^{page 264 note 1} Lawson, , “‘Das subjektive Recht’ in the English Law of Torts.” Selected Essays, Vol. 1 (North-Holland, 1977), p. 176Google Scholar.

^{page 264 note 2} Ibid., p. 177.

^{page 264 note 3} Ibid., p. 183.

^{page 264 note 4} lonescu, . La notion de droil subjectif dans le droil prive (Bruylant, Brussels, 2e éd.. 1978). pp. 141–149Google Scholar.

^{page 264 note 5} See generally, , Ghestin, & Goubcaux, , Traité de droit civil: introduction générale (L.G.D.J., Paris, 1977), pp. 124–141Google Scholar; Weil, & Terré, , Droit civil: introduction générate (Dalloz, Paris, 4e éd., 1979), pp. 82–87Google Scholar.

^{page 265 note 6} See, e.g., Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra, p. 110–115.

^{page 265 note 7} Ibid., p. 110.

^{page 265 note 8} Weill & Terré, op. cit., p. 82.

^{page 265 note 9} Lawson, op. dt., p. 177.

^{page 265 note 10} Ibid., p. 66.

^{page 265 note 11} Ibid., p. 67.

^{page 265 note 12} Woolf, Lord Justice, “Public Law—Private Law: Why the Divide?” [1986] P.L. 220Google Scholar.

^{page 265 note 13} Lawson, op. cit., p. 67.

^{page 265 note 14} Young, Hugo, The Guardian, 31 10 1985. p. 19Google Scholar.

^{page 266 note 15} Villey, , Seize essais dephilosophie du droit (Dalloz, Paris, 1969), pp 152ffGoogle Scholar; Ghestin & Goubeaux, op. cit., para. 206.Primarily because “la base principale des situations juridiques subjectives (ou droits subjectifs) est la volonté”: Dijon, , Lesujei de droit (Larcier, 1982), para. 94Google Scholar.

^{page 266 note 16} Ionescu, op. cit., pp. 131–134.

^{page 266 note 17} C.7.37.3.

^{page 266 note 18} Roubier, , Thiorie générale du droit (Sirey, Paris, 2e éd., 1951), pp. 66–67, 79Google Scholar.

^{page 266 note 19} See generally, Ionescu, op. cit., pp. 61–70; cf. Stein, , “The Fate of the Institutional System,” Huldigungsbundel Paul van Warmelo (Pretoria, 1984), pp. 220ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 266 note 20} Bergel, , Le droit des biens (P.U.F., Paris, 1983), p. 30Google Scholar; cf. Hinsley, , Sovereignty (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1986), p. 129Google Scholar.

^{page 266 note 21} Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge, reprint 1965), pp. 538–539.

^{page 267 note 22} Stein, , Legal Institutions (Butterworths, 1984), pp. 125–129Google Scholar; Samuel, , “Roma n Law an d Legal Theory,” Mélanges Villey (P.U.d'Aix-Marseille, 1985), pp. 43, 48Google Scholar.

^{page 267 note 23} Kahn-Freund, , in Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions (R.K.P., 1949), p. 21Google Scholar; Friedmann, , Law in a Changing Society (Penguin, 2nd ed., 1972), pp. 94–98Google Scholar.

^{page 267 note 24} Villey, , La formation de la pensée jurisdique moderne (Montchrestien, Paris, 4e éd., 1975), pp. 526ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 267 note 25} See e.g., Kiralfy, , “La w and Right in English Legal History” (1985) 6 Journal of Legal History 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Things may now be changing: see Lloyd, & Freeman, , Introduction to Jurisprudence (Stevens. 5th ed., 1985), pp. 432ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 267 note 26} Lawson, op. cit., p; 180.

^{page 267 note 27} Lawson, supra.

^{page 268 note 28} See Early Law and Custom (1883), pp. 365–366.

^{page 268 note 29} ViUey, , Philosophic du droit: II (Dalloz, Paris, 1979), p. 159Google Scholar; Le droit et les droits de I'homme (P.U.F., Paris, 1983), p. 66.

^{page 268 note 30} Villey, La formation (op. tit.), p. 700.

^{page 268 note 31} Cf. Kiralfy, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

^{page 268 note 32} Villey, Philosophie (op. cit.), pp. 156–159.

