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Beasts, Beliefs, Intentions, Norms1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

David Checkland
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Extract

“Terms that have histories cannot be defined.” – Nietzsche

“[T]he reality to which we were attending seemed to resist our thinking it.” – Cora Diamond

[1] Much has been learned in recent decades about the behaviour and abilities of many species of non-human animals. Increasingly many who reflect on the abilities of languageless animals are uncomfortable with a once prevalent dichotomy of either assigning these abilities to the realm of mere (usually “associative”) mechanism or granting such creatures full rationality and more or less the entire range of abilities that involves. This has lead to no little reflection and debate regarding how to proceed in studying animal “cognition,” and about what counts as adequately or accurately explaining animal behaviour. I cautiously hope herein to contribute to the clarity of what is already a discussion too rich and complex to do any justice to here. Little of what I say will be original, but the particular way of approaching the issues herein may shed some light on why certain issues have endured.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 35: Belief and Agency , 2009 , pp. 299 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2009

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Footnotes

1

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Sue Campbell, philosopher and friend.

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