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19 If suffering is a necessary qualification of acquiring national rights then the sanctification of suffering is inescapable; if national rights could be supported on more general grounds then the reference to past sufferings might be avoided, and might be replaced with more forward looking, reconciliatory policies.

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22 See the distinction I draw between the right to national self-determination and the right to self-rule in ‘The Right to National Self-Determination,’ Social Research 58 (1991) 565-90.

23 This process demands that the specific features of each case be closely examined: the nature of the groups involved, the history of the conflict, and the possible violation of rights that would follow from the proposed arrangements. Only then will it be possible to determine what kind of national rights are entailed in each specific case.

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25 Note that some approaches will combine both kinds of justifications. Still it will be important to know which kind of justification is grounded in a theory of nationalism and which ones are grounded in other types of theory.

26 The distinction between principles and policies somewhat parallels Max Weber's distinction in ‘Politics as a Vocation’ between the ethics of conviction, which refers to absolute values and need not compromise with reality, and the ethics of responsibility, which judges particular situations in a pragmatic fashion, “not leaving absolute moral standards totally out of consideration but at the same time not letting them govern one's political actions.” In Gerth, H.H. and Milles, C. Wright, eds. and trans., From Max Weber (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul 1948).Google Scholar

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31 In her intriguing discussion of the faces of injustice, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven: Yale University Press 1990), Judith Shklar reminds us that the definition of injustice is social and political. What usually passes for an injustice “is an act that goes against some known legal or ethical rule. Only a victim whose complaints match the rule-governed prohibitions has suffered an injustice. If there is no fit, it is only a matter of the victim's subjective reaction, a misfortune, not really unjust.” Injustice may sometimes be unavoidable, but we must not ignore it. Our normative rules ought to be structured so as to help us judge what is the best thing to do in each particular case, and to acknowledge injustice even when unable to alleviate it or forced to impose it.

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33 The structure of this claim follows Raz's, J. definition of a right in The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986), 165–192.Google Scholar

34 See mainly the writings of Taylor, Charles, on this matter especially Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and ‘The Politics of Recognition,’ in Gutmann, A., ed., Multiculturalism: Examining The Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1994).Google Scholar

35 See Mill, J. S., Representative Government (esp. chap. 16) and Miller, D., On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995)Google Scholar.

36 Defining the desire to preserve and enhance the national or cultural identity as the shared grounds of all theories of nationalism challenges the widely accepted interpretation of nationalism as necessarily prescribing the creation of a nationstate. The statist approach to nationalism is misleading in its endorsement of a specific political solution, which was popular in a particular historical setting as the sole end and the only true interpretation of nationalism.

37 For a discussion of polycentric nationalism see Smith, A., Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth 1983)Google Scholar; for the idea of reiterated nationalism see Walzer, M., ‘Two Kinds of Universalism,’ Tanner Lecture, Oxford, 1989Google Scholar.

38 Judt, T., ‘The New Old Nationalism,’ New York Review of Books, 22 May 1994, 49–50Google Scholar

39 Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Blackwell 1983)Google Scholar

40 Dworkin, R., ‘To Each His Own,’ New York Review of Books, 14 April 1983Google Scholar

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43 Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974), 4Google Scholar

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45 Rawls, , A Theory of Justice, 139.Google Scholar

46 Judt’ s criticism, according to which a veil which allows members to acknowledge the general division of the world into nations and the fact that they themselves are members of such nations “isn't hiding anything significant,” is based on a misunderstanding of the role of the veil.

47 Katznelson, I., Liberalism's Crooked Circle: Letters to Adam Michnik (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1996), 160Google Scholar

48 Dworkin, R., ‘Reply,’ New York Review of Books, 21 July 1983Google Scholar

49 Judt, T., ‘Reply,’ New York Review of Books, 23 June 1994, 64Google Scholar