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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
From 1905, when Saskatchewan was made a province, to 1911, the Liberal party in Saskatchewan controlled both the federal and the provincial patronage. These six years gave it an enviable opportunity for laying firm foundations for a political organization. During the next ten years the federal patronage was in the hands of a Conservative or a Union party but the more important provincial patronage remained with the Liberals. Then in their last eight years of uninterrupted power, the Saskatchewan Liberals once more had the support of a federal Liberal government. Thus for twenty-four years after the formation of the province the Liberal rule over Saskatchewan was uninterrupted, and for fourteen of those years the Liberals also ruled over the Dominion. Until a few years before its defeat in 1929, it seemed as if the longer the party remained in power the stronger grew the party organization. It is this long period of development under favourable conditions which makes the Liberal organization in Saskatchewan worthy of close study.
The Liberal party in Saskatchewan, like Liberal and Conservative parties in the other provinces, had two sides to its organization—one formal and ineffective, the other informal and effective. In its formal aspect it resembled party organization elsewhere. The Liberals in each polling sub-division elected one or two representatives. These met to elect a constituency executive. Each constituency executive had one representative on the central council of the provincial party, on which there also sat the executive elected at a party convention. This formal organization, which paid so strict a homage to democratic theory in its pyramidical structure based upon the people's will, was unimportant. The constituency organization, for example, did very little; it met, perhaps, once a year. The formal organization constituted a democratic façade which hid from the common gaze the naked autocracy of effective party management. In the effective party organization which did the work, won the elections, and consequently possessed the reality of political power, appointments were from the top down.
1 The Liberal organization in Ontario in the federal election of 1908 is an interesting example of an autocratic and effective party organization, called in this instance a “Board of Strategy”, operating “behind the screen of the official organization”. This Board, which in large measure derived its directing force from Sir Clifford Sifton, was engaged for months before the election in organizing every constituency and every poll and in planning with foresight and judgment “the whole campaign,—the selection of candidates, the strategy for the province and the individual constituencies, the character of the literature distributed” ( Dafoe, J. W., Sir Clifford Siflon in Rdation to his Times, Toronto, 1931, pp. 341–2)Google Scholar
2 If it is true that “public meetings don't change no votes” but man-to-man arguments do, then orthodox political history must be subjected to a disquieting examination. In so far as general elections have been taken as deciding anything except which body of men should constitute the government, they have been considered as voicing public opinion on certain fairly definite issues which are put before the people in the speeches of the party leaders, but if the arguments which influence the voters are not so much those used by party leaders as those used by party canvassers, is there any possibility of determining what was the “will of the people” in 1911 or 1878 or even 1935, for who knows the effective arguments used by party canvassers in Brantford and Winnipeg and Sherbrooke in 1911 or 1878 or indeed in 1935? The policies advocated by the leader of a party in different sections of the Dominion are not always the same. How much more different are likely to be the arguments put forward by the canvassers for a party in different constituencies or in different sections of the same constituency?
3 For an account of the valuable work performed by these special workers see Richardson, Burton T., “High Politics in Saskatchewan” (Canadian Forum, 09, 1934, p. 462).Google Scholar The following story of one of the accomplishments of a leading Liberal (an ex-road superintendent) in the provincial election of 1934 shows how valuable are the services which a special worker can render his party: “Liberals in Saskatchewan were not surprised some weeks before the election to learn there was some talk going around among Ukrainian voters that, though they had always voted Liberal, they had not received due recognition. They did not have a candidate of their own in the campaign. As there are between 40,000 and 50,000 Ukrainian voters in Saskatchewan, this report created a problem requiring the closest attention of the inner circle of the party. It was just the sort of situation that “Archie” McCallum could handle. Here is what happened. The Ukrainians got one of their own prairie-born sons, a Saskatoon doctor, as a candidate in one of the north-eastern constituencies. Despite reports in the daily papers that an ‘outside’ candidate would not be welcome, the Ukrainian candidate arrived, receiving the support of the nominating convention, and any ruffled feelings among local Liberals were smoothed over. It was a situation that required finesse. Political dopesters said it was a sacrifice hit on the part of the Liberal party. A Ukrainian candidate in one constituency would keep the Ukrainian vote in eight or ten other constituencies in line. It did not matter whether or not he was elected. Came the election. The Ukrainian-Canadian candidate not only won the seat, but he piled up a majority of about 2,000 out of only some 6,000 votes in the riding.”
4 B. T. Richardson (“High Politics in Saskatchewan”) gives an interesting example of how this system worked in 1934, the election which returned the Liberals to power:
“The final report, three days before the election, on Last Mountain told Liberal headquarters the votes had been counted by Liberal workers as follows:
A canny organizer knew this report was not as good as it seemed. First of all allowances must be made in all totals for the voters who will not get out to vote. Deduct five per cent. Being a realist, the organizer must allow further a margin of error for over-enthusiasm. No doubt everyone who can be counted as Liberal has been counted in this way. On the other hand the opposition is likely to be under-estimated. Therefore, deduct a further ten per cent. from the Liberal total.
There are still 989 ‘doubtful’ votes to be allotted, and if the worst happens this total will all go to the strongest opponent. Add them to the C.C.F. This brings the possible standing to:
This is much too close for comfort. It is time to train some of the big guns on Last Mountain. Liberal speakers and canvassers poured into the southern end of the constituency, which is only twenty miles from headquarters.
Here is what the returning officer found when he counted the ballots:
And that is how Last Mountain worked out. It is hard to believe, but the figures came right out of the Liberal organization.”
5 Canada Sessional Papers, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, General Election, 1925, p. 477.Google Scholar
6 Ibid., 1921, p. 444.
7 Richardson, , “High Politics in Saskatchewan”, p. 461.Google Scholar
8 Dafoe, , Sir Clifford Sifton in Relation to his Times, pp. 341–2.Google Scholar
