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A Classical Perspective on the Modern Workplace: The Aristotelian Conflict in Sexual Harassment Litigation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2015

Erika Chamberlain
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Extract

The current structure of sexual harassment litigation in Canada poses unique issues for Aristotle’s distinction between corrective and distributive justice. Due to a series of decisions in the 1980s and 1990s, sexual harassment claims in Canada must be brought exclusively under human rights legislation. This system views sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, and roughly subscribes to the view that sexual harassment is an incident of distributive injustice. However, the form of the litigation tends to undermine its distributive justifications. The litigation generally corresponds to the traditional adversarial model, with the complainant seeking damages from the harasser. Consequently, some commentators have argued that sexual harassment should be treated as a private law cause of action, rather than an issue for the human rights system. This article examines the rationale for classifying sexual harassment as an object of corrective or distributive justice, and particularly whether harassment should be viewed as an individual or a group harm. It also addresses the emerging claims for heterosexual male-on-male or bisexual harassment, which create problems for the view that sexual harassment is a form of discrimination “because of sex.” Finally, the article explains how the distributive and corrective theories of justice are manifested in the extent of employer liability and the available remedies.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , January 2002 , pp. 3 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2002

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References

1. Weinrib, E.J., The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995)Google Scholar at 73.

2. See, for example, New Brunswick Human Rights Act, S.N.B. 1985, c. 30, s. 7.1; Newfoundland Human Rights Code, R.S.N. 1990, c. H-14, ss. 12-13; and Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990.C. H.19, s. 7(2).

3. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 1999-2000 (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2000)Google Scholar at 41 (Table 1).

4. See, for example, E. Frankel Paul, “Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm” (1990) 8 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 333; and J. Dine & B. Watt, “Sexual Harassment: Moving Away from Discrimination” (1995) 58 Mod. L. Rev. 343.

5. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) [hereinafter Meritor].

6. Consequently, it was properly addressed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).

7. Meritor, supra note 5 at 2404.

8. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 [hereinafter Janzen].

9. (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Bhadauria].

10. Supra note 2.

11. Bhadauria, supra note 9 at 203.

12. [1995] B.C.J. No. 1203 (S.C.), online: QL (CJ).

13. Ibid. at para. 235.

14. [1995] O.J. No. 4564 (Gen. Div.), online: QL (CJ).

15. Ibid, at para. 47.

16. See Lajoie v. Kelly (c.o.b. Swayzees Restaurant), [1997] M.J. No. 52 (Q.B.), online: QL (CJ); Clark v. Canada [1994] 3 F.C. 323 (T.D.); and Kulyk v. Toronto Board of Education, [1996] O.J. No. 2972 (Gen. Div.), online: QL (CJ). Some courts distinguish Bhadauria on the grounds that the Ontario Human Rights Code specifically prohibits sexual harassment under section 7(2), while other provincial statutes are silent on the issue. See T.D. v. Runte, [ 1996] A.J. No. 1231 (Q.B.), online: QL (CJ). However, given the ruling in Janzen, it appears an untenable position to argue that sexual harassment is not included in the general prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.

17. [1997] O.J. No. 4775 (Gen. Div.), online: QL (CJ).

18. Ibid, at para. 1.

19. [1998] N.B.J. No. 123 (Q.B.), online: QL (CJ).

20. Ibid, at para. 18.

21. Trans. Rackham, H. (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1996)Google Scholar.

22. Ibid, at 1130b30-1131a1.

23. Ibid, at 1131b16-20.

24. Ibid, at 1132a2-5.

25. Ibid, at 1132a7-10.

26. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. The provincial legislation has comparable purposes.

27. According to the Annual Report, 1999-2000 of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, supra note 3 at 41, 73% of all new complaints filed arose out of employment situations. Similarly, 64% of complaints filed with the Canadian Human Rights Commission arose out of employment, in addition to 18% of complaints filed for “harassment.” Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 2000 (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2001) at 26.

28. V. Schultz, “Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment” (1998) 107 Yale L.J. 1683 at 1757.

29. Supra note 8. As will be discussed, this focus on the but for test has created significant problems for those who bring complaints against bisexual perpetrators, and men who bring claims against other heterosexual men.

30. Ibid, at 1290.

31. (1986) 8 C.H.R.R. D/3831 (Man. C.A.).

32. Ibid, at D/3845.

33. Ibid, at D/3846.

34. Janzen, supra note 8 at 1290.

35. (1980) 1 C.H.R.R. D/155 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).

36. Ibid, at D/156 [emphasis in original].

37. K. Abrams, “The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment” (1998) 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1169 at 1218.

38. Ibid. at 1208.

39. Ibid. at 1206.

40. For a more thorough argument on this point, see K.M. Franke, “What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?” (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691.

41. Abrams, supra note 37 at 1219-20.

42. Frankel Paul, supra note 4.

43. Ibid, at 361.

44. Dine, supra note 4.

45. See, for example, Wright v. Methodist Youth Services Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. 111. 1981).

46. 72 F. 3d. 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).

47. Ibid, at 1195. The same reasoning was applied in Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111. 1988).

48. Frankel Paul, supra note 4 at 362.

49. Ibid, at 364.

50. Ibid, at 350 (emphasis added],

51. Ibid, at 365.

52. See supra note 25.

53. Abrams, supra note 37 at 1218.

54. Franke, supra note 40 at 696.

55. Supra note 2, s. 7(2) [emphasis added).

56. Supra note 26, s. 14(2)

57. R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, as am. by R.S.C. 1985, c. 9 (1st Supp.), s. 1.

58. Ibid., s.247.1

59. See, for example, A.J. Morris, “On the Normative Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law: Understanding the Competing Models of Discrimination Law as Aristotelian Forms of Justice” (1995) 15 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 199.

60. See J. Gardner, “Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination” (1989) 9 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 1 at II.

61. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84.

62. Ibid, at 94 [emphasis in original].

63. Supra note 26, s. 65(1).

64. Janzen, supra note 8 at 1293.

65. Supra note 26, s. 65(2).

66. Supra note 2, s. 45(1). However, under section 41 (2), the Board of Inquiry may order an employer to take action to prevent recurrence of the harassment, if the employer had knowledge of the harassment and failed to take steps to prevent it or penalise the harasser.

67. See Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 26, ss. 53 and 54.

68. Hendry v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) (1980), 1 C.H.R.R. D/160 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).

69. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1988), 19 C.C.E.L. 172 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

70. Cuff v. Gypsy Restaurant (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/3972 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).

71. Dhillon v. F.W. Woolworth Co. Ltd. (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/743 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).