1 See the Act's long title.

2 Rights Brought Home: the Human Rights Bill, Home Office, Cm. 3782.

3 Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 31(3); R.S.C. Ord. 53 r. 3(7).

4 The victim test is described in more detail at pp. 137-138 below.

5 E.g., R. v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275.

6 E.g., R. v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte CPAG [1990] 2 Q.B. 540; R. v. Inspectorate of Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace (No.2) [1994] 4 All E.R. 329, (where some members of the group may in fact have been regarded as victims of the measure in question, though it is not clear to what extent this factor influenced the decision to grant standing); R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386; R. v. Sefton MBC, ex parte Help the Aged [1997] 4 All E.R. 532; R. v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275. See generally Cane, “Standing up for the public” [1995] P.L. 276.

7 A clear example is provided by Rose L.J. in ex parte World Development Movement [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386, 395G-396B.

8 Per Lord Diplock in R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Businesses [1982] A.C. 617, 644: “It would in my view be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group … or even a single public spirited [citizen] were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.”

9 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223.

10 See generally Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford 1998).

11 The powers of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission discussed in note 53 may provide a guide to the scope of section 7: the HRC, whilst barred from “relying on Convention rights”, is empowered to bring proceedings “involving law or practice relating to the protection of human rights”.

12 For one view, see Supperstone & Coppel, “Judicial Review after the Human Rights Act” [1999] E.H.R.L.R. 301, 308-309.

13 Hansard HL Deb. vol. 583 cols. 827-828 (24 November 1997).

14 “Public law” should be taken here to refer to judicial review proceedings under Order 53. Tort and other civil actions against public authorities are treated here as “private law” matters.

15 Existing jurisprudence on the victim test derives mostly from Commission decisions on the admissibility of claims taken to Strasbourg. Until 1998, the Court itself rarely pronounced on the standing question, though it did have jurisdiction to find applications admitted by the Commission to be inadmissible. Following the abolition of the Commission by Protocol 11, the new full-time Court will take over its functions, including decisions on standing. The new Court will not necessarily follow the Commission's interpretation of the victim test. See generally: O'Boyle, Harris & Warbrick, , Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London 1995), pp. 630–638Google Scholar; Dijk, Van & Hoof, Van, Theory & Practice of the ECHR 3rd ed. (London 1999), pp. 44–60Google Scholar; Zwart, , The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions: the case law of the European Commission on Human Rights & the Human Rights Committee (London 1994), ch. 3Google Scholar.

16 Previously Article 25, prior to the ratification of Protocol 11; all Articles are referred to here by their post-ratification numbers.

17 E.g., close relatives of one killed in alleged violation of Article 2 are regarded as indirectly affected and accordingly entitled to bring an action in their own right based on that violation: e.g. Mrs W v. UK (1983) 32 D.R. 190.

18 Op cit., at p. 633.

19 (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 214.

20 (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149.

21 (1982) 38 D.R. 74.

22 Compare comments in Times Newspapers v. UK (1990) 65 D.R. 307 concerning the possibility of generating victim status from the chilling effect of defamation laws.

23 Klass v. FRG (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 214, para. 33; X v. Austria (1976) 7 D.R. 87. Though cases such as Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association v. UK (1976) 36 Coll. 1 may suggest that the Commission might sometimes be prepared to take a very loose view of the standing requirements: see Dijk, Van, Judicial Review of Governmental Action & the Requirement of an Interest to Sue (Alphen 1980), p. 350Google Scholar.

24 E.g., churches: X & Church of Scientology v. Sweden (1979) 16 D.R. 68; trade unions: Council of Civil Service Unions v. UK (1987) 50 D.R. 228; Ahmed & UNISON v. UK (1995) 2 E.H.R.R. CD 72.

25 Norris & The National Gay Federation v. Ireland (1984) 44 D.R. 132. Some UK applicants are represented by Liberty lawyers: see for example Hilton v. UK (1988) 57 D.R.108.

26 Confédération des Syndicats Médicaux Franais v. France (1986) 47 D.R. 225.

27 Article 35 § 2(a).

28 Dudgeon v. UK (1982) 2 E.H.R.R. 214, para. 41.

29 (1972) 16 Yearbook of the ECHR 212.

30 Ibid., at p. 260.

31 Op. cit., at p. 47.

32 (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 1.

