1 See E.N. VII. 3, 1146b7.

2 Metaph. B1, 994b27-9

3 See Meno 80d5-8.

4 Metaph. B1, 994a34-b1

5 Ibid., 995b1-2.

6 Ibid., 994a27-8; cf. 996a15-17.

7 Ibid., 995b2-4

8 Ibid., 996a15-17

9 Ibid., 996a9-10; the puzzle is sketched at B6, 1003a5-17.

10 In this paper I intend my usage of the terms ‘particular’ and ‘universal’ to conform to the definitions of ‘kath hekaston’ and ‘katholou’ given at De Interpretatione VII. The phrase that I translate ‘particular’ is not used in the Categories.

11 Metaph. M10, 1087a10-25

12 Owen, G.E.L., ‘Particular and General', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1978) 2.Google Scholar My own interpretation, though at times incompatible with Owen's, is very much indebted to his work.

13 Owen, 3

14 See note 10.

15 I believe that this constraint is not independent from the first - in particular, it emerges from the ti esti requirement.

16 De Anima A4, 408b1-18

17 De Anima A3, 405b31-406a2, J.A. Smith translation. Of course, Aristotle's own view is that thinking and the like are activities, and not movements at all. Nonetheless, the A4 passage cited is part of a dialectical treatment intended to support the contention in the text just quoted. Aristotle's point is that even if we allow that thinking, perceiving, etc., are movements, it still will not follow that the soul is moved because it is the man who does these things in virtue of soul, and the soul itself is not something that also does them. I should hasten to point out that the A4 passage is in fact compatible with the claim that the soul does change. This passage gives a particular list of some of the things that we say (e.g., that the soul grieves), and states that the fact that we say these things does not require the soul to be the subject of grieving, etc. However, this leaves open the possibility that there are other changes (not covered by the list) for which the soul is the appropriate subject. Further, there may be additional considerations that would indicate that when the composite, for instance, grieves, there is some other predicable that comes to be true of the soul, and hence the soul would be a subject for some property the having of which is a necessary condition for the composite's changing in the way appropriate to the composite.

18 See De Anima B1, 412b6-8.

19 In Section VII it is suggested that likewise the form is not (strictly speaking) universal because it is not universal with respect to a plurality of actual objects.

20 This is the view I expressed and tried to defend in my PhD thesis, ‘Aristotle on Changing Individuals: Some Aspects of his Essentialism’ (University of Wisconsin, Madison: 1976). The view by no means originates with me, however. I was particularly indebted to Albritton, Rogers ('Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle's Metaphysics,’ Journal of Philosophy, 54 (1957))Google Scholar.

21 See note 20.

22 In this note I present some further evidence that in parts of Metaph. Z Aristotle is seriously pursuing the idea that the formal component of a composite must be universal. Metaph. Z15 refers to the formal component as the ‘logos,’ or ‘formula,' by which he means definition, and then goes on to argue that no particular has a definition. Since definition is of the universal, and no particular is definable, the formal component is here argued to be universal. I do not wish to maintain that in the end Aristotle intends to accept this argument without qualification, but only that he is presenting a powerful case for the view that form is universal. It should be noted that at 1039b26-7 he refers back to Z8 - we are told that we have already shown that the logos does not come into being. It is in Z8 that he argued for this claim, and hence the formal component of Z8 should be identified with the logos of Z15. This gives us an additional reason to suppose that the formal component of Z8 is intended to be general.

I used to think (seen. 20) that the contrast made at Z15, 1039b25, between the essence of house and the essence of this house showed a commitment to particular essences, and hence to the idea that the formal component of a material particular was itself (strictly speaking) particular and peculiar to just that particular. However, this cannot be right. The essence of this house is said to be subject to genesis and phthora, and Z8 says that every gignomenon is composite - one part matter, one part form. Hence Aristotle must be using the phrase ‘the essence of this house’ to refer to a gignomenon which as such is one part matter, one part form, and cannot be identified with the formal component of the composite. S. Marc Cohen helped me to get clear on this point. See his contribution, this volume, 41 ff.

23 Michael Frede has pointed out that there are at least two different ‘sets of intuitions that might make one inclined to think that the ultimate principles of reality are universal,’ and that the issues I address in connection with the last aporia of B6 do not do justice to both. He rightly thinks that the aporia sketched at 998b14ff (esp. 998bl7) is concerned with the ‘other set,’ and that both must be taken into consideration if we are to properly understand Aristotle's treatment of the idea that the principles are universal. (See note 27.)

24 This is the interpretation that I have been exploring in ‘On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About Predication’ (in How Things Are, Bogen, J. and McGuire, J.E., eds., (Boston: D. Reidel 1984Google Scholar), and ‘Aristotle: Essence and Accident' (in Grandy, R. and Warner, R., eds. Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, [Oxford forthcoming]Google Scholar).

25 Although not predicable in common of actualities, they are, being predicable in common of a plurality of bodies, immune to the Z15 arguments against the definability of particulars.

26 A related, but less serious difficulty is this. If the species-form is the substance of the particular composite, and there is a plurality of members for each species, then the species-form is the substance of a plurality of things. But then … (shades of Z13!)

27 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the December, 1982, meetings of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, and an abstract was published in the Journal of Philosophy. I would like to thank Michael Frede for the very helpful comments he prepared for that session. Much of the honing process for this paper took place during the Fall of 1982, during which time I incurred a debt of gratitude to Princeton University, enjoying an appointment as a Visiting Junior Fellow of the Council of Humanities and George W. Perkins Junior Fellow in the Department of Philosophy. Finally, I owe thanks to Jonathan Lear for helping me with the final draft.