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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2015
My primary goals in this article are to show: first, that we can identify and justify which basic freedoms are important ones to protect in the global context; second, that we can monitor whether we are making progress with respect to whether more or fewer people are enjoying the important freedoms; third, that we can identify some key institutions that play a central role in fortifying those freedoms; fourth, that we can help build or fortify local capacity with respect to protecting basic freedoms; fifth, that external support and building international institutions can play an important role in securing local capacity to protect basic liberties. The emphasis is on trying to construct local capacity to protect basic freedoms. However external support has a key role to play. I argue that protecting press freedom and building institutions of international justice play crucial roles in securing local capacity to protect basic liberties. We have obligations to support those institutions that would facilitate progress with respect to protection of basic liberties. So, for instance, we have a range of responsibilities to support press freedom in all countries, along with international efforts to bring to justice violators of basic liberties.
For very helpful comments on previous drafts of this work I am grateful to Stephen Davies and Darrel Moellendorf.
1. Brock, Gillian, “Egalitarianism, Ideals, and Cosmopolitan Justice” (2005) XXXVI Phil. Forum 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Brock, Gillian, “Global Distributive Justice, Entitlement, and Desert” Can. J. Phil. [forthcoming]Google Scholar. Brock, Gillian, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice [unpublished, book manuscript with author].Google Scholar
2. Ibid. at ch. 5. See also, Brock, Gillian, “Taxation and Global Justice” [unpublished]Google Scholar.
3. Many people raise questions of the following kinds when talk of social contracts is introduced: Is the contract supposed to be actual or hypothetical? If only hypothetical then why does a purely hypothetical contract have any binding force anyway? And if it has no binding force, then why adhere to it? I see talking in terms of social contracts as a way to specify what expectations various parties to the contract may reasonably have of each other: it is simply a way of fleshing out what those reasonable expectations might be. So, in answer to the questions listed: no, the contract developed assuming the ideal world presupposition is neither an actual contract nor a purely hypothetical one. It is a way to sift through what (actual) parties might reasonably expect of one another, by imagining a certain (hypothetical) choosing situation. Talking about social contracts is a way to talk about, and so uncover, the reasonable expectations people might have of one another in ongoing cooperation.
4. The motivation of the parties in the original position is thus a mix of self-interest (as they are instructed to be self-interested) and fairness (they must arrive at a decision about what would be fair). This motivation is thus different from the typical Rawlsian story. Delegates must reach agreement on a fair basic framework, but I try to highlight how we can show what it is reasonable to expect, by leaning almost entirely on what is prudent (i.e., what rational, self-interested delegates would find of benefit). The original position helps shield them from knowledge of their identity and so helps to harness the power of self-interest.
5. I prefer to have my delegates randomly selected rather than being representatives for a range of reasons having to do with the problematic nature of representation, especially in this context. The notion of representation does, and can do, no real work here.
6. I contend that if a rational individual does not know the odds, it is not rational to gamble (under at least certain conditions, especially the ones described). She will have to think more seriously about what “the strains of commitment” will really involve and what she will honestly be prepared to tolerate.
7. This is Rawls’s term, but basically here it means that whatever decisions are made at this conference will be binding ones—you will have to live with the results knowing this imposes “the strains of commitment”. See, for instance, Rawls, John, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001) at 103-04Google Scholar.
8. They will also have information about those who dissent from these common views. Notice how this recognition, though seemingly obvious, is decidedly lacking in Rawls’s account as discussed in The Law of Peoples.
9. Would this idea really need further justification? Perhaps someone might Press for one, especially someone concerned with the idea that those not from liberal democracies might not see this emphasis on freedom as so important or even reasonable. So let me say more about why I think the level of attention I give to freedom can be expected to be universal. If you do not know anything about what sort of position you will occupy under the new arrangements, why would you allow some people to have more freedom of a very basic kind than others? Unless you agree that everyone should have equal basic freedom, you might end up (say) giving some people more basic freedom than you have: you might deny yourself the freedom to go about your business free from assault, though others enjoy this liberty. Given their lack of knowledge about their particular interests, prudent delegates would agree to equal basic liberties. Similarly, it would not be prudent to agree to adopt (say) racist or sexist practices, since one may find oneself at the receiving end of such practices once the conference concludes. It would be better not to place constraints on one’s liberties and opportunities, since it would be more prudent to have more rather than less freedom to pursue whatever your goals turn out to be.