33 (1966) 20 Coll. 86, 99. The Court has not been consistent in exercising this power: see Van Dijk & Van Hoof, op cit., at p. 222, criticising this aspect of the Court's judgment in De Becker v. Belgium (1962) 1 E.H.R.R. 43.

34 Article 47 x 2.

35 Brownlie, , Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford 1998)Google Scholar, ch. XXII, esp. at pp. 482-496.

36 Austria v. Italy (1961) 4 Yearbook of the ECHR 116, 140.

37 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 387; Young, James & Webster v. UK (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 20.

38 E.g., McCann v. UK (1995) 21 E.H.R.R. 97, para. 5; Harlow, & Rawlings, , Pressure through Law (London 1992)Google Scholar, ch 6; Lester, op. cit.

39 E.g., JUSTICE's application to intervene in Monnell & Morris v. UK (1987) 10 E.H.R.R. 205.

40 A juge rapporteur (or Chamber of the Court) will make the initial investigations previously executed by the Commission: Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court (1998) Rules 49 & 53.

41 (1995) 38A Yearbook of the ECHR 236.

42 Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court (1998) Rule 61.

43 Straw & Boateng, “Bringing Rights Home” (1997) E.H.R.L.R. 71, 76.

44 Per Lord Chancellor, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 583 col. 831 (24 November 1997).

45 Ibid. col. 835.

46 For the purposes of Article 13, a judicial remedy is not necessarily required: see generally Harris & O'Boyle & Warbrick, op. cit., ch. 14.

47 Both these provisions are excluded from those Convention rights covered by the scheme of the Act: s. 1. For further discussion see Hansard HL Deb. vol. 583 cols. 475-481 (18 November 1997).

48 See paras. 18-20, Report of the Committee on Legal & Administrative Questions, at p. 224, vol. I of The Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires of the European Convention on Human Rights (The Hague 1971), and ensuing debate of the Consultative Assembly, vol. II, pp. 58-200.

49 International law has traditionally maintained that states alone have procedural capacity, even in respect of claims concerning losses suffered by individuals: Brownlie, op. cit., ch. XXV.

50 See pp. 148-149 below at notes 97-99.

51 Compare Northern Ireland & Scotland Acts 1998, where the Law Officers’ standing (in particular to challenge primary and subordinate legislation made by the devolved bodies) is explicitly saved: s. 71 and s. 100 respectively. Lord Lester pointed out this inconsistency between the Human Rights Act and devolution legislation, hoping that the omission of such provision in the former would be remedied: Hansard HL Deb. vol. 593 col. 1550 (21 October 1998). Since the Attorney General is in any case likely to be required to defend the government's position in Strasbourg and pursuant to section 5 of the Human Rights Act, he is not the obvious applicant to bring proceedings against the government.

52 See Otton J. in R. v. Inspectorate of Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace (no. 2) [1994] 4 All E.R. 329, 350; Lord Diplock in R. v. IRC, ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Businesses Ltd [1982] A.C. 617, 644.

53 See Spencer & Bynoe, The Human Rights Commission: The Options for Britain & Northern Ireland (London 1998). Amendments to the Human Rights Bill to establish a Commission were unsuccessful; Hansard HL Deb. vol. 585 cols. 820-828 (5 February 1998). The Human Rights Task Force of non-governmental organisations set up to assist in the process of implementing the Act and in creating a “human rights culture” is likely to make recommendations on this topic; as will a Parliamentary Human Rights Committee which is likely to be established, as envisaged in the Government's White Paper. The Commission established under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 is empowered to bring proceedings involving law or practice relating to the protection of human rights: s. 69(5)(b). However, it may not bring cases on the ground that any legislation or act is incompatible with Convention rights, or rely on Convention rights in any proceedings; such arguments are expressly reserved for victims and the Law Officers: s. 71. But the Commission is empowered to assist victims who bring their own actions under the Human Rights Act 1998: s. 70(3).

54 Mr. O'Brien, M.P., Hansard HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 1086 (24 June 1998); Lord Chancellor, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 583 col. 832 (24 November 1997).

55 See p. 129 above at notes 23-27.

56 See Wadham, & Mountfield, , Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (London 1999), at pp. 40–41Google Scholar.