^{page 268 note 33} Pugliese, , “‘Re corporales,’ res incorporales' e il problema del diritto soggettivo.” Studi Arangio-Ruiz (Jovene, Naples, 1953), III, pp. 225ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 269 note 34} See Harlow, & Rawlings, , Law and Administration (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), pp. 1–59Google Scholar.

^{page 269 note 35} “Governmental Liability: Law of England—General and Constitutional Questions,” Report for the U.K.N.C.C.L. Colloquium on Governmental Liability, Birmingham University, 09 1985Google Scholar.

^{page 269 note 36} See, e.g., Shaw v. D.P.P. [1962] A.C. 220.

^{page 269 note 37} See, e.g., Thomas v. N.U.M. [1986] Ch. 20.

^{page 269 note 38} David, & Brierley, , Major Legal Systems in the World Today (Stevens, 3rd ed., 1985), pp. 316–317Google Scholar.

^{page 269 note 39} Milsom, , Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths, 2nd ed., 1981), p. 243Google Scholar.

^{page 269 note 40} Lawson, op. cit., p. 181.

^{page 269 note 41} Weir, “Complex Liabilities,” International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XI, Chap. 12, para. 8.

^{page 269 note 42} Roubier, , Droits subjectifs et situations juridiques (Dalloz, Paris, 1963), pp. 9ff., 73ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 270 note 43} Weir, op. cit., para. 67; Stein, Legal Institutions (op. cit.), p. 125.

^{page 270 note 44} Samuel, , “Roman Law and Modern Capitalism” (1984) 4 L.S. 185Google Scholar.

^{page 270 note 45} Weir, , A Casebook on Tort (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed., 1983), p. 269Google Scholar.

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^{page 270 note 47} Twining, & Miers, , How To Do Things With Rules (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2nd ed., 1982), pp. 284ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 270 note 48} See, e.g, King v. Liverpool City Council [1986] 1 W.L.R. 890, 902.

^{page 270 note 49} Read v. J. Lyons & Co. [1947] A.C. 156; cf. Brown, & Garner, , French Administrative Law (Butterworths, 3rd ed., 1983), pp. 122–123Google Scholar.

^{page 270 note 50} See, e.g., Miller v. Jackson [1977] Q.B. 966; Ex p. Island Records Ltd. [1978] Ch. 122.

^{page 270 note 51} Hart, , Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford, 1983), p. 28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page 271 note 52} Weir, “Complex Liabilities” (op. cit..), para. 4.

^{page 271 note 53} Jhering, , Geist des romischen Rechts: III (1865), pp. 332ffGoogle Scholar; Villey. Seize essais (op. cit.), pp. 208–220.

^{page 271 note 54} Lloyd & Freeman, op. cit., pp. 566ff.

^{page 271 note 55} Ionescu, op. cit., pp. 141–149.

^{page 271 note 56} Lawson, op. cit., p. 183.

^{page 271 note 57} Cf. Batiffol, , Problèmes de base de philosophie du droit (L.G.D.J., Paris. 1979), pp. 178ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 271 note 58} Atiyah, , Promises, Morals and Law (Oxford, 1981), pp. 9–28Google Scholar.

^{page 271 note 59} See, e.g., Palatine Graphic Arts Co. Ltd. v. Liverpool City Council [1986] Q.B. 335, C.A.; Griffith, , The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana, 3rd ed., 1985), pp. 202–203Google Scholar.

^{page 271 note 60} See e.g., National Westminster Bank plc v. Morgan [1985] A.C. 686, H.L.

^{page 271 note 61} See, e.g., N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A. M. Satterthwaite & Co. [1975] A.C. 154, P.C.; Atiyah, , The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979), pp. 716ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 272 note 62} Jacquemin, & Schrans, , Le droit économique (P.U.F., Paris, 3rd éd., 1982), p. 106Google Scholar.

^{page 272 note 63} Villey, , Le droit romain (P.U.F., Paris, 7e éd., 1979), pp. 99–108Google Scholar.

^{page 272 note 64} But cf. MacCormick, , Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford, 1982), pp. 154–166Google Scholar.

^{page 272 note 65} Cf. MacCormick in Lloyd & Freeman, op. cit., p. 461.

^{page 272 note 66} Batiffol, op. cit., pp. 303, 313. The distinction between “ius” and “interest” may well have been recognised by the Romans: see, e.g., D1.6.2; 47.7.8pr; 47.8.13, 23.