10. On my account, a need is basic if satisfying it is a necessary condition for human agency. This link to agency helps us derive a list of our basic needs that can circumvent concerns about how an account of such needs could be sufficiently “objective”, non-arbitrary, and enjoy widespread cross-cultural support. If basic needs are those things the satisfaction of which is necessary for human agency, by examining the pre-requisites of human agency, of what being a human agent is like, we can derive a more specific list of such conditions, and so basic needs. For instance, by definition, to be an agent one must be able to deliberate and choose. In order to deliberate and choose one will need at least a certain amount of (1) physical and mental health, (2) sufficient security to be able to act, (3) a sufficient level of understanding of what one is choosing between, and (4) a certain amount of autonomy. Because of its important role in developing (and maintaining) (1)-(4), I also add a fifth basic need which underlines the importance of our social needs, namely, (5) decent social relations with at least some others. These ideas are developed in my “Needs and Global Justice” in Philosophy [forthcoming].
11. Questions about the kind of favoritism we may show to co-members of our group can only be addressed once there is commitment to the basic framework with all its protections. Assuming this is the case and we have a suitably well organized basic structure in which vital interests are protected all have prospects for decent lives and control over those lives as is consistent with protection of vital interests, it may be permissible to favor other interests of compatriots and in other ways be partial to members of one’s group in conferring further benefits, so long as this is not in conflict with provision of the basic agreed framework. Theoretically, at the very least, there is some permissible space for favoring our compatriots in certain matters, but the extent of the favoritism we may show must be governed by the commitment we all have to support the basic framework and does not include (for instance) favoring the non-basic interests of compatriots above more needy non-compatriots, since this would not be selected in the normative thought-experiment.
12. A skeptic may complain: Is it true that one needs the basic liberties to engage in all these core activities? One can certainly (say) run a household, build dwellings, work, raise children, and so forth without having a hint of basic freedom. Indeed, slaves did all of these things without enjoying any of the freedoms listed. But did they really, we might wonder? They may have built dwellings, worked and so forth, but were they free to enter into and maintain loving human relationships or live a life that had coherence or meaning for those the slaves themselves? While it may be the case that someone severely liberty-deprived (such as a slave) could engage in one or other of these core activities unproblematically, it is hard to see how a severely liberty deprived person could engage in several of these core activities while not enjoying any of the basic liberties listed.
13. Karatnycky, Adrian, “Gains for Freedom Amid Terror and Uncertainty” downloaded from http://www.freedomhouse.org in December, 2004, at 3.Google Scholar
14. Karatnycky, ibid. at 4.
15. Ibid. at 5.
16. “Freedom in the World 2004” at 1, originally available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/methodology.htm.
17. See, for instance, Brock, Gillian, “Closing the Gap Between Theory and Practice: Global Poverty, Taxation, and Global Justice” [unpublished].Google Scholar
18. “Freedom of the Press 2004: A Global Survey of Media Independence” ed. by Karlekar, Karin Deutsh, originally available at http://www.freedomhouse.org at x.Google Scholar
19. Ibid. at xi.
20. Ibid. at xi.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. at 2.
23. Ibid.
24. Silvio Berlusconi “used his position as prime minister to exert undue influence over the public broadcaster RAI, in addition to manipulating coverage at his family’s own sizable media empire, which includes Italy’s three largest private television stations.” Ibid.
25. Ibid. at 3.
26. “In Memory of Chris Gehring, 1968-1997” The Washington Post (18 January 1997), online: Internews.org http://www.internews.org/articles/1990s/97_washpost_gehring.htm Google Scholar
27. For instance, Freedom House purchased a printing Press for operation in Kyrygstan.
28. Gillian Brock, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice, supra note 1 at ch. 5.
29. Of course, simply having access to more resources will not help with the other catalog of ills recorded above, such as government harassment of various kinds, including politically motivated law-suits to be heard in front of judiciaries that are far from independent. Here other mechanisms for trying to hold governments more accountable will have to be used such as the crucial work done by Reporters Without Borders in exposing such actions to the international community, where other Pressures can be brought to bear. But there is no doubt that making more resources available will help in those many cases where people are just too poor to run independent media, and governments keen to stay on side with the international community will be hard Pressed to deny such folks the opportunities to go ahead under their own steam.
30. As of 1 January, 2005, there are now 97 signatories.
31. As Gardner puts it: “The ICC, …, is like a global safety net to catch large-scale criminals who would otherwise fall through the cracks” Gardner, Maggie “In Uncharted Waters: Seeking Justice Before the Atrocities Have Stopped” at 10 (June 2004)Google Scholar, online: Citizens for Global Solutions www.globalsolutions.org/programs/law_justice/icc/resources/uncharted_waters.pdf. The US has been opposed to the court fearing that it might be used for politically motivated or frivolous prosecutions of US troops. However, the 97 countries that ratified the 1998 Rome Treaty argued that there are enough protections in the mandate of the court to prevent frivolous or wholly inappropriate prosecutions.
32. The ICC cannot bring to trial any person under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged crime. Effectively, this excludes all child soldiers from the court’s jurisdiction. Indeed children caught up in atrocities such as being forced to become soldiers, sexual slaves, or forced laborers of other kinds, are considered victims.
33. Supra note 32 at 18.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. at 29.
36. Ibid. at 29.