57 See Earl Russell, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 585 cols. 807-808 (5 February 1998); and various speakers at Hansard HC Deb. vol. 314 cols. 1062-1082 (24 June 1998). Academic commentators paint a similar picture, e.g., Van Dijk, op. cit. note 23, at pp. 232-233.

58 See Spencer & Bynoe on the advantages of Human Rights Commission-instigated litigation: op. cit., at p. 90.

59 Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1446, 1460, per Jeevan Reddy J., The petitioners here brought an action on behalf of villagers whose right to life (enshrined by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution) had been infringed by environmental pollution.

60 SP Gupta v. India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149; People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802. This was regarded in Gupta as an extension of the standing rules which enable children and prisoners to be represented in court: para. 16.

61 Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Borowski [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575; Canada (Minister of Finance) v. Finlay [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607; Canadian Abortion Rights Action League v. Attorney General of Nova Scotia (1990) 69 D.L.R. (4th) 241 (Nova Scotia S.C.); Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236.

62 Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, 146 per Laskin J..

63 Supreme Court Act 1985, R.S.C., c. S-26, s. 53; Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Ontario 1997), pp. 224-225.

64 Corporation of Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Att Gen of Canada (1990) 72 D.L.R. (4th) 742 (Ontario H.C.). The ECtHR dealt with a similar situation in Klass, by giving the concept of “victim” a somewhat attenuated interpretation, (see p. 128 above at note 19). However, this broad interpretation of victim will not be available in all cases: see Hilton v. UK (1988) 57 D.R. 108, discussed by Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick, op. cit., at pp. 632-633. It is not clear whether the Canadian surveillance legislation would have satisfied the Klass requirements for broad victim standing.

65 Cahill v. Sutton [1980] I.R. 269, per Henchy J. (Ireland); see also Canadian Council of Churches [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236, 254-255, per Cory J. (Canada); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State (1982) 454 US 464, 472, per Rehnquist J. (USA).

66 See Re Danson and Attorney General of Ontario [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086: insistence on factual basis for cases brought under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

67 [1990] 2 Q.B. 540. See also R. v. Inspectorate of Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) [1994] 4 All E.R. 329, and other cases listed in note 6.

68 [1992] 1 W.L.R. 711.

69 (1990) 110 S.Ct. 1717.

70 [1980] I.R. 269.

71 Brilmayer, “The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the ‘Case or Controversy’ Requirement” (1979-80) 93 Harv. L.R. 297; see Tushnet's criticisms, “The ‘Case or Controversy’ Controversy” 93 Harv. L.R. 1698 and Brilmayer's reply thereafter, at p. 1727.

72 Hilson & Cram, “Judicial review and environmental law—is there a coherent view of standing?” (1996) 16 L.S. 1. The exceptional case suggested—involving an issue of national interest—may be compared with the Convention striking out cases under Article 37, see p. 130 above at notes 32-34. It is impossible to define in advance what constitutes a case sufficiently important to warrant (continued) judicial investigation in the face of victim opposition (or mere apathy?), so any rules formulated on this basis will necessarily be uncertain.

73 Per Bhagwati J., SP Gupta v. India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 at para. 13.

74 See Feldman, “Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theory” (1992) 55 M.L.R. 44.

75 Re T [1993] Fam. 95.

76 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech (No. 2) [1994] Q.B. 198.

77 Since the preparation of this article, Feldman has suggested what may be called an instrumental approach to rights enforcement based on competing individualist or “collectivist” philosophies, which may be applied alongside the non-instrumental approach discussed here. His concern is with the extent to which particular rights are perceived as satisfying public as opposed to purely individual purposes, and the role of social values in defining the scope of the rights protected by any system. Where such collective values are present, as he argues is the case with the European Convention, an individualistic standing test may be inappropriate, since it will fail to reflect the collectivist values that inform the content of the rights protected. Feldman, “The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles” (1999) 19 L.S. 165, at pp. 173-178, 193-194.

78 The following account and discussion of these models is derived from Spann, “Expository Justice” (1983) 131 U.Pa.L.R. 585; Chayes, “Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv.L.R. 1281; Fiss, “The Forms of Justice” (1979) 93 Harv.L.R. 1; and Monaghan, “Constitutional Adjudication: the Who & When” (1973) 82 Yale L.J. 1363. The author is grateful to Christopher McCrudden for directing her to this literature.

