Last updated 09/07/24: Online ordering is currently unavailable due to technical issues. We apologise for any delays responding to customers while we resolve this. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/news-and-insights/technical-incident
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
We may begin by stating three fundamental factors which in their interrelationship and when set into our scheme of economic competition are the basis of the minority group status of the Japanese immigrants in America. It is also these three factors which serve to relate the American-born Japanese to the present world crisis.
To be considered first is the factor of race. It has been used as a discriminating category for land ownership, for naturalization, and for regulating immigration. In 1913 California passed the first of the anti-alien land laws, prohibiting aliens ineligible for citizenship from owning land. Other states followed later with similar laws. In 1922 the United States Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision that members of the “Mongolian race or the Malay race” could not be naturalized. The final legal disability placed upon the Japanese on a basis of race was denying them the right of any further immigration. This was established by the National Immigration Act of 1924, often called the “Exclusion Act.” Other groups face social problems because of discrimination based upon racial features, but in the case of the Japanese, when race is combined with the other two factors, it gains unique significance.
The second factor of fundamental importance is that of the Japanese ethnic heritage, of which a central point of concern was the Japanese family system. As early as 1900 the Americans in San Francisco were demanding exclusion, but then the immigrants were mainly single males, as the sex ratio of 2,369.9 males for every hundred females shows, but by 1910 this had dropped to 694.1.
This paper was read at the round table on Sociology at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Kingston, May 24, 1941.
1 For details regarding these laws see Ichihashi, Yamato, Japanese in the United States (Stanford University, Calif., 1932).Google Scholar When California passed the first of the laws in 1913, the test case for naturalization had not yet been instituted. This California law was not declared unconstitutional. Although some Japanese had been naturalized, it was generally agreed that they were not eligible for citizenship, as in 1906 the American Congress had reconsidered the naturalization law and had retained the phrase “free white persons.”
3 For court cases dealing with problems of constitutional rights of the Japanese see Documental History of Law Cases Affecting the Japanese in the United States, 1916-1924, vols. I and II, compiled by the Consulate General of Japan (San Francisco, 1925).Google Scholar The final test case for naturalization, the “Ozawa Case,” was in the federal courts from March, 1916, until Nov., 1922. In 1916 Judge demons pointed out that about fifty Japanese had been naturalized prior to that year.
4 As a consequence of this movement and other factors the birth rate of the American-born Japanese reached its peak in 1921 and since then has declined rather rapidly. In 1921 there were 7,209 births reported in the registration area of the United States. In 1936 there were 1,803. Although not all states belonged to the registration area in 1921, but did in 1936, those which did not had only a negligible number of Japanese residents. See Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics (Washington, U.S. Census Bureau) for respective years.
For a study of the characteristics of the Oriental element of American population, see Holmes, S. J., “Trend of Birth Rate of Oriental Population in U.S.A.” (Journal of International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population, vol. II, pp. 47–9Google Scholar).
5 These women were known as “picture-brides.” The traditional scheme of arranging marriages was followed but the ceremony was carried on by proxy. After arrival in the United States, the couple was married in accordance with the laws of the state of residence. The years 1908 to 1920 are known as the “picture-bride period.”
6 See Strong, E. K., The Second-Generation Japanese Problem (Stanford University, Calif., 1932), p. 21.Google Scholar
7 For a description of a Japanese community in America see Miyamoto, S. F., Social Solidarity among the Japanese in Seattle (University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences, Seattle, 1939, vol. II, pp. 57–130).Google Scholar
8 To see the community role which gives rise to such fears, see Spivak, J. L., Honorable Spy (New York, 1939).Google Scholar This will be discussed later.
9 With respect to these schools see Svensrud, Marian, “Japanese and Their Language Schools” (Sociology and Social Research, vol. XVII, pp. 259–64)Google Scholar; Tanaka, T. J., “The Japanese Language School in Relation to Assimilation” (University of Southern California, Department of Sociology, 1933, M.A. thesis).Google Scholar
10 As an example see MacFadden, Bernarr, “War! War! An Open Letter to President Roosevelt” (Liberty, vol. XIII, 05 16, 1936).Google Scholar
11 See “The Nisei: California Casts an Anxious Eye upon the Japanese-Americans in its Midst” (Life, 10 14, 1940, pp. 75–82).Google Scholar
12 This was derived from the fact that the policy of the Japanese government was to treat immigrants like colonials. Japan has kept a close watch on her nationals abroad, and most of the immigrants have looked upon their residence abroad as a temporary residence. No other country has watched its nationals abroad so solicitously as Japan. This phase of Japanese migration needs more intensive research.