^{page 272 note 67} Villey, Seize essais (op. cit.), pp. 212ff.

^{page 272 note 68} See D.19.5.3–4.

^{page 273 note 69} See D.44.7.51.

^{page 273 note 70} Stein, , “Roman and Common Law” (1979) 59 Boston Univ.L.R. 437Google Scholar.

^{page 273 note 71} Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 Q.B. 232, 242–243.

^{page 273 note 72} See, e.g., Priming and Numerical Registrating Co. v. Sampson (1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465; but cf. Reynolds', observation: (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 628, 633Google Scholar.

^{page 273 note 73} Weir, Casebook (op. cit.), pp. 401–406.

^{page 273 note 74} Wilson v. Lombank Ltd. [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1294; Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s.1.

^{page 273 note 75} Weir, Casebook, pp. 343–344.

^{page 273 note 76} Rigby v. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 W.L.R.1242.

^{page 274 note 77} See, e.g., Lawson, , The Rational Strength of English Law (Stevens, 1951), pp. 143–147Google Scholar.

^{page 274 note 78} Lawson, “Das subjektive Recht” (op. cit.), p. 183.

^{page 274 note 79} Cf. Jones, , Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (Oxford, 1940), 175–176Google Scholar.

^{page 274 note 80} See, e.g., French New Code of Civil Procedure, Art 12.

^{page 274 note 81} Stein, “The Fate of the Institutional System” (op cit), pp. 218ff.

^{page 274 note 82} David & Brierley, op. cit. pp. 321–323.

^{page 274 note 83} See, e.g., Dutton v. Bognor Regis U.D.C. [1972] 1 Q.B. 373

^{page 274 note 84} [1964] A.C. 465.

^{page 275 note 85} See, e.g., Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch. 384, 416.

^{page 275 note 86} See, e.g., Chief Constable of Kent v. V. [1983] Q.B 34, 43, 46 where it is the plaintiff's duty which gives rise to his right to an injunction.

^{page 275 note 87} See, e.g., Morris v. Beardmore [1980] A.C. 446.

^{page 275 note 88} David & Brierley, op. cit., p. 321.

^{page 275 note 89} This idea is latent in the expression “equity acts in personam”: English legal thought does not operate on the Roman idea of suing a thing (cf. Gaius 4.16–17.)

^{page 275 note 90} Cf. Weir, Casebook, p. 436.

^{page 275 note 91} See generally Gummow, Heydon & Austin, , Cases and Materials on Equity (Butterworths, Australia, 1975), pp. 20–66Google Scholar.

^{page 275 note 92} Cf. Weir, Casebook, pp. 443–444. And so is an area like that of copyright. With regard to the actio in rem, see D.6.1.9, 13.

^{page 275 note 93} See, e.g., Heydon, Gummow & Austin, supra.

^{page 276 note 94} See, e.g. Ingram, v. Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31.

^{page 276 note 95} Leigh & Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. [1986] A.C. 785, 816–817.

^{page 276 note 96} Weir, Casebook, pp. 4–5.

^{page 276 note 97} See, e.g., Ex p. Island Records Ltd. [1978] Ch. 122; Tate & Lyle Food and Distribution Ltd. v. G.L.C. [1983] 2 A.C. 509.

^{page 276 note 98} Art. 544.

^{page 276 note 99} Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 94–98.

^{page 277 note 1} See, e.g., Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings [1977] A.C. 890.

^{page 277 note 2} Tuck, , Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 49ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. D.1.5.4pr.

^{page 277 note 3} Ullmann, , The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (Methuen, 1967), p. 74Google Scholar.

^{page 277 note 4} See, e.g., Hubbard v. Pitt [1976] Q.B. 142; Thomas v. N.U.M. [1986] Ch. 20.

^{page 277 note 5} But cf. Turpin, , British Government and the Constitution (Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, 1985), p. 292Google Scholar; Zellick, , “Government Beyond Law” (1985) P.L. 283Google Scholar.

^{page 277 note 6} But then America does have a written Constitution and Bill of Rights; cf. Simmonds, , Central Issues in Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell, 1986), p. 132Google Scholar.

^{page 278 note 7} For an interesting journalistic insight into this whole question (and the problem of rights more generally), see Torode, , The Guardian, 7 01 1986, p. 21Google Scholar. (Torode was a member of the Younger Committee on Privacy.)