79 See O'Regan J. in Ferreira v. Levin NO & others [1996] 1 S.A. 984, at para 229 (South African Constitutional Court).

80 Davis, “An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process” (1942) 55 Harv. L.R. 364, 402-403.

81 Bryden, , “Public Interest Intervention in the Courts” (1987) 66 Can Bar. Rev. 490Google Scholar; Singh, , The Future of Human Rights in the UK (Oxford 1997), ch. 10Google Scholar.

82 E.g., R. v. GLC, ex parte Blackburn [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550; R. v. Speyer [1916] 1 K.B. 595, discussed by Sedley J. in R. v. Somerset CC, ex parte Dixon [1997] Crown Office Digest 323. Contrast mandamus, a remedy which seems historically to have reflected more of a right/duty analysis of public law: Schwartz, & Wade, , Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States (Oxford 1972), p. 294Google Scholar.

83 Historically, the prerogative remedies were the means by which the sovereign, via the royal courts, controlled and supervised the inferior courts and administrative bodies: see Wade, & Forsyth, , Administrative Law, 7th ed. (Oxford 1994), pp. 702–705Google Scholar.

84 Remedies in Administrative Law, Law Com WP 40 (London 1971) para. 74.

85 “The Function of Standing Rules in Administrative Law” [1980] P.L. 303, 323-324.

86 Hansard HL Deb. vol. 585 col. 805, (5 February 1998).

87 R. v. Somerset CC, ex parte Dixon (1997) Crown Office Digest 323, at 331; cited by Lord Lester in support of a broader standing rule for the Human Rights Act: Hansard HL Deb. vol. 585 cols. 805-806 (5 February 1998). See also Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals, Law Com 226 (Cm. HC 669) para 2.5: public interest in vindicating the rule of law.

88 Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435.

89 R. v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275, 292, per Simon Brown L.J.

90 [1995] 1 A.C. 1.

91 [1995] 1 A.C. 1, 8-9.

92 See O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237 and subsequent cases developing the so-called public/private divide. It is not clear why the individual applicant could not argue the general EU law point at stake as a public interest applicant: see Cane, “Standing up for the public” [1995] P.L. 276, 284.

93 [1993] 1 W.L.R. 872, 894. Hirst L.J. was similarly of the view that the EOC could, if it wished to see the matter resolved, support a test case through the industrial tribunal system, ibid. at pp. 902-903.

94 [1999] 1 A.C. 450.

95 Sun Life Assurance v. Jervis [1944] A.C. 111, distinguished in Salem as inapplicable to public law.

96 See also Royal College of Nursing v. DHSS [1981] A.C. 800, though the nature of the case was not discussed by the HL; Gilick v. W.Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1986] A.C. 112, especially Lord Bridge. See also Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals, Law Com 226 (Cm. HC 669) paras. 8.12, 8.14; Laws, “Judicial Remedies & the Constitution” (1994) 57 M.L.R. 213. Cf. Beatson, “Prematurity & Ripeness for Review”, in Forsyth, & Hare, (eds.), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord, (Oxford 1998)Google Scholar. Compare the procedure for obtaining advisory opinions from the Supreme Court of Canada: note 63. See also Attorney General's References under the Criminal Justice Act 1972, s. 36: Jaconelli, “Attorney General's References—a Problematic Device” [1981] Crim.L.R. 543.

97 See Practice Directions & Standing Orders applicable to Civil Appeals, HL, direction 34(1); R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International & others intervening) (no. 3) [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827; R. v. Khan [1997] A.C. 558, Lord Nolan at 578 F-G. For the position in the Court of Appeal, see R.S.C. Ord. 59 r. 8(1).

98 As did the Public Law Project in R. v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] Q.B. 575.

99 English, “Wrongfooting the Lord Chancellor: Access to Justice in the High Court” (1998) 61 M.L.R. 245. See also Singh, , The Future of Human Rights in the United Kingdom, (Oxford: Hart, 1997)Google Scholar ch. 7.

100 R.S.C. Ord. 53 r. 5(3).

101 Fiss op. cit., at p. 36. See in particular appeals to the House of Lords: leave may be refused where the petition does not involve a point of law “of general public importance”, House of Lords Practice Directions 4.6.

102 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council & others [1999] 2 A.C. 349, 378 F, (emphasis added).