For a popularized statement of the point of view “Once a Japanese Always a Japanese,” see Price, Willard, Children of the Rising Sun (New York, 1938)Google Scholar, chap, XXIII, “Rising Sons on Far Horizons.”
13 An elaboration of this is given in Treat, P. J., Japan and the United States, 1852-1921 (Stanford University, Calif., 1928).Google Scholar For a statement of American-Japanese relations see Chang, Chung-Fu, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore, 1931).Google Scholar
When the United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands in 1898, Japan sent a warship to Honolulu. Some say this was in protest, others claim it was to protect her nationals. At the time of the San Francisco “School Affair” in 1906, Japanese journalists talked about “sending ships.”
14 By Japanese novelists the second generation has been portrayed as a tragic character, neither fully Japanese nor accepted by Americans but yet expected to fight for America. Rumours have it that the “nisei” would be the first to be sent to the front; others say they will be sent to concentration camps. One nisei told the writer that he was “fattening” himself up for the “lean and long days behind barb wire.” Another nisei said that the expected war was a favourite topic of conversation after dinner among the cannery workers in Alaska.
15 The Japanese are no longer agricultural labourers but are rather owners or operators of farms. They are also in the fruit and produce marketing trade, while those living in the cities are in small businesses of various kinds, particularly hotel, cleaning and dye shops, groceries, and the Oriental art goods shops. Among the second generation an increasing number are entering community services such as the professions, and there is a well-defined struggle to get into the white collar occupations. A few have gone into the civil service, and this number is likely to increase. The central problem of the American-born Japanese is still the problem of occupational discrimination. The most detailed statement of this is Strong's The Second-Generation Japanese Problem. The best statement of the Japanese in California agriculture, is that of McWilliams, Carey, Factories in the Field (Boston, 1939).Google Scholar
16 It is not known what influence the Manchurian developments, starting in September, 1931, had upon the problems of the American-born Japanese. At that time the average age was about ten years, as calculated by Strong, and what went on within Japanese community and family life in America is unknown, as these problems would be expressed mostly in the Japanese language papers. Further research would undoubtedly show that the period from 1931 to 1937 was a formulative period, the attitudes and trends of which came forth explicitly in 1937 and the years following.
17 An excellent analysis of this is given by Reed, J. P. in his Kokutai: A Study of Certain Sacred and Secular Aspects of Japanese Nationalism (University of Chicago Libraries, 1940).Google Scholar
18 “Japanese in San Francisco Form Emergency Committee” (Rafu Shimpo, Los Angeles daily, 10 22, 1937).Google Scholar One columnist in this paper, Aug. 12, 1937, stated that the American-born Japanese read the American papers and then condemn Japan.
19 This propaganda has been analysed by Lasker, Bruno and Roman, Agnes in Propaganda from China and Japan (New York, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938).Google Scholar
20 A columnist in the Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 12, 1937, points out that the Chinese are “clever propagandist” while the Japanese are “tongue tied,” “blunt,” and “diplomatically clumsy.” It was felt that they were unable to present an adequate case for their cause. An informant said that the Chinese hired an American advertising firm, paying as a first fee $300,000. In contrast he pointed out that Japan was using Japanese who could hardly speak English but who had prestige as defined by the Japanese in Japan.
21 Propaganda meetings were held so as to present Japan's point of view. An eighteen-year-old girl asked, at such a meeting, why Japan did not fight Russia if Japan was fighting communism. Why fight China? Another student pointed out to a consul that no mention had been made of economic factors. Were not these a major part of Japanese motivation? For young people to ask such questions is, from the Japanese point of view, almost impertinent.
22 It is obvious that the Japanese in America were unable to achieve and maintain the same level of regimentation as in Japan.
23 See Price, Children of the Rising Sun, p. 295, where a picture is given of supplies from San Francisco to Japan. The picture is titled “Japanese in California send not only substantial money contributions to the Imperial war treasury but ship-loads of supplies for Japanese soldiers in China.” Donations collected by the Osaka Mainichi and Tokyo Nichi Nichi are called a “Cheer Fund.” The Sunday English edition of the Osaka Mainichi reported Y1,336,062.67 had been contributed on the closing September 4, 1937. Some of this was donated by Japanese residing abroad. The Mainichi (Sept. 5, 1937) reported Y80.000 had been remitted to the War Office via the Japanese Consulate from the Japanese residents in Hawaii. The same paper reports $70,000 from the Japanese in Southern California. It is reported as contributed by the “Japanese Residents' Association.”