^{page 278 note 8} Cf. Turpin, op. cit., pp. 406–407, 430–432, 464–470.

^{page 278 note 9} See, e.g., Williams, Shirley & Wilson, Des, The Guardian 11 08 1986, p. 18Google Scholar.

^{page 278 note 10} For a general discussion, see Simmonds, op. cit., pp. 141–151.

^{page 278 note 11} Weir, “The Common Law System,” International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. II, Chap. 2, Part III, para. 115.

^{page 278 note 12} Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582; Wheeler v. Leicester City Council [1985] A.C. 1054.

^{page 278 note 13} Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344.

^{page 278 note 14} See, e.g., Thomas v. N.U.M. [1986] Ch. 20; and The Guardian and The Observer injunction case: The Guardian 26 July 1986, p. 4.

^{page 279 note 15} Bourgoin S.A. v. Minister of Agriciuulture, Fisheries and Food [1986] Q.B. 716, 759ff, 787ff.

^{page 279 note 16} O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237.

^{page 279 note 17} Council for Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374; Certoma, , The Italian Legal System (Butterworths, 1985), pp. 20–24Google Scholar.

^{page 279 note 18} See Bourgoin, supra.

^{page 279 note 19} See, e.g., Wandsworth L.B.C. v. Winder [1985] A.C. 461.

^{page 279 note 20} Young, Hugo, The Guardian 31 10 1985, p. 19Google Scholar; Norton-Taylor, , The Guardian 14 01 1986, p. 5Google Scholar.

^{page 279 note 21} Rubin, & Sugarman, , Law, Economy & Society (Professional Books, 1984), pp. 74ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 279 note 22} Turpin, op. cit., p. 289.

^{page 279 note 23} Ibid., p. 290, quoting Research Paper 7, Devolution and Other Aspects of Government: An Attitudes Survey (HMSO, 1973), p. 10.

^{page 280 note 24} Jones, op. cit., pp. 155–156.

^{page 280 note 25} Turpin, op. cit., p. 291 quoting from Daintith, , “Legal Analysis of Economic Policy” (1982) 9 Journal of Law and Society 191CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page 280 note 26} Turpin, p. 290.

^{page 280 note 27} Champaud, , Le droit des affaires (P.U.F., Paris, 2e éd., 1984), p. 46Google Scholar.

^{page 280 note 28} Ibid., pp. 6ff; Jaquemin & Schrans, op. cit., pp. 11ff. And see also Lévy, , Histoire de la propriété (P.U.F., Paris, 1972)Google Scholar; Macpherson, , The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962)Google Scholar.

^{page 280 note 29} Batiffol, Problèmes (op. cit.), p. 46.

^{page 280 note 30} Eörsi, , Comparative Civil (Private) Law (Budapest, 1979), pp. 68, 283Google Scholar.

^{page 280 note 31} Renner, , The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions (R.K.P., 1949), p. 107Google Scholar.

^{page 280 note 32} Ibid.

^{page 281 note 33} See, e.g., Hoehn, , “Le droit subjectif et le IIlme Reich,” Études Lambert (L.G.D.J., 1938), III, 240ffGoogle Scholar. And see Cotta, , Le corporatisme (P.U.F., Paris, 1984), p. 75Google Scholar.

^{page 281 note 34} See, e.g, Griffith, op. cit., p. 122.

^{page 281 note 35} See, e.g., Villey, La formation (op. cit.), pp. 647–648.

^{page 281 note 36} Brimo, , Les grands courants de la philosophic du droit et de I'état (Pedone, Paris, 3e éd., 1978), p. 8Google Scholar.

^{page 281 note 37} Ullmann, , “Public Law as an Instrument of Government”, Diritto e potere nella storia europea (Olschki, 1982), I, 37ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 281 note 38} Ullmann, , Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (Sources of History, 1975), pp. 218ffGoogle Scholar; Medieval Political Thought (Penguin, 1975), pp. 146ff.

^{page 282 note 39} Ullmann, Law and Politics (supra), pp. 218–219; Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (Methuen, 2nd ed., 1966) pp. 170–173.

^{page 282 note 40} Milsom, op. cit., pp. 56–57.

^{page 282 note 41} The point can be tested by looking at the amount of space devoted to these two theorists in English legal history or jurisprudence textbooks. Cf. Villey, La formation (op. cit.), pp. 635ff.

