Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-v5vhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-01T17:35:17.418Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

An antidote to anarchy? Images of monarchy in Greece in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 July 2021

Spyridon G. Ploumidis
Spyridon G. Ploumidis*
Affiliation:
National and Kapodistrian University of Athenssploumid@arch.uoa.gr
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Since Roman times the representation of monarchy as an antidote to anarchy was a strong form of legitimization for the monarchical institution. In modern Greece, this formula dates back to 1821. The Greek Revolution and its republican constitutions were identified by European statesmen with anarchy and demagogy. Thus, a foreign monarch, alien to Greece's internal factions, was deemed the ideal remedy for internecine strife, and the best guarantor of internal unity as well as stability in the Near East. This image of monarchy proved its usefulness again during the First World War, when a controversy between the premier Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine over foreign policy and constitutional issues led to the National Schism (1915–17).

Keywords

monarchyanarchyEleftherios VenizelosNational Schismmodern Greece
Type
Article
Information
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , October 2021 , pp. 240 - 254
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of theCentre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, University of Birmingham

Introduction

The era of modernity created new ordeals for monarchy. In the late sixteenth century, a large part of the political literature of the Reformation, such as the anonymous Vindiciae contra tyrannos (Basel 1579), put forward new challenges in regard to the legitimacy of Europe's kings.Footnote 1 In pre-modern polities the ideals of hierarchy, order and divinely appointed sovereignty were the sole and ubiquitous foundations of royal power.Footnote 2 For this reason, the entry into modernity required the search for new forms of legitimacy of monarchy. Legitimation by tradition (e.g. noble birth, or Divine Right) was no longer sufficient, and new forms of popular legitimation, of what the political scientist Samuel E. Finer calls the Palace/Forum type, proved necessary.Footnote 3

In practice this meant that in modernity, kings had to seek some form of popular election sympathies, so as to avert allegations that they were, or ruled as – in Aristotelian terms – ‘tyrants’ (tyrannoi).Footnote 4 In the century and more that followed the turmoil of the French Revolution (1815–1914), the spread of nationalism and liberalism at the expense of dynasticism produced an environment even more inimical to monarchs: after the fall of Napoleon it was clear that, if monarchy were to survive in a modern European setting, royal families had to position themselves not as God's agents on earth, but instead as servants of the nation and an antidote to lawlessness and civil strife.Footnote 5

My aim in this article is to explore images of monarchy in Greece in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, placing particular emphasis on the multifaceted notion of anarchy, which appears to have been the most useful (though not the sole) spectre used by royalists during the period for the legitimization of monarchy and the restoration of monarchs. In doing this, I seek to make a contribution to the understanding of the function and the structural role of the monarchical form of government in the Greek state within its European and South-east European setting. For, as Jeroen Duindam rightly notes, while the histories of individual kings and queens are well known, the collective history of kingship and dynasty remains a terra incognita.Footnote 6

Monarchy versus ‘anarchy’

In modern Greece, this formula of legitimizing monarchy dates back to the Revolution of 1821. As the secretary of the first British Legation to independent Greece explains, the Greek Revolution (as a war crisis in the Near East) and its republican constitutions were identified by European statesmen and diplomats, in the reactionary spirit of Restoration, as ‘anarchy’ and ‘demagogy’ and condemned by the Allied Great Powers at the Verona Conference in 1822 as a ‘danger to peace and social order’ in Europe.Footnote 7

For this reason, in as much as anarchy was considered a political hazard on both the international and the domestic level, monarchy served a dual purpose. In particular, as the diplomatic historian Michel Lhéritier noted in 1925, monarchy was initially imposed on Greece as a cure for ‘anarchy’ and ‘immorality’ (a reference to the Revolution of 1821), and as a bearer of ‘harmony’ and ‘political stability’ to the newly liberated country, as well as a guardian (in the best interests of Europe, which had been shaken by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars) of ‘order’ and ‘tranquillity’ in the Near East.Footnote 8 In public imagery, monarchy was counterposed to ‘anarchy’, because ‘only kingship’ was in a position to tame ‘the rowdy character of Modern Greeks’ and to put an end to their ‘petty ambitions’.Footnote 9

To this end, the Greek throne was offered in 1830 to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, and two years later, upon Leopold's abdication, to Prince Otto of Bavaria.Footnote 10 According to George Finlay, the Scottish Philhellene and contemporary observer, absolute monarchy was deemed by the Three Powers that liberated Greece (Britain, France and Russia) as imperative for the welfare and good government of the new state, particularly after the period of chaos, anarchy and civil war that followed the assassination in 1831 of John Capodistrias, Greece's first governor.Footnote 11 Thus, as John A. Petropulos explains, a foreign monarch, alien to Greece's internal factions, was naturally seen as the best remedy for Greece's internecine strife, the guarantor of her internal unity and stability, and her saviour from self-destruction.Footnote 12 It seems that a decisive role in the final choice of this form of government had been played earlier by Capodistrias himself, who, according to the testimony of the first Austrian envoy to Greece, had maintained that a federal and constitutional polity akin to that of the United States of America, which had initially inspired many Greek revolutionaries, would merely bring ‘anarchy’. By contrast, in Capodistrias’ mind, monarchy was the sole polity that could ‘withstand revolution’ and integrate Greece into the contemporary security system of Vienna, which had been established by the victors over Napoleon in 1815, and to the international society of the Restoration known as the Holy Alliance.Footnote 13 As expected, upon his arrival in Greece in 1833, King Otto announced that his first duty was to put an end to anarchy and discord, and to restore public order, concord and security.Footnote 14

In the course of time, the formula, monarchy versus anarchy, became more compelling. Thirty years after King Otto's accession, in 1863, the change of dynasty followed the same pattern. As in 1831–2, when anarchy followed the violent death of Capodistrias, the dethronement of Otto caused a serious breakdown of public order, with gangs of bandits reaching the outskirts of Athens, leading to a period of political instability that lasted about a year.Footnote 15 Thus the interregnum of 1862–3 became, in common perceptions, synonymous with chaos and anarchy.Footnote 16 The biographer of the new king, Georgios Aspreas, wrote that by October 1863, when Prince George of Denmark arrived in Greece, the country had undergone a painful phase of ‘absolute anarchy’ owing to ‘the most awful political discords’ which had torn the country apart.Footnote 17 Supporters of the monarchical institution played this card for all it was worth. They stressed that once again and within a relatively short period of time, Greeks had proven themselves unfit for self-rule and republican government. Consequently, George I came to Greece as a Messiah, with the task of restoring order, and tranquillity.Footnote 18 Contemporary historical accounts mention that the public, and particularly conservative politicians, saw in the advent of the King the elimination of the ‘anarchy’ which had overwhelmed Greece and its capital.Footnote 19 Half a century later, the loyalist axiom that ‘the constitutional monarch is the great arbitrator and peacemaker for democratic peoples’, especially ‘in times of political tension or demagogy’, still held sway in domestic politics.Footnote 20 For, according to the perceptions of the time, ‘chaos and anarchy meant death for the nations.’Footnote 21

