The term ‘componential analysis’ is used here to refer to the theory of semantic structure developed by Goodenough (1956, 1965, etc.), Lounsbury (1956, 1964, etc.) and others. Obviously the notion of a semantic component - or ‘feature,’ or whatever other term is applied - is common to a wide variety of semantic theories, and ‘componential analysis’ is sometimes used (e.g. by Lyons 1968) to cover the whole of this wider field; nevertheless the Goodenough-Lounsbury theory is sufficiently unified and different from others to warrant separate treatment.

Although the theory is intended to be, and undoubtedly is, much more widely applicable, a great deal of the descriptive work in componential analysis is in the field of kinship terminologies, and the basic concepts of the theory may conveniently be exemplified from this semantic domain. Drawing on the sign theory of Charles Morris, Goodenough distinguishes between the denotatum, designatum and significatum of a word (1965: 286 n.3):

This paper comprises some of the reactions of a psycholinguist to a book which has already attracted considerable critical attention: D. T. Langendoen’s The Study of Syntax: the Generative-Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English. These views are not essentially at variance with the theoretical and pedagogical criticisms of Sampson (1970), Householder (1971), or Chambers (1971), but rather complement and supplement them. The questions raised here are of a somewhat more fundamental nature in the context of linguistic inquiry, having to do with certain assumptions most formal linguists take for granted – assumptions concerning the validity of introspective data and the formalizability of presuppositions. In a sense, the present critique is a general indictment of some current trends in linguistics, but The Study of Syntax, in its eclectic attempt to epitomize them all, invites the brunt of the criticism.

In his recent dissertation, David Stampe (1972) discusses the notions of natural processes in child phonology. Earlier, Ingram (1971) discussed the concepts and formulations of phonological rules in child language. What we propose to demonstrate here is that the rules inherent in acquisitional phonology are ordered and, moreover, that these rules are ordered implicationally (in the sense of “unilateral implication” enunciated by Jakobson in discussing the stratified structure of the phoneme inventory). Our contention is that there are rules in child phonology, that these rules are ordered, and that while the entire inventory of rules does not appear in any child’s phonology, the presence of any one necessitates the presence of others - in a specific order.

A Sémantèse. Toute tentative de représentation et de mesure du temps présuppose qu’on s’est donné les moyens de les réaliser. A ces fins, se sont d’abord imposés à l’homme les phénomènes facilement et concrètement observables que sont les cycles naturels: l’incessante alternance du jour et de la nuit a permis la définition du concept de journée, le cycle lunaire celui de mois, le retour périodique des saisons celui d’année.

On n’a pas à insister sur les avatars qui, dans l’histoire des civilisations, ont abouti à conférer à ces mots une valeur, une DURÉE stable. On se contentera d’observer que les progrès réalisés dans cette voie ont toujours été liés à ceux de l’astronomie. Ainsi, par exemple, fut-on de plus en plus en situation d’expliquer rationnellement les variations de la durée du jour ou de la course apparente du soleil, de corriger certaines inexactitudes (durée exacte de l’année solaire grâce à l’invention de l’année bissextile), de revoir la notion de mois (qui ne se calcule plus d’après le cycle lunaire), etc… Ce bref et très incomplet excursus montre à suffisance combien, dans l’esprit de l’homme, la représentation du temps est tributaire de la représentation spatiale.

In traditional studies of historical phonology, there is frequently a division between sound change and analogy. Sound change is said to proceed gradually and inexorably under strictly phonetic conditions; “La règle générale est que les transformations phonétiques s’opèrent avec une constance absolue c’est-à-dire que les mêmes phonèmes placés dans les mêmes conditions, se développent d’une manière identique.” (Schwan-Behrens 1963: 12). Occasionally, when the conditions are not apparent, there may be some concern until further research uncovers the conditioning factors. Such was the case with Verner’s law, for example. Yet in any interesting situation, there remains a body of forms for which the proper phonetic environment cannot be found. The items just do not follow the normal phonetic “laws.” In these cases, analogy is often called on to explain the discrepancy, and also to account for the reintroduction of regularity into a system “ravaged” by the forces of phonological change; “L’analogie joue un rôle considérable en roman (et en français) qui s’est reconstitué, comme on l’a dit, sur les ruines du latin où les ravages d’une évolution phonétique brutale avaient entièrement boulversé le système des oppositions morphologiques et de leurs valeurs” (Guiraud 1965: 63).