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Britain’s central role in the search for an international peacekeeping force for Cyprus, 1963-64

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2016

James Ker-Lindsay
James Ker-Lindsay*
Affiliation:
Royal United Services Institute
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Abstract

This work examines the way in which the British, Greek and Turkish Governments established a peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, in Cyprus in December 1963 and how the United Kingdom, aided by the United States, subsequently handled the creation of a replacement international peacekeeping force. Although the United Kingdom did everything in its power to keep peacekeeping efforts under its own control for as long as possible, when this was no longer feasible it tried to create a NATO-based peacekeeping force. This was opposed by the (Greek Cypriot) Government of Cyprus which favoured a United Nations peacekeeping force. Given the tensions between the British Government and the Government of Cyprus over which of these two international bodies should be responsible for peacekeeping it is strange that the United Kingdom never took seriously Greek Cypriot calls to have the Commonwealth considered as an alternative to the other two. This work examines these processes and analyses why the United Kingdom favoured NATO, opposed the UN and to all intents and purposes ignored the Commonwealth.

Type
Articles
Information
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies , Volume 23 , 1999 , pp. 222 - 245
Copyright
Copyright © The Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, University of Birmingham 1999

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References

1. The general characteristics of a peacekeeping operation are the use of military forces, granted permission to act as peacekeepers by the conflicting parties, in an impartial and non-coercive way in order to prevent those conflicting parties from engaging in violence. Insofar as peacekeeping was not mentioned in the Charter, Dag Hammarskjold, the second Secretary-General of the UN, once said peacekeeping equates to Chapter 6½ of the Charter of the United Nations. Brady, Christopher & Daws, Sam, ‘UN Operations: The Political-Military Interface’, International Peacekeeping 1 (Spring 1994) 65 Google Scholar. The first peacekeeping force was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) created during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

2. See for example, White, N.D., Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester 1993) 211 Google Scholar. James, Alan, Peacekeeping in International Politics (London 1990) 5–6 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. ‘CYPRUS: Memorandum by the Prime Minister’, 2 January 1964, CAB 129/116. Both the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers actually claimed credit for the idea. The Cyprus Mail, 27 December 1964. As a result we are unlikely ever to know which Government actually put the plan forward.

4. Crawshaw, Nancy, ‘Cyprus: The Political Background’, in Koumoulides, John T.A.: Cyprus in Transition (London 1989) 2 Google Scholar.

5. In addition to the Greek and Turkish forces (ELDYK and TURDYK) stationed on the island the force was composed of three British regiments: the 1st Gloucesters (the Glosters), the 3rd Green Jackets, and the RAF Regiment: Keesing ‘s Contemporary Archives, 13-20 June 1964, p. 0114.

6. Foreign Office (FO) Telegram to Ankara, No. 2247, 27 December 1963, FO 371/168984.

7. Telegram from UKMIS UN New York to FO, No. 2346, 27 December 1963, FO 371/168983.

8. ibid.

9. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No. 2237, 27 December 1963, FO 371/168983.

10. Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, 2 (Nicosia) 21.

11. United Nations Security Council Document, S/5488.

12. Telegram from Nicosia to the CRO, No. 1103, 28 December 1963, FO 371/168984.

13. The New York Times, 28 December 1963.

14. Telegram from Nicosia to the CRO, No. 1114, 28 December 1963, FO 371/168985.

15. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, June 13-20 1964, p. 20113.

16. The Turkish Cypriot leadership accepted on the condition that the conference would have only five parties (rather than six if the Government of the Republic of Cyprus were included), namely: the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriot Community, and the Turkish Cypriot Community. Sandys apparently agreed to this but was asked to confirm it in writing. When he did so he signed the document but underneath wrote ‘Good luck to you.’ The Turkish Cypriot leadership argue that Sandys was thereby negating the promise as this comment insinuated that it would be up to the Turkish Cypriots to enforce this promise. Osman Orek (Minister of Defence, 1960-63), personal interview with the author.

17. The Cyprus Mail, 4 January 1964.

18. Document contained in FO 371/174745.

19. 9 January 1964, CAB 128/38.

