by the idea of the international investigatory commission, officials did not wish to draw undue attention to the island. See minute by Hardinge, n.d., FO 608/33.
50. See note thirty-five, Cecil Diaries.
51. ‘Cyprus: Note by the President of the Board of Education’, 21 October, 1919, secret, G.T. 8379, CAB 24/90.
