¹ Chamberlin, E. H., The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the Theory of Value (Cambridge, Mass., 1933)Google Scholar; and Robinson, Joan, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (London, 1933).Google Scholar

See the many references to the controversy cited by Chamberlin in chapter ix which he added to his book with the fifth edition. (All citations in this paper are to the sixth edition, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, but apply also to the fifth.) See also Chamberlin, E. H., “Monopolistic Competition Revisited,” Economica, XVIII, 11 1951, 343, especially 358–61Google Scholar; and Robinson, Joan, “Imperfect Competition Revisited,” Economic Journal, LXIII, 09, 1953, 578, n. 1.Google Scholar

² First published London, 1919; references in this paper are to the 4th edition, London, 1923. Neither did Professor Machlup refer to it in his two recent books, The Economics of Sellers' Competition (Baltimore, 1952)Google Scholar, and The Political Economy of Monopoly (Baltimore, 1952).Google Scholar

³ Paul T. Homan, J. M. Keynes, and T. W. Hutchison (see footnotes 4 and 5). Among those who give little or no attention to the work, see Schumpeter, Joseph A., History of Economic Analysis (New York, 1954), especially 972–85Google Scholar, “The Competitive Hypothesis and the Theory of Monopoly,” and 1150–2, “Theory of Individual Firms and Monopoly”; also his Ten Great Economists (New York, 1951), 105–6Google Scholar; Haney, L. H., History of Economic Thought (3rd ed., New York, 1947)Google Scholar; Gide, Charles and Rist, Charles, A History of Economic Doctrines, tr. Richards, R. (2nd ed., Boston, 1948)Google Scholar; Whittaker, Edmund, A History of Economic Ideas (New York, 1950)Google Scholar; Ferguson, John M., Landmarks of Economic Thought (New York, 1938)Google Scholar; Bell, John Fred, A History of Economic Thought (New York, 1953)Google Scholar; Newman, Philip C., The Development of Economic Thought (New York, 1952).Google Scholar

⁴ Homan, Paul T., Contemporary Economic Thought (New York, 1928)Google Scholar; and Keynes, J. M., “Alfred Marshall, 1842–1924” in Memorials of Alfred Marshall, ed. Pigou, A. C. (London, 1925).Google Scholar Keynes described the book as representing the “fruits of Marshall's learning and ripe wisdom on a host of different matters,” and compared it to a mine, saying it was a “thing to quarry in and search for buried treasure.” He also wrote that “it contains the suggestions, the starring points for many investigations,” and that “there is no better book for suggesting lines of original inquiry to a reader so disposed.” He also warned, however, that the broad generalizations were smooth, urbane, and undogmatic.

⁵ Hutchison, T. W., A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870–1929 (London, 1953).Google Scholar See especially 76 ff. and 308. Hutchison is the only one of the historians examined who calls attention to Marshall's anticipation of some of the basic notions of Professor Chamberlin and Mrs. Robinson. Hutchison does not notice all of the instances where this occurs in Industry and Trade; he fails to note Marshall's descriptive term, “conditional monopoly,” and he devotes no space to Marshall's treatment of product differentiation and selling costs.

⁶ XXVII, 324.

⁷ “Increasing Returns and the Representative Firm: A Symposium,” Economic Journal, XL, 03, 1930, 79.Google Scholar The editors or the Journal have attached a bibliographical headnote to this series of articles listing previous Journal articles dealing generally with the subject of the symposium. One of these is “The Representative Firm,” Economic Journal, XXXVIII, 09, 1928, 387 Google Scholar, by Lionel Robbins, who in it refers to Industry and Trade to show that Marshall did not make much use of the concept of a “representative firm” in that work. Dr.Clapham's, J. W. “Of Empty Economic Boxes,” Economic Journal, XXXII, 09, 1922, 305 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, is also listed. In his second paragraph, Dr. Clapham makes a single reference to Industry and Trade, implying that it offers little of analytical value to the student.

⁸ Sraffa, Piero, “The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions,” Economic Journal XXXVI, 12, 1926, 535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Robinson, Imperfect Competition, Foreword, v; and Triffin, Robert, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 8, n. 10.Google Scholar

⁹ On page 155, where she cites p. 404 of Marshall's Industry and Trade.

¹⁰ Pp. 395–7. Italics mine. See also 178–9.

¹¹ Monopolistic Competition, 68–9.

¹² “Laws of Returns,” 545.

¹³ Industry and Trade, 398. Sraffa, it may be noted (“Laws of Returns,” 549), justifies on two grounds the lack of attention given in his discussion to the “disturbing influence exercised by the competition of new firms attracted to the industry.” In the first place, he says, heavy expenses hinder newcomers; in the second, this influence is important only when monopoly profits are considerably above the level of profits in the trade in general.

¹⁴ Chamberlin, , Monopolistic Competition, 191–3Google Scholar; Robinson, , Imperfect Competition, 54, n. 2.Google Scholar Mrs. Robinson also remarks, “Both methods can be applied to problems of competition and of monopoly. Marshall introduced into his system of analysis an artificial cleavage between monopoly and competition, by treating competitive problems only by the ‘marginal’ method, and monopoly problems only by the ‘areas’ method.” (p. 54, n. 2.) She notes also that Dr. Zeuthen “makes use only of Marshall's ‘areas’ technique” (Preface, vii).

¹⁵ Imperfect Competition, 6. She says “maximum monopoly net revenue” is “at best a clumsy” tool and “is inappropriate to many of the operations required of it.”

