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Perception as Input and as Reason for Action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
John McDowell (1979) suggests that virtuous agents have a perceptual sensitivity allowing them to determine reliably what to do in any specific context of deliberation. Moreover, the reliable perception yields an accurate depiction not only of the facts of the situation but of the morally right act to do. Finally, the reliably kind behavior of a kind person
is not the outcome of a blind, non-rational habit or instinct, like the courageous behaviour- so called only by courtesy- of a lioness defending her cubs. Rather, that the situation requires a certain sort of behaviour is … his reason for behaving in that way, on each of the relevant occasions (331). Perception delivers a reason for action.
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- Copyright © The Authors 1995
References
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