The same discourse of legitimizing monarchy in the eyes of Greeks recurred in 1909–10, when the country was once again shaken by political tumult and a mass movement of public protest against the ‘oligarchy’ (i.e. the political establishment) and clientelism (synallagi). These led to a military coup (the Goudi ‘revolution’, as it was called by the putschists), through which the Cretan-born liberal politician Eleftherios Venizelos was elevated to power and hailed by the press as ‘the long-expected Messiah’ and ‘the saviour of the Nation’. With reference to the 1909 ‘revolution’, loyal supporters of monarchy, such as the university professor Neoklis Kazazis, claimed that this popular movement was tantamount to anarchy and social and political ‘disintegration’.Footnote 22 For his part, Venizelos went out of his way to counteract this orchestrated attempt by the monarchists to denigrate this ‘revolutionary movement’, by presenting it as ‘anti-dynastic’ and inimical to the Crown.Footnote 23 In August 1909, in his first addresses to the putschists, the Cretan statesman asserted that the ‘revolution’ was not by any means anti-dynastic; its sole enemy, he insisted, was ‘the ruling plutocratic oligarchy’, not the ruling dynasty, let alone monarchy as such. Therefore, it had no intention of causing anarchy or endangering order in any way.Footnote 24

All in all, at the turn of the twentieth century the institution of the monarchy was presented as an antidote to ‘anarchy’: social unrest, political instability and civil conflict.Footnote 25 Greece was not an exceptional instance in this modern legitimizing process: compare Romania, where Carol I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen replaced Prince Ion Cuza as head of state in 1866. The enthronement of a foreign ruler in Bucharest in the place of an indigenous prince was regarded as a prerequisite for the restoration of political stability in the country.Footnote 26 Along the same lines, in Bulgaria the election of Ferdinand I of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha by the Sobranie (the Bulgarian parliament) in 1887 was aimed expressly at ending an interregnum of ‘anarchy’, by which was meant the lawlessness, and political instability that followed the dethronement of Prince Alexander I of Battenberg.Footnote 27

As in the early nineteenth century, the word ‘anarchy’ also had international connotations. Its broadest meaning encompassed the destabilizing potential of the diverse national questions that simmered in the Balkans, which signified that it was capable of setting South-East Europe ablaze. However, in the area of foreign affairs additional factors came into play. In the Balkans, foreign dynasties tended to become integral parts of international rivalries; in this context, the fact that most of the dynasties of South-Eastern Europe were of German descent tended to alleviate fears of excessive Russian influence in the region. Indeed, before Bismarck's turn towards a more Anglophobic foreign policy in the mid-1880s, the Germans were viewed by the British as cousins and, in Queen Victoria's own words, as ‘a most useful ally’ of Britain against Russia.Footnote 28 In Romania in particular, Europe's Great Powers assigned to Carol I the task of curtailing Romanian nationalism and safeguarding peace in the East, especially with the neighbouring Austro-Hungarian empire. To this end, in 1883 Romania joined the Triple Alliance, the defensive pact between Germany, Austria and Italy that revived the Holy Alliance's conservative spirit of monarchical solidarity and aimed at retaining the status quo, stability, and social order in Central and Eastern Europe against the threat of pan-Slavism. At that time, this threat was considered to be an ominous, anarchic revolutionary force, as perilous to the dynastic thrones of Europe as French republicanism.Footnote 29 In a similar manner, George I of Greece was advised, in George Finlay's words, ‘to refrain from all aggressive acts against Turkey’; prior to the Greek-Ottoman war of 1897, which was calamitous for Greece, King George had followed a prudent foreign policy, effectively avoiding any drastic military action that would encroach upon the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.Footnote 30

The background and the varied faces of anarchy

The image of the monarchy as a panacea for anarchy and civil strife was grounded in the Roman legal tradition and political thought. The antithesis dates back to the decades following Republican Rome in the first century BC, when Augustus bestowed upon himself the extraordinary powers of princeps and imperator in order to face the internal crisis of government most efficiently.Footnote 31 In other words, the aversion of modern polities to anarchy and their recourse to monarchy was deeply rooted in historical experience: that of internecine strife in the late Roman republic.

At the same time, the ancient Greek (and in particular Aristotelian) aversion to the tyrannos continued to possess a certain resonance. Hence the anxiety of medieval (and later) kings to avert any allegations against them of ruling like tyrants, something that they considered to be highly damaging to their public image.Footnote 32 In modern Greece, particularly after the dethronement of King Otto in 1862, kings systematically sought to avoid any hint or association of their name with tyranny. Accordingly, they represented themselves as ‘Princes of a Democratic People’, and their throne as being ‘established on the love of their People’.Footnote 33 The motto of the Greek monarchs ‘My power is the people's love’, which King George I, the founder of the second Greek dynasty, borrowed from his Danish dynasty, followed the same populist principle; in fact, this maxim was another ingenious formula against revolution: it was first used by the Danish king Frederick VII in the wake of the upheaval of 1848.Footnote 34

On the other hand, the term ‘tyranny’ continued well into the twentieth century to be used as a synonym for royal ‘despotism’ and ‘absolutism’.Footnote 35 The identification of monarchy with tyranny was a recurrent theme in the discourse of staunch republicans like Georgios Philaretos, the jurist and former Minister of Justice.Footnote 36 At the turn of the twentieth century, republicans continued to be in the minority in Greece. Yet their cause gained momentum during the First World War thanks to an unprecedented political crisis – in fact, a low-key civil war – that later came to be known as the National Schism. In 1916–17, this crisis, sparked a year earlier by a strong disagreement and open confrontation between Venizelos and King Constantine over foreign policies and constitutional issues, divided Greece into two opposing separate states centred upon Athens and Thessaloniki.Footnote 37 During this period, the Thessaloniki government declared that King Constantine had forfeited his right to the throne and denounced him as a tyrant.Footnote 38 Venizelos and his associates continued to censure Constantine in this most offensive way, with overt references to ‘despotism’ and ‘royal tyranny’, over the course of the following four years (1917–20), until Venizelos’ fall from power as a result of his crushing electoral defeat on 1/14 November 1920.Footnote 39

