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Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
Motivational internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between an agent's moral judgments and what she is motivated to do. One way to express the central thesis of this view is as follows:
Necessarily, for any agent 5, if 5 judges that some available action is morally right (or good, or obligatory, or …) for 5 to perform (or to refrain from performing), then 5 is motivated, at least to some extent, to perform (or to refrain from performing) that action.
This is, to borrow a phrase from David Lewis, quite an unlovely mouthful. Perhaps a simpler way of articulating things would be:
Necessarily, an agent's sincere moral judgment that she ought to φ provides her with some motivation to φ.
Yet another formulation of motivation internalism is:
Necessarily, if an agent makes a moral judgment, then she has some desire that favours, inter alia, any course of action that judgment entails.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 35: Belief and Agency , 2009 , pp. 1 - 24
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Authors 2009
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