103 See cases listed in note 6 above.

104 See, in particular, Rose L.J.'s emphasis of the merits of the World Development Movement's application, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386, 395G-396B.

105 E.g., R. v. Her Majesty's Treasury, ex parte Smedley [1985] Q.B. 657. Courts in other jurisdictions are also prepared to abandon or at least compromise the private law lis inter partes model of adjudication in public law cases to ensure the enforceability of “rights”, constitutional or otherwise, enjoyed by the public as a whole: SP Gupta v. India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149; Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] I.R. 713. Cf. US resistance of the citizen suit movement: e.g. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War (1974) 418 US 208; the Warren Court decision in Flast v. Cohen 88 S.Ct. 1942 (1968) seems to have suffered an ignominious “death by distinguishing”; however, Congressional standing rules often achieve citizen suits where the Supreme Court would otherwise refuse to allow it under Article III of the United States Constitution, e.g. in environmental legislation: Bennett v. Spears (1997) 117 S.Ct. 1154.

106 [1997] C.O.D. 323, 328; and see R. v. Legal Aid Board, ex parte Bateman [1992] 1 W.L.R. 711. See also the courts of the other jurisdictions discussed in note 105; they too are wary of overstepping some undefined mark, so broader standing may only be awarded “if there is no other reasonable and effective manner” of briging the matter before the court (Canadian case law, note 61), or “in an appropriate case” (Ireland: per Walsh J. in Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Coogan [1989] I.R. 734, 743-745).

107 Article 46.

108 Lester, , “Amici Curiae: Third Party Intervention before the ECHR”, in Matscher, & Petzold, (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: the European Dimension, 2nd ed. (Cologne 1990)Google Scholar, specifically in relation to third party intervention under Article 36 § 2.

109 Ibid.

110 Though all will not necessarily be lost for the victim challenger. Since the court itself as a public authority will be required to act compatibly with Convention rights, (even whilst having to apply incompatible legislation), it may also be called upon to exercise any discretion that it has to mitigate the effects of the legislation on a victim before it: Feldman, “Remedies for Violation of Convention Rights under the Human Rights Act” [1998] E.H.R.L.R. 691.

111 Sections 3(2)(b)(c) & 4(6).

112 Per Lord Scarman, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 582 col. 1256 (3 November 1997). In the case of legislation enacted after the HRA, the dialogue is in fact commenced by the Minister who makes a statement of compatibility when introducing the legislation in question into Parliament: s. 19. However, the fact that there is no requirement for these statements to contain any indication of the reasons for concluding that the legislation is compatible may make for a rather limited dialogue.

113 Feldman, op. cit. (1998), at p. 699.

114 See Henry L.J. in R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] Q.B. 517, 564E-F. Though compare Henderson's recent discussion of proof of legislative facts: “Brandeis briefs and the proof of legislative facts in proceedings under the Human Rights Act 1998” [1998] P.L. 563.

115 See note 53 above.

116 An early opportunity to review the test may come during debates on the creation of a Human Rights Commission for Britain and the possible litigating powers of such a body, particularly in the light of the experience of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, (which was formally established in March 1999), discussed at note 53. The Northern Ireland body has a statutory duty to report after two years operation on the adequacy and effectiveness of functions conferred on it by the Northern Ireland Act: s. 69(2).

117 Compare Lord Chancellor, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 583 col. 835 (24 November 1997) and Mr O'Brien, M.P., Hansard HC Deb. vol. 314 cols. 1083-1086 (24 June 1998).

118 Article 46.

119 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 1, para. 31.

120 JUSTICE—All Souls Report, Administrative Justice: Some Necessary Reforms (Oxford 1988), ch. 8 para. 8.2.

121 Marriott & Nicol, “The Human Rights Act, Representative Standing and the Victim Culture” [1998] E.H.R.L.R. 730, 741.

122 On the public-private law question, see generally Oliver, , Common Values and the Public-Private Divide, (London 1999)Google Scholar. On the particular question of the horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act, see Wade, “The United Kingdom's Bill of Rights”, in Cambridge Centre for Public Law, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Practice and Principles (Oxford 1998), pp. 62-64; Hunt, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights Act at Common Law” [1998] P.L. 423; Bamforth, “The Application of the Human Rights Act to Public Authorities and Private Bodies” (1999) C.L.J. 159.

123 Op. cit. note 96.