Subsequently, monarchy needed to offset such accusations of tyranny, which were painful and might even prove fatal. Its new quest for legitimization involved an opening to popular currents, including strong infusions of populism and paternalism. In 1960, Panagiotis Pipinelis, an eminent advocate of royalism and a future foreign secretary and prime minister, highlighted the fact that the monarch was traditionally seen as ‘the true father of the nation’ and enjoyed a direct emotional connection with his subjects.Footnote 40 The pinnacle of such populist royalist politics had been the Reservists’ movement of 1916, in the midst of the National Schism. The Reservists (Epistratoi), a truly mass movement of over 200,000, openly vowed fanatical devotion and blind allegiance to the Crown; in November 1916, their fanatical royalism issued in a violent pogrom against Venizelists.Footnote 41

Yet, for all the Reservists’ forcefulness and fanaticism, it is important to assess the impact of this exercise in paternalism and populism. Elements of monarchist discourse seem to have played a role on a tactical level, cementing the cohesion of the royalist camp, but do not appear to have been particularly useful as tools for popular mobilization. Historically, scaremongering and the spectre of anarchy in the form of civil unrest and strife proved more effective political weapons. The antithesis of monarchy and anarchy appears to have cut across class and partisan politics and to have most effectively rallied a wider following and sympathy for the Crown. Monarchy was systematically projected by staunch royalists, such as the Finance Minister Athanasios Eftaxias (1849–1931), as ‘the pillar of order and peace’ that averts ‘civil conflict’ and other socio-political dangers.Footnote 42

In this crucial role, the monarchs of Greece were presented as ‘the animated symbols of national unity’.Footnote 43 The dichotomy between monarchy and anarchy was so deeply ingrained in the public imagery of the Crown and in civics education that not only accession to but also abdication from the Throne was interpreted as a sacrifice in the interests of averting anarchy. In the 1949 edition of the school manual on civics we read that in 1862 King Otto left Greece ‘because he did not desire to cause a civil war’ between his subjects.Footnote 44 Likewise, the post-war historiographers of the monarchy cum civic educators remind us that sixty years later King Constantine, in an open letter to the prime minister (14 September 1922), presented his abdication as an act of ‘patriotism’ and ‘royal gallantry’ that aimed at forestalling civil strife and internecine carnage.Footnote 45 In a similar manner, the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1918 had been projected as a painful self-sacrifice for the sake of his people, so that the Reich might live in unity.Footnote 46

Such discourse organically interwoven with the institution of monarchy was prominent in Greece during the First World War. From the onset of the National Schism, the royalists stigmatized Venizelos as ‘a maniacal enemy of the King’,Footnote 47 and a herald of ‘anarchy, national disintegration and internecine war’.Footnote 48 They argued further that by disagreeing with the King and by abstaining from the national elections of 6/19 December 1915 Venizelos showed that he did not really want Greece ‘to have a government or a king, so that the country remains in a permanent state of anarchy’.Footnote 49 On this way of thinking, a vote for the anti-Venizelists meant the salvation of ‘the Nation from anarchy’.Footnote 50 For the anti-Venizelists the voters’ choice was between monarchy and anarchy.Footnote 51

In the same way, in the next general elections of 1/14 November 1920, which paved the way for the restoration of Constantine to the throne, Venizelos was once more identified with anarchy, trouble and abnormality: the ideology of Venizelism was castigated as ‘an incitement to successive revolutions’; ‘a source of troubles’; ‘an unexpected whirlwind that blows from below and causes violent storms’; a danger to ‘public order’ and ‘private interests’, i.e. ‘business and capital’.Footnote 52 In the mind of steadfast royalists such as General Ioannis Metaxas there was no doubt that Venizelos was synonymous with ‘social and state anarchy’.Footnote 53 Therefore, in the narrative of the royalist press, a ‘republican Greece’ was an ‘anarchic Greece’Footnote 54, meaning a non-law-abiding polity marred by anarchy and internal turbulence.Footnote 55

These arguments in defence of the monarchy were not short-lived weapons against Venizelos and his liberal radicalism. On the contrary, in the long term they proved to be quite solid and persuasive, as they consolidated the campaign for the restoration of Constantine in 1920 and George II in 1935 and 1946. Besides the revolutionary character of Venizelism, another key to their success was the threat of communism, which made its formidable appearance in October 1917 and added further conviction to the notion of anarchy.Footnote 56 Within this new political framework, in 1920 a tenacious monarchy was presented by its adherents as ‘a necessary bulwark and dam’ against the ‘flood’ of communism and hailed as ‘an instrument of order’ against this new ‘world class of revolutionaries’.Footnote 57 In its envisioned new role, the monarchy was again contrasted with the republic, which was deemed incapable of counteracting the Bolsheviks of Lenin and Trotsky and stemming the Bolshevik current; in the event of the parliamentary elections of 1/14 November 1920, Venizelos (as opposed to the exiled King Constantine) was accordingly identified as the Kerensky of Greece.Footnote 58

In an analogous manner, in 1935, the return of George II to the throne was supposed, in his followers’ eyes, to put an end to ‘a long and turbulent period of political anarchy’ and to terminate ‘the twenty years of civil strife’ which had started in 1915; on that account, the restitution of constitutional monarchy would restore ‘order, peace and tranquillity, safety and stability’ in the turbulent country.Footnote 59 Restoration was propagated as the only ‘way out of political anarchy’, and a safeguard for ‘political stability’ and ‘internal peace and order’.Footnote 60 In addition to being identified with the calamities of the National Schism, republicanism was, in the referendum of 3 November 1935, also craftily associated with communism. The ballot papers in favour of the monarchy were printed in azure (the royal colour of the restored Bourbons in 1814–30), those for the republic in red.Footnote 61