24 In the Rafu Shimpo, Sept. 11, 1937, an article with respect to the war states that the Chinese and Americans contribute, so the Japanese can if they wish. In gathering field data one informant was asked about the organization which was rumoured to be collecting donations. This informant at first refused to make any statement. Later he admitted that collections were made. He explained that it was being done quietly and seemed embarrassed to admit that he had contributed.
25 In the New World Sun, a San Francisco daily, April 25, 1938, Tad Uyeno discusses a writer who had earlier “condemned” the first generation for “contributing excessive sums of money to the Japanese soldiers.” The writer felt that this money could be used to better advantage in nisei, meaning second generation, welfare. The Canadian-born Japanese have made the same complaints. The flow of money to Japan has been a point of resentment on the part of the nisei for some time, as they feel underprivileged with respect to their homes when compared with white people of similar economic status.
26 The newspapers have many articles on this point scattered through them. For an example see the New World Sun, Oct. 16, 1937. This article points out that we did not penalize the Italians. The September and October, 1937, issues of Rafu Shimpo have good articles. The North American Times, a Seattle daily, Jan. 22, 1938, refers to a “Kent Japanese” who boycotted Nipponese goods and “received money for Chinese aid.”
27 It is interesting to observe that Japan and America are each other's best customer and that the trade is reciprocal. Yet the Americans do not want to see Japan rule the Orient and apparently are willing to fight a war so as to participate in the industrialization of China. For extent of the trade see Foreign Commerce Year Book (Washington, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
28 “At the San Francisco office of the U.S. array recruiting service … the report that the regular army will not accept any one of Japanese ancestry was confirmed by the recruiting officer” (Japanese-American News, a San Francisco daily, Nov. 6, 1940).
29 New World Sun, Oct. 26, 1940.
30 Great Northern Daily News, Jan. 21, 1941. In Fresno, Calif., it was reported that a “nisei member of a national defense organization who was told to resign on account of his race” created an “incident.” Colonel Stimson's letter was a reply to an inquiry being made by a civilian.
31 New World Sun, Dec. 29, 1940.
32 Over the Labour Day weekend, the Japanese American Citizens' League held its sixth biennial convention in Portland, Oregon. The reception there on the part of the press seems to have set the course for other Coast papers. Considerable editorial and news space was devoted to this meeting. One editor openly apologized for American treatment of this minority group. The American Press had a long dispatch about the convention, this being included in the newscast of the Richfield Oil news which is the most popular newscast on the Pacific Coast. All of this favourable publicity surprised even the Japanese. One correspondent wrote the writer, saying that “the newspapers, even Hearst, are leaning over backwards.” A local weekly of Santa Barbara, Common Sense, a white American paper, was indignant over the fact that the regular army refused to take two Orientals, one a Chinese and one a Japanese, both American-born. One cannot fully appreciate this newspaper material without having read the materials published during the long period of agitation between 1900 and 1924.
33 During this period occasional newspaper reports appeared as to the policy regarding the Canadian-born Japanese.
34 “Job Hope Fading for Young Folks” (Japanese-American Courier, May 10, 1941).
35 North American Times, March 31, 1941; the issue of March 5 carried an “Issei Manifesto,” issei meaning first generation.
36 A Japanese friend residing in New York said that a rumour had spread through both North and South America that the Japanese were about to be interned. All of the corporation employees in New York were highly excited, many of them having packed their bags.
37 Quoted in a personal letter from Mr.Sakamoto, James, publisher of the Japanese-American Courier, dated 04 21, 1941, addressed to the writer.Google Scholar
38 Mr. Sakamoto also stated that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents on the Coast were attempting to find out how discrimination would manifest itself. No conclusion can be drawn from this statement, but it would not be unlikely for the Bureau to- be watching for efforts of foreign agents to stir up latent prejudices.
39 The problem of collective activity is stated in my paper “Political Behavior of the American-born Japanese” ( State College of Washington, Research Studies, vol. III, 1940 Google Scholar). It is interesting to note that although there are many organizations among the Japanese, none but the Japanese American Citizens' League is organized for the handling of such crises, yet it has not had the full support that the anticipation of such crises would seem to warrant.