^{page 282 note 42} Trespass can still be a useful “right” against the state, especially where real property is concerned: see, e.g., Morris v. Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446.

^{page 282 note 43} Turpin, op. cit., p. 292.

^{page 282 note 44} Ullmann, Individual and Society (op. cit.), pp. 96–97, 150.

^{page 282 note 45} Atiyah, The Rise and Fall (op. cit.), p. 342.

^{page 282 note 46} Turpin, op. cit., p. 407 quoting McKenzie, & Silver, , Angels in Marble: Working Class Conservatives in Urban England (1968), p. 251Google Scholar.

^{page 282 note 47} Ullmann, Individual and Society (op. cit.), p. 74.

^{page 282 note 43} Ibid.

^{page 282 note 49} Atiyah, supra.

^{page 282 note 50} See, e.g., Reg. v., I.R.C., exp. Preston [1985] A.C. 835, 852, 864ff.; but cf. Bradley [1986] P.L.508.

^{page 282 note 51} Jones, op. cit., p. 142.

^{page 283 note 52} See, e.g., the reported statement of SirDonaldson, John: “Though there can be no doubt about the public interest in ensuring that allegations of wrongdoing by the Security Service, MI5, should be investigated, that is very different from arguing that they should be exposed in the press”: The Guardian 26 07 1986, p. 4Google Scholar.

^{page 283 note 53} Batiffol, Problémes (op. cit.), p. 296; La philosophie du droit (P.U.F.,5éd., 1975), pp. 31–54.

^{page 283 note 54} Ionescu, op. cit., p. 147; Jolowicz, , Lectures on Jurisprudence (Athlone 1963) pp. 167–168, 175–179Google Scholar.

^{page 283 note 55} Lawson, “Das subjektive Recht,” op. cit., p. 183.

^{page 284 note 56} Moreover from an epistemological point of view the positivist-voluntarist position runs into problems: Atias, , Épistémologie juridique (P.U.F., Paris, 1985), pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

^{page 284 note 57} Jolowicz, Lectures (op. cit.), pp. 92–93; Gough, , The Social Contract (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1957), pp. 186–206Google Scholar.

^{page 284 note 58} Roubier, Théorie générale du droit (op. cit.), p. 79; Batiffol, Problémes (op. cit.), pp. 42–50.

^{page 284 note 59} Bobbio, , “Sur le positivisme juridique,” Mélanges Roubier (1961), 1, 53, 59ffGoogle Scholar; Atias, op. cit., p.66.

^{page 284 note 60} Finnis, , Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, 1980), pp. 198–226Google Scholar.

^{page 284 note 61} Certoma, op. cit., pp. 22–23.

^{page 284 note 62} See, e.g., D.1.6.2; 47.23.3.1; Roubier, Droilssubjectifs (op. cit.), pp. 68–69.

^{page 284 note 63} Certoma, op. cit., p. 23.

^{page 284 note 64} Samuel (1984) 100 L.Q.R. 537, 539.

^{page 285 note 65} Finnis, op. cit., pp. 206–210.

^{page 285 note 66} D.l.4.1.

^{page 285 note 67} See, e.g., D.4.4.16.4; Macpherson, Possessive Individualism(op. tit.), pp. 255–257.

^{page 285 note 68} Ullmann, Law and Politics (op. til.), pp. 53–79.

^{page 285 note 69} Stein, Legal Institutions (op. cit.), p. 125.

^{page 286 note 70} Weir, Casebook (op. cil.), p. 268.

^{page 286 note 71} See, e.g., Cooper, v. Wandswonh Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B.(N.S.) 180Google Scholar; 143 E.R. 414.

^{page 286 note 72} See e.g., I.R.C. v. Rossminster Ltd. [1980] A C. 952: omnia praesumuntur rite esse acla.

^{page 286 note 73} LéVy, Proprété (pp. tit.), pp. 112–114; Griffith, op. cit., pp. 202–203.

^{page 286 note 74} Weir, “Complex Liabilities”(op. cit.), para. 67.

^{page 286 note 75} Griffith, op. cit., p. 203. See generally, Roubier, Droits subjectifs (op. cit.), pp. 1–43.

^{page 286 note 76} Griffith, op. cit., pp. 83–87.

^{page 286 note 77} Turpin, op. cit., pp. 92–93; Lewis, & Wiles, , “The Post-Corporatist State?” (1984) 11 Journal of Law and Society 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.