The initial enthusiasm over the restoration of George II receded rather quickly, for nine months after his return to the throne the king gave his consent to the suspension of the constitution and the establishment of an authoritarian regime under Metaxas. The King's popularity and image suffered terribly from his identification with Metaxas and his repressive measures.Footnote 62 As a result of this, during the Axis occupation of Greece, while the king and his exiled royal government were in London, all the major resistance organizations (EAM/ELAS, EDES, EKKA and AAA) were avowedly republican.Footnote 63

However, about a year after the end of the Second World War monarchy in Greece experienced another U-turn in its history. By 1946, the bitter experience of the dramatic internecine events of December 1944 (a Communist-led revolt in Athens) had obliterated the bleak memories of the royal coup of 4 August 1936 and the Metaxas dictatorship (1936–41).Footnote 64 In 1956, the academic historian Apostolos Daskalakis asserted that this traumatic experience had resulted once again in ‘the people wanting above anything else the return of the king [George II] as a guarantor of order’ and a deterrent against the ‘anarchy’ of communism.Footnote 65 For – as the dominant political discourse had it – since ‘the bands of anarchists’ were preparing ‘a revolution against government’, and these ‘anarcho-communists’ were striving to lead the country into ‘an internecine fight’, the return of George II to his throne and the restoration of constitutional monarchy were portrayed as the only solution to Greece's political woes.Footnote 66 Truly, the result of the referendum of 1 September 1946, which was overwhelmingly supportive of the monarchy, was more a vote of aversion toward the KKE than an expression of support for George's restoration.Footnote 67 The Greek Civil War (1946–9) was another prime opportunity for the loyal supporters of monarchy to argue more emphatically that this form of government was ‘the most suitable contemporary force that is indispensable both for peoples’ welfare and for averting internecine wars and the turning of entire civilizations into ruins’.Footnote 68

After a relatively peaceful interval in the 1950s, the monarchy faced new challenges in the 1960s. The anti-communist trump card (along with the concomitant values of tranquillity, order, and social hierarchy) continued to be played by the Crown, but it did not appeal much to the 1960s generation, which was more attracted by the prospect of material progress and social equality.Footnote 69 In a further setback, by falling out with strong political figures, King Paul, who had succeeded George II in 1947, and Queen Frederika were targeted by the entire political spectrum (Left, Centre and Right).Footnote 70 In 1963, King Paul undermined and finally annulled a major constitutional reform, historically known as the ‘Deep Cut’, planned by Konstantinos Karamanlis’ centre-right government, which would have restricted the rights and prerogatives of the Crown.Footnote 71 The breach between the king and the political elites culminated two years later in the resignation of Georgios Papandreou's centrist government and ended in political havoc.Footnote 72

In the turmoil of the years 1965–7, Papandreou, a former Education Minister in Venizelos’ government, recycled the memory of the National Schism of 1915–17 and, in imitation of Venizelos, launched a fierce anti-monarchist campaign.Footnote 73 In reaction to this chaos, King Constantine II, who had succeeded his father Paul in 1964, fell back on his last stronghold, the army. However, the unanticipated coup of 21 April 1967 and the failed royal counter-coup of 13 December 1967 proved that the king had lost control of the armed forces, and he was forced into exile.Footnote 74 The disgraceful entanglement of the throne with putschists and the egalitarian political culture of the 1960s eventually led to the abolition of the monarchy seven years later by a referendum after the fall of the military junta.Footnote 75

Forty years after the abolition of constitutional monarchy, the discourse of the ‘antidote to anarchy’ still survives in Greece. Along identical lines with their predecessors, leading present-day champions of the Greek monarchy argue that this is the sole form of government that, ‘in the best interests of society’, can be the correct ‘remedy’ for or at least a ‘sedative’ to ‘the excessive Ego and individualism of the Greek’; and the antidote for the ‘chronic problem’ of ‘pitiless civil war’, which constitutes ‘a pathology of Greek political life since 1821’. As they see it, by being in a position to subdue the ‘demon’ of ‘chaos’, the Crown secures ‘social cohesion’ and offers a ‘priceless service to the nation’.Footnote 76

Epilogue

This analysis concurs with Jeroen Duindam's argument that the monarchy is a multifaceted, complex and under-researched historical theme. The case study of modern Greece corroborates that during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, despite all the upheavals and adversities, monarchy in Europe experienced a distinct upturn in popularity. In fact, the years 1880–1914 have been plausibly identified by historians as the last apogee of monarchy in Europe.Footnote 77 Monarchy remained popular among Europeans primarily because it was the form of government most comprehensible to innately conservative peasants whose family lives were regulated by patriarchal principles. Moreover, while the political sway and influence once exercised by royalty abated, support for the Crown as the symbol of national unity, stability and permanence in a world of rapid urban and industrial change appeared to increase steeply shortly before the First World War.Footnote 78 In addition to this, the multiple ‘invented traditions’ of royalty, such as coronations, pageantry, marriages, state visits and funerals, and the royal ‘symbolics of power’ (coats of arms, insignia, monuments, etc.) continued till the outbreak of the Great War to provide enormously popular spectacles for an increasingly literate mass audience.Footnote 79

Ironically, the First World War constituted a ‘revolutionary war’ that dramatically altered the balance of political and social power in favour of liberalism, republicanism, ethnic nationalism, Bolshevism and feminism. It certainly emerges as a milestone in the history of monarchy in Europe, not least in Greece, where King Constantine was ousted in 1922 and a republic proclaimed two years later.Footnote 80 The negative outcome of the Great War for the Powers of Central and Eastern Europe was regarded, to a certain degree, as a failure of monarchy. This is because, prior to 1914, royalty east of the Elbe had retained fundamental prerogatives in the conduct of military and foreign policies and symbolized the bellicose qualities of their respective nations.Footnote 81

For this reason, defeat and the calamity of war, together with the incapacity of Europe's most autocratic and powerful monarchs to forestall armed violence, signalled the inglorious end of monarchy in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, and Turkey.Footnote 82 In Greece, the House of Glücksburg, on the basis of its royal prerogatives, was likewise held responsible for the catastrophic defeat of Greece at the hands of Kemalist Turkey in 1922,Footnote 83 with the concomitant loss of Greek-held Western Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace,Footnote 84 and was formally ousted two years later, while the monarchy was simultaneously abolished.Footnote 85

Yet, for all these vicissitudes, monarchy in Greece managed to survive its setbacks and to turn the tables twice in the twentieth century within a difficult domestic and international political environment. This success of the monarchy before the 1960s cannot be attributed solely to staunch royalism and the Machiavellian methods of the Anti-Venizelists,Footnote 86 but to a great extent also to the powerful imagery and symbolism of the Crown, especially its definition as an antithesis of and its effectiveness against any form of ‘anarchy’ (civil war, banditry, left-liberalism, communism, etc.). Greece's low political cultureFootnote 87 and its long history of civil dissension greatly account for this appeal of the monarchical form of government. By virtue of its positive images and perceived extraordinary qualities as a rallying point, namely for being a rallying point of national unity and a powerful symbol of order and stability, royalty swayed the minds of Greeks.

