1 Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972. All references to Rawls are to this work, the page number following the quotation or contention cited.

2 Mill, J. S., On Liberty, p.72 (in Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, with an introduction by Lindsay, A. D., Everyman, Dent, London. 1925).Google Scholar

3 For some discussion of this point, see my ‘The Justification of Liberalism', Canadian journal of Philosophy, Vol. II, No. 2, December, 1972, pp. 208 ff ..

4 The reference (III 117) indicates volume III, page 117 of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, in eleven volumes, collected and edited by Sir Molesworth, William (John Bohn, London, 1839-1845).Google Scholar

5 A similar view is to be found in The Elements of Law. “Reason is no less of the nature of man than passion, and is the same in all men, because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain, namely, their own good, which is the work of reason.” (IV 87)

6 I wholly owe the substance of both of these accounts (and the labels used to refer to them) to John Baker, of the University of Calgary. I am very grateful to him, both for being able to make use of his ideas in the present context, and for his most helpful comments on this paper as a whole. (The labels used are not intended to indicate views about the correct interpretations of Hume and Bentham.)

7 This relationship between the Humean and the Benthamite accounts is also an idea of John Baker's, borrowed from him with gratitude.

8 Williams, Bernard: “Egoism and Altruism”, in Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p.260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Gert, Bernard ('Hobbes and Psychological Egoism’ in Baumrin, Bernard H. Ed.: Hobbes's Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism, Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 1969)Google Scholar argues that Hobbes is not a psychological egoist, except perhaps in The Elements of Law. Gert understands psychological egoism as the claim “that men never act in order to benefit others, or because they believe a certain course of action to be morally right” (p. 109). However Gert allows that Hobbes believed “that most actions of most men are motivated by self-interest“ (p. 109). As has just been shown, the account of Hobbesian practical rationality I have presented is compatible with Gert's thesis. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this paper, to take a stand on whether Gert's claim is correct: certainly psychological egoism does not follow from Hobbes's view of reasonableness in action. However there is doubt whether some passages Gert refers to do really support his thesis. Gert does not distinguish between (i) acting with the intention of satisfying the desires of another for the reason that this is expected to be a means to satisfying one of one's own (self-regarding) desires, and (ii), acting with the intention of satisfying the desires of another with no such ulterior motive. It is only if Hobbes believes that persons sometimes act with intention (ii) that the definition of benevolence in Leviathan, cited by Gert (“Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally,GOOD NATURE.” (Ill 43) ), seems to support Gert's thesis. But if this definition is understood in the light of the passage stating the fourth law of Nature, the natural reading of Hobbes is the contrary of what Gert suggests.” … that a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth, but with intention of good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust … “ (111 138) This clearly suggests thesis (i). Further, if Hobbes had thought that one's conception of one's own good might in fact include ‘other orientated' desires, it would be a possibility that one would have good reason for action even if one would not live to see those other orientated desires satisfied. But Hobbes says “For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of commonwealth, which can never happen without a civil war, very few are left alive long enough, to see their new designs established: so that the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they thought they were.” (Ill 284)

10 Richards, David A.J.: A Theory of Reasons for Action, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p.28.Google Scholar

11 This, it is suggested, may be the way in which Hobbes is attempting to move from a ‘subjectivist’ foundation to an ‘objectivist’ intermediate conclusion. Thus, as a characterization of what Hobbes is attempting to do, I would agree with Gauthier, David P., when he says (in The Logic of Leviathan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969, p.89):Google Scholar “Hobbes's moral system is an extremely impressive edifice. Its foundations are strictly subjectivistic—good ‘is the object of any man's appetite or desire’ … But on these foundations Hobbes erects ‘the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation, and society of mankind’ … All men agree that war is their enemy, and so’ all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace, which … are … the laws of nature, are good’ “ However this “impressive edifice” would hardly seem to stand upon Gauthier's reconstruction of Hobbes's foundation at p.25 of the same work: “Thus from the premiss ‘X is a necessary means to self-preservation’ we derive 'a man must do X to secure what, very probably, he wants'. And from this we derive ‘a man very probably has some reason to do X'.“ For if self-preservation is only “very probably” what a man wants, then the intermediate conclusion has force only for those who do in fact want self-preservation. And, as has been argued above, Hobbes is quite aware that not all in fact always have self-preservation as their strongest desire.

12 This discussion of ‘maximizing desire satisfaction’ rests on the assumption that desires can be individuated and counted. This assumption may well be false. But as the ‘desire maximizer’ seems committed to making it, I have gone along with it, and attempted to show that even if that assumption is allowed, the ‘desire maximization’ view will not yield Hobbes's intermediate conclusion.