20. United Nations Security Council Document, S/5514.

21. The Cyprus Mail, 20 January 1964. This move by U Thant to appoint an observer was opposed by the Soviet Union, which had long been concerned at any attempts by UN Secretaries-General to try to develop an independent role for themselves. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, they berated U Thant for having sent an observer to Cyprus without having received a Security Council Mandate to do so. As the letter stated: ‘It is the Security Council which, under the Charter, is responsible for taking practical measures to maintain international peace and security.’ ‘Letter dated 29 January 1964 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Republics to the Secretary-General’, United Nations Security Council Document, S/5526.

22. For example, on 1 January 1964, the British Government sent six hundred men of the 2nd Artillery Regiment to Cyprus as infantry leaving their field guns in the United Kingdom, the headquarters of the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade and a battalion from the Parachute Regiment. The Times, 2 January 1964.

23. The main problem was that soon after the outbreak of fighting the Turkish troops had withdrawn from their barracks. These troops needed to be persuaded to return before the Greek Government would allow its own forces to participate.

24. ‘Note of a talk with Mr. Kyprianou on 20th January 1964’, FO 371/174745.

25. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No. 110, 25 December 1963, FO 371/168982.

26. ‘Note of a talk with Mr. Kyprianou on 20 January 1964’, FO 371/174745. On the subject of the role of African troops, one senior Greek Cypriot political figure, although an opponent of peacekeeping at that time, stated that he could not recall such an objection by the Greek Cypriots but in any case such troops were preferable to British troops insofar as he regarded them as being more objective. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author.

27. See for example a statement by Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, The Cyprus Mail, 4 January 1964.

28. George Ball, The Past has Another Pattern (London 1982) 340.

29. Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition 1 (Nicosia) [n.d.] 323.

30. The Cyprus Mail, 31 January 1964.

31. Reuters, 30 January 1964.

32. The Cyprus Mail, 2 February 1964.

33. Document dated 3 February 1964, FO 371/174747.

34. It is worth noting that at the bottom of the document the Permanent Secretary, Sir Harold Caccia, who had been more in favour of the UN at an earlier stage, had written, ‘This is the sort of stuff that Lord Palmerston would have rejoiced to use or to hear from an Ally. Perhaps the PM as well as the Commonwealth Secretary should be told.’ Butler [the Foreign Secretary] in turn wrote ‘Prime Minister, as Sir H. Caccia suggests you may find some comfort from this.’ Beneath this second comment, and written in the Prime Minister’s own hand were the words, ‘Good Stuff.’ Ibid.

35. Document dated 3 February 1964, FO 371/174747.

36. The New York Times, 6 February 1964.

37. Reuters, 7 February 1964.

38. Reuters, 8 February 1964.

39. ‘Letter dated 8 February 1964 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council’, United Nations Security Council Document, S/5534.

40. For the British Government’s reply see ‘Text of a letter from the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, to Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR’, dated 8 February 1964, contained in the House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, Volume 689, period from 10-21 February 1964, p. 111 (written answers). The reply from President Johnson of the United States of America, dated 4 March 1964, can be found in FO 371/174747. The reply from Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos of Greece, dated 11 February 1964, can be found as ‘Letter dated 15 February from the Representative of Greece to the Secretary-General’, United Nations Security Council Document, S/5549. The reply from Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey, dated 24 February 1964, is in FO 371/174748.

41. Document contained in FO 371/174747.

42. ‘Cyprus: Action should Archbishop Makarios not accept the revised Four Power Proposal’, 8 February 1964, FO 371/174747.

43. ibid.

44. ibid.

45. The New York Times, 10 February 1964. However, if the comments of Ambassador Kuneralp, the Turkish Ambassador in the United Kingdom, are correct then it appears as if Turkey may have accepted some form of UN involvement three weeks prior to this. Memorandum dated 22 January 1964, FO 371/174646.

46. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern, 343. This decision was attributed by Ball to be ‘out of a desire to limit Britain’s responsibility.’

47. Makarios had actually stated to Ball that if he did not take the issue to the Security Council then he and some of his Ministers would face serious consequences, even death. ‘Document contained in FO 371/174747. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, a prominent politician at the time and Makarios’s personal physician, states that the tone with which Makarios gave this news to Ball was not belligerent but instead seemed to indicate that he sincerely believed that he had no other option. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author.

48. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern, 348.

49. ‘Letter dated 15 February 1964 from the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council’, United Nations Security Council Document S/5543.