Spyridon G. Ploumidis is Associate Professor of Modern Greek History at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He read History at the Ionian University (Corfu) and holds a doctorate from the University of London. He has published numerous works on nationalism and ethnic rivalry in the Balkans (particularly in Greece and Bulgaria); agrarianism; corporatism; the Metaxas regime (1936–1941); the Asia Minor Question (1891–1922); and the Greek Revolution of 1821.

References

1 Spellman, W. M., Monarchies 1000–2000 (London 2001) 18, 194Google Scholar.

2 J. Duindam, Dynasty. A very short introduction (Oxford 2019) 28.

3 The Palace/Forum type of government is a form of constrained autocracy legitimated by some form of popular election and a (genuine or feigned) show of popular support for the autocrat; see S. E. Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, 1 (Oxford 1997) 1.39–40; 3.1474. Divine Right is a doctrine of royal legitimacy that stems from the claim that kingship descended from Heaven, and that therefore the king is the agent of God, or at least derives his authority from Divine Providence; see Crick, B., ‘Monarchy’, in Outhwaite, W. (ed.), The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought, 2nd edn (Malden, MA 2003) 407Google Scholar.

4 Finer, The History of Government, 1.40–57; 3.1554.

5 Spellman, Monarchies, 209–10.

6 Duindam, Dynasty, 2.

7 HParish, . H., The Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece from the Year 1830 (London 1838) 55, 66, 80, 145Google Scholar.

8 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, (Paris 1925) 2.5–7.

9 S. V. Triantaphyllou and D. Rozos, Ο Θεσμός της Βασιλείας και αι παραδόσεις περί της καταγωγής του ελληνικού βασιλικού οίκου. Ιστορική ανασκόπησις (Athens 1948) 15, 26. See also H. Zervos Iakovatos, Αι δύο πρωτεύουσαι της Ανατολής κατά το 1858 και 1860 και η διπλωματία μετά της Ελλάδος (Cephalonia 1873) 103; G. Finlay, A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864, 7 (The Greek Revolution. Part II. Establishment of the Greek Kingdom), 2nd edn (Oxford 1877) 59, 88, 104–5, 108; S. P. Papageorgiou, Από το Γένος στο Έθνος: η θεμελίωση του ελληνικού κράτους 1821–1862 (Athens 2015) 296–7.

10 Parish, The Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece, 136.

11 Finlay, A History of Greece, 7.59, 88, 104–5, 108; J. Mavrogordato, Modern Greece, A Chronicle and a Survey 1800–1931 (London 1931) 34; S. V. Markezinis, Πολιτική Ιστορία της Νεωτέρας Ελλάδος 1828–1964, 1 (Athens 1966) 95; M. H. Meletopoulos, Η Βασιλεία στην Νεώτερη Ελληνική Ιστορία: από τον Όθωνα στον Κωνσταντίνο Β´ (Athens 1994) 36.

12 Petropulos, J. A., Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833–1843 (Princeton 1968) 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 A. Freiherr-von Prokesch-Osten, Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reich im Jahre 1821 und der Gründung des hellenischen Köningreiches aus diplomatischen Standpunkte, 2 (Vienna 1867) 314–15; cf. Papageorgiou, Από το Γένος στο Έθνος, 304–10.

14 T. E. Evangelidis, Ιστορία του Όθωνος Βασιλέως της Ελλάδος (1832–1862) κατά τας νεωτάτας πηγάς ξένων τε και ημετέρων ιστορικών, 2nd edn (Athens 1894) 39–40 (‘Proclamation’ of King Otto to the Greeks, Nafplion 25 January 1833, o.s.).

15 E. Kyriakidis, Ιστορία του συγχρόνου Ελληνισμού από της ιδρύσεως του βασιλείου της Ελλάδος μέχρι των ημερών μας 1832–1892, 2 (Athens 1892 [repr. Athens 1972]) 191; Markezinis, Πολιτική Ιστορία της Νεωτέρας Ελλάδος, 2 (Athens 1966) 15.

16 Meletopoulos, 42.

17 G. K. Aspreas, Η τεσσαρακονταετηρίς του Βασιλέως Γεωργίου του Α´: ιστορική μονογραφία. Ανέκδοτα. Σκιαγραφία του Βασιλέως Γεωργίου Α´ και της βασ.[ιλικής] Δυναστείας 1863–1903 μετά 35 εικόνων (Athens 1904) 30, 50.

18 Ibid., 2, 4; Triantaphyllou and Rozos, Ο Θεσμός της Βασιλείας, 49; see also A. V. Daskalakis, ‘Το ελληνικόν κράτος’, Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια, 10 (Athens [1956]) 318; W. Miller, Greece (London 1928) 37.

19 Aspreas, Η τεσσαρακονταετηρίς του Βασιλέως Γεωργίου του Α´, 7–8.

20 L. P. Nakos [lawyer and Athens MP], Συμβολή εις την σύγχρονον Ελλην.[ικήν] Ιστορίαν. Βασιλεία και πολίτευμα (Athens 1913) 6, 12, 14.

21 Iakovatos, Αι δύο πρωτεύουσαι της Ανατολής, 103, 121.

22 N. Kazazis, Ο κοινοβουλευτισμός εν Ελλάδι (πολιτική ψυχολογία) (Athens 1910) xi; see Mazower, M., ‘The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie: Venizelos and politics in Greece, 1909–1912’, The Historical Journal 35.4 (1992) 885–904 (896)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; H. Gardikas-Katsiadakis, ‘Venizelos’ advent in Greek politics, 1909–12’, in P.M. Kitromilides (ed.), Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship (Edinburgh 2006) 97. In terms of British politics, the liberal radicals are identified as ‘left liberals’; see K. Passmore, ‘Politics’, in J. Jackson (ed.), Europe 1900–1945 (Oxford 2002) 86–8.

