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Indirect Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-Smith

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 1999

Catherine Barnard  and
Bob Hepple
Catherine Barnard
Affiliation:
Fellow of Trinity College and University, Cambridge
Bob Hepple
Affiliation:
Master of Clare College, Cambridge
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Abstract

The preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice in the Seymour-Smith and Perez case about the scope and meaning of indirect discrimination has done little to clarify this perplexing concept. The ruling does not tell the thousands of short-service employees whose claims were stayed pending the litigation whether the qualifying period of two years’ continuous service for the right not to be unfairly dismissed is contrary to Community law. Nor does it provide clear standards by which disparate impact is to be tested, nor the relevant time for assessing the legality of an allegedly discriminatory measure, nor the conditions for establishing objective justification. More generally, these proceedings under Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty reveal a failure by the Court to perform its function of facilitating the national court in interpreting and applying Community equality law in a way which would be consistent and uniform throughout the Union.

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Article
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , July 1999 , pp. 399 - 412
Copyright
Copyright © The Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors, 1999

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References

1 Case C-167/97, R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith and Perez [1999] I.R.L.R. 253.

2 Currently under Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), s. 108(1).

3 Department of Trade and Industry, Fairness at Work, Cm. 3968 (May, 1998), para. 3.10.

4 See generally, Hepple, B., “Equality and Discrimination” in Davies, P. et al. (eds.) European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1996, 237 esp. at pp. 249–253Google Scholar; and, on recent developments, C. Barnard, “The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows” (1998) 57 C.L.J. 352.

5 401 U.S. 424.

6 G. Rutherglen, “Tile VII Class Actions” (1980) 47 U.Ch.L.R. 688 at p. 713; and see generally, B. Hepple, “Judging Equal Rights” (1983) 36 C.L.P. 71 at pp. 75–77.

7 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA), s.1(1)(a). There are identical definitions in the Race Relations Act 1976.

8 SDA, s. 1(1)(b). See also the Burden of Proof Directive 97/80 OJ 1998 L14/6 and the discussion in Ellis, E., EC Sex Equality Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1998, 109–136Google Scholar.

9 Case C-127/92 [1993] E.C.R. I-5535.

10 Falkirk Council v. Whyte [1997] I.R.L.R. 560; cf. Bhudi v. MI Refiners Ltd. [1994] I.R.L.R. 204 suggesting that Enderby was confined to equal pay cases.

11 A point reiterated in the “interpretative” Equal Pay Directive 75/117/EEC.

12 See further Barnard, C., “European Litigation Strategy: the Case of the Equal Opportunities Commission” in Shaw, J. and More, G. (eds.) New Legal Dynamics of European Union, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1995Google Scholar.

13 Case 96/80 [1981] E.C.R 911, para. 14.

14 [1981] I.R.L.R. 388.

15 Case 170/84 [1986] E.C.R. 1607.

16 Case 171/88 [1989] E.C.R. 2743.

17 Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] I.R.L.R. 26; applied to the Race Relations Act 1976 in Hampson v. Department of Education and Science [1989] I.R.L.R. 69.

18 Reed v. Reed, 401 U.S. 71 (1971); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). This contrasts with the text of strict scrutiny applied in the context of race where the state must show a “compelling government interest” and that the measure is “narrowly tailored” to meet specific state practice (a strict proportionality test that no other means will meet the end).

19 [1994] I.R.L.R. 176.

20 Employment Protection (Part-Time Employees) Regulations 1995, S.I. 1995/278.

21 Currently ERA 1996, s. 108(1).

22 [1994] I.R.L.R. 448.

23 [1995] I.R.L.R. 464.

24 [1997] I.R.L.R. 315.

25 Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2) [1976] E.C.R 1365.

26 Case 152/84 Marshall (No. 1) v. Southampton Area Health Authority [1986] E.C.R. 723.

27 Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany; R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. [1996] E.C.R. I-1029; Case C-392/93 R v. HM Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications [1996] E.C.R. I-1631; Joined Cases C-178, 279, 189 and 190/94 Dillenkofer v. Germany [1996] E.C.R. I-4845.

28 E.g. Case C-33/89, Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1990] E.C.R. I-2591, para. 10.

29 Ex parte E.O.C., at p. 182 per Lord Keith; and see too [1995] I.R.L.R. 464, C.A., per Neill L.J. at pp. 470–471; Mediguard Services Ltd. v. Thame [1994] I.R.L.R. 504, E.A.T.

30 Case C-342/93, Gillespie v. Northern Health and Social Services Board [1996] E.C.R. I-475, para. 24. This is questionable because it means that there is a gap in the overall protection of EC equality law, similar to the gap between the SDA and EqPA in Britain.

31 [1999] I.R.L.R. 253 at pp. 265–266.

32 Paras. 31–41.

33 See, for example, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989.

34 [1999] I.R.L.R. 253 at pp. 265–273.

35 Federal Register, vol. 43, No. 166, 25 August 1978.

36 McCausland v. Dungannon District Council (1994) 53 E.O.R. 50.

37 [1999] I.R.L.R. at p. 259.

38 [1999] I.R.L.R. at p. 258.

39 [1998] I.R.L.R. 364 C.A.

40 [1999] I.R.L.R. at p. 259.

41 Para. 59.

42 Para. 60.

43 Para. 62.

44 Para. 64.

45 Hakim, C., Key Issues in Women's Work, (London: Athlone), 1996, p. 195Google Scholar.

46 See e.g. Browne, Kingsley R., “Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond Damned Lies’” (1993) 68 Washington L.R. 477Google Scholar.

47 Keely v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 404 F.Supp. 573 (E.D.Mo. 1975).

48 Para. 46.

49 Para. 47 and implicit in para. 63.

50 Case C-343/92 De Weerd, ne´e Roks and others [1994] E.C.R. I-5721, paras. 33 and 34.

51 Case C-457/93 Kuratorium fu¨r Dialyse und-Nierentransplantionen eV v. Lewark [1996] E.C.R. I-243.

52 Case C-317/93 Nolte v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover [1995] E.C.R. I-4625.

53 Case C-444/93 Megner and Scheffel v. Innungskrankenkasse Vorderpfalz [1995] E.C.R. I-4741.

54 The Court reached similar conclusions in Case C-8/94 Laperre v. Bestuurcommissie beroepzaken in de provincie Zuid-Holland [1996] E.C.R. I-273, and Case C-280/94 Posthum van Damme [1996] E.C.R. I-179.

55 Para. 71.

56 Para. 72.

57 Case C-243/95 Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. Revenue Commissioners [1998] E.C.R. I-3739 (job sharers returning to full-time work).

58 Para. 67.

59 The Court decided similarly in Nolte, above n. 52 and Laperre, above n. 54, without citing any evidence nor considering whether the social policy aim could be achieved by other means.

60 See e.g. Case 69/80 Worringham v. Lloyds Bank [1981] E.C.R. 767, in which the Court reformulated the question to one which it wanted to answer: see A. Lester, “The Uncertain Trumpet: References to the Court of Justice from the United Kingdom”, in H.Schermers et al. (eds.) Article 177: Experiences and problems (The Hague, North Holland) 1986; Case 19/81, Burton v. British Railways Board [1982] E.C.R. 554 in which the Court misapplied the derogations in Directive 79/7 to Directive 76/207; and Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd. (above) in which the Court's answer could not be understood.

61 Barnard and Sharpston, “The Changing Face of Article 177 References” (1997) 34 C.M.L.Rev. 1113.