¹⁶ Pp. 449–50, n. 1. Italics Marshall's. See also p. 399, n. 1.

¹⁷ See Imperfect Competition, 180, 186, 203, 206, 208 n. On p. 180 she mentions railway rates. She refers also to railway rate-schedules on p. 186, and mentions discriminatory railway rates on p. 206. See also Triffin, , Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, 71, n. 19.Google Scholar

¹⁸ P. 89, n. 1. She has in mind p. 325 of Marshall's Principles.

¹⁹ P. 631. See also 628–30.

²⁰ P. 416. Marshall's conclusions compare favourably with Mrs. Robinson's. See Imperfect Competition, 207–8. She cites Professor Pigou's treatment of this question.

²¹ See especially pp. 190–6.

²² Book III, chap, iii, 423 ff.

²³ The analysis of railway rates begins with Book III, chap, xv, 445.

²⁴ Imperfect Competition, 49. In a footnote she refers to p. 485 of Marshall's Principles.

²⁵ P. 468. Marshall does not specifically identify the source of his quotation. Compare Chamberlin, , Monopolistic Competition, 106 Google Scholar, where he says “The outcome described involves no combination—not even a tacit agreement—among sellers. It is the result of each seeking independently his own profit.”

²⁶ “Laws of Returns,” 540.

²⁷ Indeed, in his earliest and simplest case, that of the ferry, he arrives at such a result. See Industry and Trade, 423 ff.

²⁸ P. 441, n. 1. Competition would have come from “tramps.” Mrs.Robinson, (Imperfect Competition, 73–4)Google Scholar, considers the “arguments advanced in favour of closing down surplus productive capacity under certain rationalisation schemes, such as that undertaken by the British shipbuilding industry,” in her chapter dealing with “Changes in Demand.”

²⁹ See Industry and Trade, 457, n. 1. He remarks elsewhere (p. 449), “the foundations of modern railway science were firmly laid by Lardner's Railway Economy, 1849.” See also n. 1 on the same page.

³⁰ See, for example, Locklin, Philip, Economics of Transportation (3rd ed., Chicago, 1947), especially chap, viiGoogle Scholar, “The Theory of Railroad Rates,” 133 ff. Marshall discusses real and apparent discrimination in railway rates in Industry and Trade, 470–1.

³¹ He cites many of these throughout the work. The reader is invited to make his own examination.

³² Imperfect Competition, 89, n. 1. She refers to Sraffa's article as follows: “Cf. Sraffa, , Economic Journal, 03 1926, p. 543.Google Scholar” Since no article by Professor Sraffa appears in the March 1926 Economic Journal, I have assumed she refers to the December 1926 article which begins on page 535 and extends to page 550.

³³ “Laws of Returns,” 542. These two are: (1) the idea that the competing producer cannot deliberately affect market prices; and, (2) the idea that each competing producer necessarily produces normally in circumstances of individual increasing costs.

³⁴ Triffin, , Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, 6.Google Scholar

³⁵ Monopolistic Competition, 56. Triffin, , in Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, 40–1Google Scholar, compares the views of Mrs. Robinson and Chamberlin. He notes Pareto's similar views on page 55 and remarks in footnote 73, “Incidental recognition of product differentiation is not rare in economic literature,” citing Chamberlin, p. 69, n. 2. Italics mine.

³⁶ Industry and Trade, 430. See also p. 452; and compare Triffin, , Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, 71, n. 19.Google Scholar

³⁷ P. 460. Consider also this statement on p. 461: “Speed and frequency of trains, spaciousness and ease of carriages, allowances of free luggage, etc. are benefits for which extra fares could be charged reasonably; in the same way that a higher rent may be reasonably charged for one ten-roomed house in which the rooms are large and well appointed, than for another which … cost much less to build.”

³⁸ P. 403. See also 596–7.

³⁹ P. 302, n. 1. Italics mine. He also relates the problem to “the struggle of small shops for their existence.”

⁴⁰ Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, 7.

⁴¹ P. 126, n. 1. Italics Chamberlin's. He cites Marshall's, Principles, 8th ed., p. 287.Google Scholar Chamberlin also notes Braithwaite's, Dorothea article, “The Economic Effect of Advertisement,” which appeared in the Economic Journal, XXXVIII, 1928, 16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The Braithwaite article does not refer to Industry and Trade.

⁴² Industry and Trade, 303–4.

⁴³ Pp. 304–6. Compare Marshall's mention of “good frontage” with Chamberlin's case of “site rent,” in Monopolistic Competition, 125. See also Marshall, , Industry and Trade, Appendix J, especially 808, 810, and 813 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ P. 307. He also remarks (p. 307, n.): “Large questions are opened up by the consideration of the dependence of newspapers and magazines on receipts from advertisements.” Compare Veblen, Thorstein, “As has already been remarked, the quantity-production of customers by appliances of publicity is a craft which runs on applied psychology.” Absentee Ownership (New York, 1923), chap, xiGoogle Scholar, “Manufactures and Salesmanship,” 309–10.

⁴⁵ Veblen's Absentee Ownership is not cited by Chamberlin in his bibliography. Among other things Veblen wrote: “Judicious and continued expenditure on publicity and the like expenditure of salesmanship will result in what may fairly be called the quantity production of customers for the purchase of the goods and services in question” (Absentee Ownership, 304, italics mine).

⁴⁶ Industry and Trade, Appendix J, 2, pp. 809–10. Italics mine. Compare Veblen, , Absentee Ownership, 304–5.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ London, 1920, pp. xii-xv.

⁴⁸ Italics mine. Hutchison also cites this footnote.