23 Τι πρέπει να γίνη (Athens 1909) 4–5. This anonymous 16-page political pamphlet was written by Alexandros Papanastasiou, a future prime minister and associate of Venizelos. At the time, Papanastasiou was primus inter pares within the so-called Sociological Society, a Piraeus-based society of Fabian socialist and radical intellectuals; see A. Papanastasiou, Μελέτες, λόγοι, άρθρα, ed. X. Lefkoparidis, 1 (Athens [1957]) 45–52.

24 S. I. Stephanou (ed.), Τα κείμενα του Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου. Η ζωντανή ιστορία της δραματικής περιόδου του έθνους, 1909–1936, 1 (Athens 1981) 142, 145 (articles first published in Κήρυξ of Chania, the main Venizelist mouthpiece).

25 Cf. Kazazis, Ο κοινοβουλευτισμός εν Ελλάδι, xi, xiv.

26 L. Boia, Romania: Borderland of Europe, tr. J.C. Brown (London 2006) 87.

27 R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford 2008) 131–2.

28 P. M. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914 (London 1980) 7, 125, 167, 178, 182; J. Hawes, The Shortest History of Germany (Exeter 2018) 97–8, 120–3.

29 E. Siupiur, ‘Charles 1er. Un modèle politique pour les monarques du Sud-Est européen’, in E. Binder-Iijima, H.-D. Löwe and G. Volkmer (eds.), Die Hohenzollern in Rumänien 1866–1947: Eine monarchische Herrschaftsordnung im Europäischen Kontext (Cologne 2010) 124, 128–9; cf. P. W. Schroeder, ‘International politics, peace, and war, 1815–1914’, in T. C. W. Blanning (ed.), The Nineteenth Century Europe 1789–1914 (Oxford 2003) 183–6.

30 Finlay, A History of Greece, 10.289; cf. T. Vellianitis, ‘Γεώργιος Α´, Χριστιανός-Γουλιέλμος-Φερδινάνδος-Αδόλφος’, Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια 8 (Athens [1956]) 319; Meletopoulos, 46 (fn. 30); G. B. Dertilis, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Κράτους 1830–1920 (Heraklion 2015) 534.

31 C. J. Friedrich, ‘Monarchy’, in D. L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, X (New York 1968) 412–13; P.-M. Martin, ‘Les quatre sources de l'idée monarchique sous la république romaine’, in L'idéologie du pouvoir monarchique dans l'antiquité (Paris 1991) 51; Finer, The History of Government, 1.40; Spellman, Monarchies, 17.

32 J.-C. Mühlethaler, ‘Le tyran à table: Intertextualité et référance dans l'invective politique à l’époque de Charles VI’, in J. Blanchard (ed.), Représentations, pouvoir et royauté à la fin du Moyen Âge (Paris 1995) 49.

33 Cf. ‘घήτω ο Βασιλεύς!’, Καθημερινή 429 (6 December 1920) 1 (statements by the leader of the National Conservative Party, Nikolaos Stratos); Καθημερινή 430 (7 December 1920) 1 (statements by King Constantine I upon his restoration).

34 G. N. Philaretos, Ξενοκρατία και βασιλεία εν Ελλάδι 1821–1897 (Athens 1897) 172; S. V. Triantaphyllou, Ελλάς: Εθνική Αγωγή (Athens 1949) 49, 99; K. M. Stamatopoulos, Περί της βασιλείας στη Νεώτερη Ελλάδα (Athens 2015) 45; cf. K. N. Rados, Δανία και Δανοί. Μετά εικόνων και γεωγραφικού πίνακος (Athens 1903) 71.

35 K. Vassileiou, ‘Βασιλεία (η)’, Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια, 6 (Athens 1928) 756.

36 G. N. Philaretos, Δημοκρατισμός του Έλληνος (Athens 1918) 21–2.

37 The term ‘National Schism’ was coined as late as 1935 by the journalist and historiographer Ioannis Passas in Ο παγκόσμιος πόλεμος και ο εθνικός διχασμός (Athens 1935). For academic accounts of the National Schism see Y.G. Mourelos, Τα “Νοεμβριανά” του 1916: Από το αρχείο της Μικτής Επιτροπής Αποζημιώσεων των Θυμάτων (Athens 2007) 150–92 and G. Th. Mavrogordatos, 1915. Ο Εθνικός Διχασμός (Athens 2015) 40–121.

38 The official denunciation of King Constantine took place on 24 November 1916 (O.S.); see K. G. Zavitzianos, Αι αναμνήσεις του εκ της ιστορικής διαφωνίας βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου και Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου όπως την έζησε (1914–1922), 1 (Athens 1946) 228; N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Η Ελλάδα των δύο κυβερνήσεων: καθεστωτικά, διπλωματικά και οικονομικά προβλήματα του Εθνικού Διχασμού (Athens 1988) 49; Mavrogordatos, 1915, 100–1.

39 Εθνική Άμυνα 6 (Heraklion 20 April 1917) 1 (‘Manifesto’ of Ioannis D. Tsirimokos to ‘the Cretan People’); Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων της Βουλής, period XX, session II (Athens 1931) 201 (speech of Georgios Kafantaris on 11 August 1917, o.s.); Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων της Βουλής, period XX, session IV (Athens 1931) 1059 (speech of Eleftherios Venizelos on 25 August 1920, o.s.).

40 P. N. Pipinelis, Το Στέμμα εις το πλαίσιον των δημοκρατικών θεσμών (Athens 1960) 9; see also: Th. Diamantopoulos, Οι πολιτικές δυνάμεις της βενιζελικής περιόδου, 1 (Athens 1985) 43; Th. Veremis, Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: ο οραματιστής του εφικτού (Athens 2017) 24.

