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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
Of all legal disciplines, constitutional law is the most affected by the European Communities and their law. It is true that the law of competition and restrictive trade practices (to take an example) has, to an important extent, been altered and is currently regulated by Community law. However, the new elements in the European law of restrictive practices are only indirectly related to the nature or structure of the Community and its law as such. They could (with the exception of the new possibilities of judicial review through the European Court of Justice) just as well have come from a traditional international treaty as from international law. For, when we think of the law of restrictive practices we mainly think of what the rules say and much less of how they are enacted—in other words the content of rules and much less their legal nature.
1 For reasons of simplicity I am talking of the “European Community” although of course there are three, legally separate, Communities, sharing however the same organs or institutions. This simplification may also be justified by the fact that the discussion of Community problems mostly refers to the European Economic Community, by far the most important of the three Communities.
2 See R. Schumann, Préface, in Reuter, P., La Communauté du charbon et de l'acier (Paris, 1965), p. 5Google Scholar: “pas de documents communs à tous les signataires et ayant ainsi une valeur interpretative.”
3 See case 8/55, 16 July 1956, Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v. High Authority (1956)Google Scholar 2 Recueil 199; case 5–11, 13–15/62, 14 December 1962, Sociéta Industriale Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority [1963]Google Scholar C.M.L.R. 13; case 18/63, 19 March 1964, Schmitz & Wollast v. E.E.C. (1964)Google Scholar 10 Recueil 163; case 11/70, 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. [1972]Google Scholar C.M.L.R. 255.
4 Art. 20 ECSC Treaty; Art. 137 EEC Treaty; Art. 107 Euratom Treaty.
5 As those of the judgment of the European Court on the European Road Transport Agreement, case 22/70, 31 March 1971 [1971] C.M.L.R. 335.Google Scholar
6 See Hans, Peter IpsenEuropäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Tübingen, 1972), pp. 66Google Scholaret seq., 198 et seq.
7 See also Green, A. W., Political Integration by Jurisprudence (Leyden, 1969).Google Scholar
8 Aktuelle Fragen des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, Abhandlungen aus dem gesamten Bürgerlichen Recht, Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (1965), vol. 29.Google Scholar
9 See footnote 3, case 11/70.
10 Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, supra, pp. 124 et seq.
11 Case 26/62, 5 February 1963. NV Algemene Transport en Expiditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.Google Scholar
12 Case 57/65, 16 June 1966, Lütticke v. Hauplzollamt Saarelouis [1971] C.M.L.R. 674.Google Scholar
13 Case 9/70, 6 October 1970, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein [1971] C.M.L.R. 1.Google Scholar
14 Note 5, supra.
15 See the angry article in Le Monde of 27 April 1971, pp. 19–20Google Scholar: La Cour de Justice de Luxembourg a-t-elle outrepassé ses compétences?
16 Pt. II, § 5.
