Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gvh9x Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T15:07:31.664Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Some Theoretical Schemes of Proportional Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

Duncan Black
Duncan Black*
Affiliation:
Glasgow University
Get access

Extract

We have already considered the election of a single candidate to represent a constituency. Now we turn to the problem of choosing the group of representatives who will best reflect the political opinions held throughout a country or constituency. The desirability of proportional representation, ceteris paribus, we take to be self-evident; a change in the electoral system that makes the legislative bodies more truly reflect the citizens' opinions will certainly be desirable, provided the party system and the system of cabinet government remain as effective after the change as they had been before. Of course, the source of difficulty, the opponents of proportional representation would add, is that when proportional representation is introduced other things do not remain the same: instead a degeneration of the party and cabinet system sets in.

These “dynamic changes” include alterations in party structure, a heightening or lessening of the political interest of the voters, alterations in the type of persons who stand for Parliament, new problems of cabinet formation, and increased or lesser control by the electorate over the course of government. And we readily concede that these are the aspects of the problem that it is most important to investigate to decide whether proportional representation would, in practice, do good or harm. The present paper will make no reference to them, and is not, indeed, much concerned to answer the broad question of whether proportional representation would, in any particular circumstances, be a good thing or a bad thing. A proper scientific procedure permits the treatment in isolation of particular aspects of each wider problem; and our concern is with the “statics” of the problem. (We only consider one or two small dynamic changes which are intimately connected with the course of the argument.)

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , August 1949 , pp. 334 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1949

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 “The Theory of Elections in Single-Member Constituencies” (Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XV, no. 2, 05, 1949).Google Scholar

2 This has been dealt with in Hoag, C. G. and Hallett, G. H., Proportional Representation (1926)Google Scholar and Hermens, L. R., Democracy or Anarchy? (1942).Google Scholar The two books reach diametrically opposed conclusions.

3 Black, , “Theory of Elections in Single-Member Constituencies,” pp. 168–71.Google Scholar

4 Ibid.

5 Or else by the majority criterion. We ourselves are indifferent as to which of these is used. Ibid.

6 This method of allocation gives practically the same results as the use of a quota system. Mathematically it is simpler than a quota and enables us to express the argument of the paper more clearly. But it is not an essential step in our argument and if desired may be replaced by the use of a quota.

7 Cf. Hoag, and Hallett, , Proportional Representation, pp. 440 ff.Google Scholar See also, for example, the different results shown for a choice of Socialist leaders by Socialist, Liberal and Conservative voters in a recent gallup poll, the Daily Express, June 28, 1948.

8 It might be thought desirable to have the further restriction that the voter should be required to show his order of preference for all the candidates of the party of his first choice, before he is allowed to do so for other parties.

9 In general, when there are r parties there will be (r-1) ratios to be determined from equations.

10 The single vote in single-member constituencies used in Great Britain has marked effects on party structure, acting towards enforcing a two-party system. There is something to be said in favour of this and many would claim it as the chief advantage of the system. But there is nothing to be said in favour of a method which, like Alternative 3 or Alternative 4, would atomize parties.

11 Cf. Dicey, A. V., The Law of the Constitution (8th ed.), pp. lxvi–lxxv.Google Scholar