41 The Reservists (officially, the Panhellenic Association of Reservists) were a royalist paramilitary organization formed in the summer of 1916 in the immediate aftermath of the demobilization of the Greek army, following the demands of a collective note submitted by the Entente Powers to the Greek government on 8/21 June. In the controversy between Venizelos and Constantine, the royalist agenda benefited from propaganda disseminated in the barracks and from the popularity that King Constantine had gained from his remarkable feats as Field Marshal in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. See G. Th. Mavrogordatos, Εθνικός Διχασμός και μαζική οργάνωση: οι Επίστρατοι του 1916 (Athens 1996) 66; Mavrogordatos, 1915, 85–6, 89, 99–100; Ch. D. Vittos, Ο Εθνικός Διχασμός και η γαλλική Κατοχή (1915–1920) (Thessaloniki 2008) 94–5; Ploumidis, S. G., ‘From the Old to the New Greater Greece: The bellicose evolution of the Greek Great Idea in 1912–1913’, Études balkaniques 49.2 (2013) 85–8Google Scholar.

42 A. P. Eftaxias, Η Ελλάς εν τω μεταιχμίω ζωής και θανάτου: πολιτική μελέτη ανατυπωθείσα εκ του Νεολόγου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (Athens 1897) 158.

43 [S. Dragoumis], Εις έργον προς ανόρθωσιν. Επιστολαί και γνώμαι πολιτευομένου πρώην βουλευτού Μεγαρίδος (Athens 1897) 12. See also N. Alikakou, Αγωγή του Πολίτου. Εθνική αγωγή και στοιχεία κοινωνιολογίας – κοινωνικής οικονομίας – ισχύοντος δικαίου διά την Μέσην Εκπαίδευσιν, 3rd edn (Athens 1947) 26, (where it is argued that the Crown and the royal insignia symbolize ‘national unity’); cf. V. Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (Oxford 1995) 63. In twentieth-century Greece, the German-inspired civic education (Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung) was the study of theoretical and practical aspects of citizenship. It included civil law and the basic concepts of government, as well as the rights and duties of citizens. Its principal aim was to instil the ideals of the rule of law, order and justice, and the principles of ‘moral society’; see G. Kerschensteiner, Η έννοια της αγωγής του πολίτη, tr. E. S. Kakouros (Athens 1926) 7, 11–12, 41–2, 44, 53, 68, 70.

44 Triantaphyllou, Ελλάς: Εθνική Αγωγή, 48. See also Kyriakidis, Ιστορία του συγχρόνου Ελληνισμού, II, 180; D. Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770–1923 (London 1972) 88.

45 Triantaphyllou and Rozos, Ο Θεσμός της Βασιλείας, 56–7.

46 J. C. G. Röhl, ‘The Unicorn in Winter: Kaiser Wilhelm II in exile in the Netherlands, 1918–1941’, in P. Mansel and T. Riotte (eds.), Monarchy and Exile: the politics of legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II (Basingstoke 2011) 337.

47 Ch. Christoulakis, Ποίος πραγματικώς είνε ο Βενιζέλος, offprint from Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις (Athens 1915), cited in G. S. Ploumidis, ‘Αντιβενιζελικά φυλλάδια και η πολεμική τους (1910–1935)’, in Th. Veremis and O. Dimitrakopoulos (eds.), Μελετήματα γύρω από τον Βενιζέλο και την εποχή του (Athens 1980) 612.

48 ‘Ο θρίαμβος του Ελληνικού Λαού’, Σκριπ 7,766 (7 December 1915) 1.

49 ‘Ποία είνε η έννοια της αποχής εκ της ψηφοφορίας’, Εμπρός 6,874 (5 December 1915) 1.

50 ‘Η μεγάλη σημασία της σημερινής ιστορικής ημέρας’, Σκριπ 7,765 (6 December 1915) 1.

51 ‘Τα αναπόφευκτα συμπεράσματα της προχθεσινής εκλογής’, Εμπρός 6,877 (8 December 1915) 1.

52 ‘Ο ταραξίας’, Καθημερινή 365 (3 October 1920) 1; ‘1917–1920’, Καθημερινή 428 (5 December 1920) 1.

53 Μ., ‘Να λησμονήσωμεν’, Μέλλον 323 (27 October 1926) 2. The weekly Μέλλον was a mouthpiece of Metaxas’ Free Thinkers’ Party (est. 1922). It was published in Argostoli, Cephalonia, Metaxas’ birthplace and powerbase.

54 ‘Διδάγματα από το παρελθόν’, Εφημερίς των Ελλήνων 1 (18 May 1935) 3. This Athens daily was an organ of the Royalists’ Union, a coalition of royalist parties that was forged under the leadership of Metaxas ahead of the general elections of 9 June 1935.

55 M. Malainos, ‘Τι πταίει! Το φάντασμα’, Εφημερίς των Ελλήνων 9 (26 May 1935) 1.

56 The Socialist Workers’ Party of Greece joined the Third International in April 1920; see G. D. Katsoulis, Ιστορία του Κομμουνιστικού Κόμματος Ελλάδας, I (Athens [1976]) 181.

57 ‘Δημοκρατία;’, Καθημερινή 171 (7 March 1920) 1.

58 Ibid.; ‘Κερένσκυ’, Καθημερινή 406 (13 November 1920) 1. The socialist revolutionary Alexander Kerensky was the head of the Provisional Government that was overthrown by the Bolsheviks on 25 October 1917 (o.s.). Henceforth, Kerensky's name became a synonym for political feebleness; see S. A. Smith, The Russian Revolution. A very short introduction (Oxford 2002) 34–9.

59 Καθημερινή 4945 (1 November 1935) 1 (speech by Panagis Tsaldaris, leader of the conservative Popular Party, to the ‘People’ of Athens); Γ.Α.Β. [G. A. Vlachos], ‘Σταθμός’, Καθημερινή 4948 (4 November 1935) 1; ‘Γαλήνη’, Καθημερινή 4967 (23 November 1935) 1; Πρωΐα 11–3 and 11–4 (3 and 4 November 1935) 1 (addresses by Tsaldaris and Regent Georgios Kondylis ‘to the Greek People’).

60 I. Metaxas, ‘Η Ένωσις Βασιλοφρόνων’, Εφημερίς των Ελλήνων 1 (18 May 1935) 1; I. Metaxas, ‘Η ακατανίκητος δύναμις των πραγμάτων’, Εφημερίς των Ελλήνων 145 (12 January 1936) 7.

61 J. S. Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935–1941 (Oxford 1977) 18–19, 25; G. Hering, Τα πολιτικά κόμματα στην Ελλάδα 1821–1936, tr. Th. Paraskevopoulos, 2 (Athens 2008) 1247.

