* Pentland, H. C., “The Role of Capital in Canadian Economic Development before 1875,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVI, no. 4, 11, 1950, 457–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Aitken, Hugh G. J., “A Note on the Capital Resources of Upper Canada,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVIII, no. 4, 11, 1952, 525–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹ Buchanan's estimate of the capital per head of Lower Canadian settlers in 1829 works out to £9. If this figure can be applied to all immigrants, including those of Upper Canada, the capital imported that year was £100,000 (Public Archives of Canada, M.G. 22, vol. 34, Immigration, Miscellaneous MSS., 1792–1863). Buchanan estimated that immigrants brought £250,000 in 1831 and £600,000 in 1832, which work out to about £5 and £12 per head, respectively. These totals are cited in Cowan, Helen I., British Emigration to British North America, 1787–1837 (Toronto, 1928), 240.Google Scholar Buchanan did not make clear whether they took account of immigrants proceeding to the United States.

It appears to me that the immigrants of the early 1830's were considerably wealthier than those before or those for a long time after. The increase in the proportion of immigrants from Southern Ireland suggests smaller and smaller sums per head. It might be doubted whether the famine migration should be credited with any capital at all. In this connection, Dr. Aitken refers me to the recent article by Imlah, A. H., “British Balance of Payments and Export of Capital, 1816–1913,” Economic History Review, Second Series, V, no. 2, 1952, 219–20Google Scholar, which argues that large sums were carried out of Britain by emigrants (1816–46) and proposes an average sum per head of £15 or better. This article suggests also that Irish emigrants carried more per head than English. Whatever the validity of these views, I do not think that Canadian immigrants had anything like £15 per head or that Irish immigrants to Canada were as well off as the rest. I can only invite anyone who believes otherwise to follow the endless and melancholy record of immigrants' poverty (especially Irish poverty) in our Archives. There is always the possibility, of course, that a few very rich persons may make up for thousands of poor ones. Canada received some rich immigrants in the early thirties, but some of these soon proceeded to the United States.

With respect to Dr. Aitken's hypothetical calculation, it overstates somewhat the population growth of Upper Canada, and very much, I think, the capital per head. I would guess his total is much too high, not only for Upper Canada, but for the two Canadas.

² Two small and short-lived, banks represented American capital: the Bank of Canada (Montreal, 1818) and the Niagara Suspension Bridge Bank (1836).

³ Upper Canada, Assembly, Journals, 1833–1834, Appendix, 77, 113–14Google Scholar; P.A.C., Upper Canada Sundries, April 17, 1839, Merritt to Macaulay, enclosure by J. H. Dunn.

⁴ Macdonald, Norman, Canada, 1763–1841, Immigration and Settlement (Toronto, 1939), 275 Google Scholar, indicates that the Company put out £70,000 by May, 1829. Total capital paid up was £125,000 in 1829 and £170,000 in 1833 ( Skelton, O. D., The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tiloch Galt, Toronto, 1920, 19, 27 Google Scholar). Useful data on the Company's affairs are found in P.A.C., Upper Canada Sundries, Feb. 1, 1838; March 20, 1839; and July 20, 1839.

The Cleveland editor cited by Dr. Aitken was not very well informed. The Canada Company's annual cash payment was about £10,000, but its total instalment in 1829 was £15,000, including amounts allowed for improvements. The instalments were fixed and rose to £20,000 from 1835. The Company was required to make its cash payment in specie, but the “circulating specie medium of the province” does not seem a meaningful measure since most business was transacted by paper, and specie in circulation tended constantly towards zero.

⁵ Plus expenditure on the Rideau Canal, of which I had taken account previously. The figure shown for the Rideau Canal in Stacey (£1,650,000) is far too high. There is some question whether other sums shown really are sums spent in Canada.

⁶ The London bankers made this point in 1833 ( Upper Canada, Assembly, Journals, 1833–1834, Appendix, 113–14Google Scholar). Again in 1839 the Barings wrote, “The market is glutted with all sorts of American securities, and although the stocks of the United States are generally preferred to the Canadian Debentures, the greatest difficulty is found in raising money on the former.” (P.A.C., U.C. Sundries, Nov. 16, 1839, Dunn to Harrison, enclosure).