62 S. G. Ploumidis, Το καθεστώς Ιωάννη Μεταξά (1936–1941) (Athens 2016) 38, 181–2. In his reports, the American Ambassador to Athens. Lincoln MacVeagh, identifies George II and Metaxas as ‘Siamese twins’, and their close relationship as the ‘Gordian knot’; see J. O. Iatrides (ed.), Ambassador MacVeagh Reports. Greece, 1933–1947 (Princeton 1980) 150.

63 H. Fleischer, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα: Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης 1941–1944, 1 (Athens [1989]) 147–50, 371–2, 383, 387–8.

64 Technically, the Fourth of August regime was a royal dictatorship, akin to those of King Alexander in Yugoslavia, King Boris ΙΙΙ in Bulgaria, and King Carol ΙΙ in Romania. Kingship remained throughout its duration the cornerstone of its power structure; hence its most despised opponents were the Venizelists and Communists (venizelokommounistes), i.e. the arch-enemies of monarchy that had already been tainted as anarchists; see Ploumidis, Το καθεστώς Ιωάννη Μεταξά, 20, 67, 72–3; G. Th. Mavrogordatos, Μετά το 1922. Η παράταση του Διχασμού (Athens 2017) 85–6.

65 Daskalakis, ‘Το ελληνικόν κράτος’, 328; see also Markezinis, Πολιτική Ιστορία της Νεωτέρας Ελλάδος, II, 15; D. I. Papadimitriou, Από τον λαό των νομιμοφρόνων στο έθνος των εθνικοφρόνων. Η συντηρητική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα 1922–1967 (Athens 2006) 235, 260.

66 Εμπρός 463 (1 September 1946) 1 (proclamation by the Minister of Armed Forces and Acting Leader of the Popular Party, Petros K. Mavromichalis, ‘to the Greek people’).

67 V. Kondis, ‘Η εμφύλια διαμάχη, 1944–1949’, in Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (Athens 2015 [2000]) 123.

68 Triantaphyllou and Rozos, Ο Θεσμός της Βασιλείας, 5.

69 Cf. K. E. Botsiou, ‘Το Στέμμα και ο «Συμμαχικός Παράγοντας» 1961–1967’, in M. Vasilakis (ed.), Από τον Ανένδοτο στη Δικτατορία (Athens 2009) 91, 93, 97, 104–5, 108; E. Hatzivassiliou, Ελληνικός φιλελευθερισμός: το ριζοσπαστικό ρεύμα, 1932–1979 (Athens 2010) 377–9.

70 K. E. Botsiou, ‘Η αρχή του τέλους της βασιλευομένης: Στέμμα και κρίση ηγεμονίας τη δεκαετία του ’60’, in A. Rigos, S. I. Seferiades and E. Hatzivassiliou (eds.), Η «σύντομη» δεκαετία του ’60: Θεσμικά πλαίσια, κομματικές στρατηγικές, κοινωνικές συγκρούσεις, πολιτισμικές διεργασίες (Athens 2008) 106, 114; D. P. Sotiropoulos, Από τον Ανένδοτο στο «Δεξιά-Αντιδεξιά» (Athens 2019) 61–2.

71 Hatzivassiliou, Ελληνικός φιλελευθερισμός, 385–92; N. K. Alivizatos, Το Σύνταγμα και οι εχθροί του στη νεοελληνική ιστορία 1800–2010 (Athens 2011) 375–80.

72 E. Nikolakopoulos, Η καχεκτική δημοκρατία: κόμματα και εκλογές, 1946–1967 (Athens 2001) 339–52; S. Rizas, Η ελληνική πολιτική μετά τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο: κοινοβουλευτισμός και δικτατορία (Athens 2008) 328–64; Sotiropoulos, Από τον Ανένδοτο στο «Δεξιά-Αντιδεξιά», 126–9.

73 Ch. Triantaphyllou, ‘Ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος στη συλλογική μνήμη: η ανάδειξη ενός εθνικού συμβόλου (1936–1967). Πολιτικές χρήσεις, ιστοριογραφικές αποτυπώσεις, δημόσιες μνημονεύσεις’, unpublished PhD thesis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens 2020, 191–2, 213–7.

74 Klarevas, L., ‘Were the Eagle and the Phoenix birds of a feather? The United States and the Greek coup of 1967’, Diplomatic History 30 (2006) 471–508CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rizas, Η ελληνική πολιτική μετά τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο, 420–39; Botsiou, ‘Η αρχή του τέλους της βασιλευομένης’, 121; Sotiropoulos, Από τον Ανένδοτο στο «Δεξιά-Αντιδεξιά», 133–8.

75 The referendum on the form of government, which was held on 8 December 1974, returned a clear majority of 69% for the republic; see Alivizatos, Το Σύνταγμα και οι εχθροί του, 495.

76 Stamatopoulos, Περί της βασιλείας, 28–9, 39–42.

77 Spellman, Monarchies, 226.

78 Ibid., 210, 232–3.

79 Ibid., 233.

80 Friedrich, ‘Monarchy’, 414; Passmore, ‘Politics’, 93; D. Bacharas, ‘La Grèce après la guerre: dictature et république dans un monde en mutation (1922–1925)’, unpublished PhD thesis, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales/Centre de Recherches Historiques, Paris 2010, 36, 330, 356–7.

81 Spellman, Monarchies, 235–6, 238.

82 Ibid., 242, 270; Kershaw, I., To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914–1949 (London 2016) 88–91Google Scholar.

83 Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων της Δ´ των Ελλήνων Συνελεύσεως, Ι (Athens 1924) 27 (parliamentary speech by A. Papanastasiou, 23 January 1924, o.s.).

84 Ελεύθερος Τύπος 2432 (5 November 1923) 2 (public speech by General Theodoros Pangalos).

85 Mavrogordatos, Μετά το 1922, 40.

86 I am particularly referring here to the the referendum of 1935, which returned a result of 98% for King George II and was obviously rigged; see Hering, Τα πολιτικά κόμματα στην Ελλάδα, II, 1246–7; Mavrogordatos, Μετά το 1922, 76–8, 441–5.

87 In Finer's terms, Greece falls into the category of countries of low political culture, in which localism and provincialism play a major role in politics, and pluralism is minimal: Finer, S. E., The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd edn (New Brunswick 2002) 129–31, 137Google Scholar.