⁷ U.C. Sundries, Sept. 20, 1837, Dunn to Joseph.

⁸ Indeed, money was obtained in this way. The Barings “illegally” sold debentures at 87–88 in 1839 and, apparently, throughout 1840, despite protests (U.C. Sundries, Nov. 16, 1839, Dunn to Harrison; P.A.C., P.S.O., C.W., nos. 2313, Nov. 4, 1840, and 3343, Dec. 31, 1840).

⁹ There are two reasons why conversion should have been sincerely intended. Many of the War Losses debentures were held, in widely scattered places, by poor people who wanted cash, but who had to take debentures or nothing after twenty years' waiting. Secondly, 6 per cent interest in Canada was too high if bonds could be sold in London at 5 per cent.

¹⁰ U.C. Sundries, March 9, 1839, Ridout to Macaulay. See Shortt, Adam in Canada and its Provinces (Toronto, 1914–1917), IV, 600–14, 616–20Google Scholar; V, 264–8.

¹¹ Innis, H. A. and Lower, A. R. M., eds., Select Documents in Canadian Economie History, 1783–1885 (Toronto, 1933), 374–7Google Scholar; Upper Canada, Assembly, Journals, 1833–1834, Appendix, 114–15Google Scholar; U.C. Sundries, June 26 and June 27, 1837, Turquand to Joseph; and Nov. 25, 1839, Macaulay to Harrison.

¹² Upper Canada, Assembly, Journals, 1839, vol. II, Part II, 547–52Google Scholar; U.C. Sundries, March 9, 1839, Ridout to Macaulay.

¹³ Thus, The Report of the Earl of Durham (4th ed., London, 1930), 101 Google Scholar: “The greater part, almost the whole of the imports of Upper Canada entering at the ports of Lower Canada …” and 133 (prohibition of imports from the United States, and tea smuggling).

¹⁴ That the Montreal community was early alive to the threat of the Erie Canal is demonstrated in a discussion of possible counter-measures in or about 1810 (P.A.C., S 81, Jan. 12, 1810 (?), Porteous and others to the Civil Secretary). Interest in the problem of the St. Lawrence as a whole is shown in Lower Canada, Assembly, Journals, 1819, Appendix G.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The great private contribution of the Montreal Community was the Lachine Canal. The proceedings of the private corporation that undertook the work may be followed in P.A.C., Public Works I, vol. 12, Minutes and Proceedings respecting Lachine Canal Navigation, 1819–1821. They are far from suggesting a lack of public spirit, or of ambition to develop the St. Lawrence. When the same people, essentially, were appointed to superintend the succeeding government work, they often strained their private credit to make up for the deficiencies of legislative grants (P.A.C., Public Works I, vol. 13, Lachine Canal Commission: Minute Book, 1821–1827).

¹⁶ R. B. Sullivan (U.C. Sundries, 1838, Report on the State of the Province) painted a prophetic picture of the United States, grown with British help, turning upon the benefactor and driving her out of world markets. He argued, of course, that aid extended to Canada did not involve a similar threat. Sullivan's writing appears to be the source from which were paraphrased those “blunt” observations of Sir George Arthur which Dr. Aitken cites. But Sullivan was more blunt. Thus: “… the British people express their wonder at American enterprize and industry, when in fact the greatest part of the money which paid for these improvements (Rail Roads, Canals, and other public works) came from London, and the labourers who made them from Ireland, leaving to America the very easy task of employing other people with other peoples' money.”

¹⁷ I doubt whether the absence of cabinet government or obstacles to vertical mobility have ever driven off investors; but a struggle to introduce new institutions does so, while the struggle lasts.

I wish to record a doubt, also, of the importance of “the politician-promoter, the key figure in the expansion of the American frontier,” even though Dr. Aitken is here supported by a very large and learned company. It seems to me that in societies of a northwest European type (at least), development is dependent upon supplies of resources, capital, and labour; but not upon promoters, who are always in excess supply.