* I am grateful to Chad DeChant, Emily Hoechst, Joseph Kakesh, and Matthew McAdam for helpful discussion and to Cheryl Misak for detailed comments on an earlier draft.

1 Cf. Kanigel, RobertThe One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency (New York: Viking, 1997)Google Scholar, reviewed by Will, George F. in the New York Times Book Review, June 15, 1997.Google Scholar

2 I employ the following abbreviations in citing Dewey, often citing both a popular edition and the collected works:

3 Cf. HNC 277, MW 14:189.

4 On Lippmann and his relation to Dewey on this issue, see Diggins, John PatrickThe Promise of Pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)Google Scholar, Chapter 8.

5 Dewey, PP 202-3. See p. 208 for the proviso about informed experts.

6 PP45.

7 See, e.g., Dewey, “The Logic of Judgments of Practice,” MW 8:47.

8 Dewey, TOV 41, MW 13:228. Cf. Logic 175-76, LW 12:179.

9 Dewey, “The Logic of Judgments of Practice,” MW 8:38. Cf. Logic, LW 12:17: “Rationality as an abstract conception is precisely the generalized idea of the means-consequence relation as such.” It does seem clear that Aristotle's bouleusis, normally translated as “deliberation,” is limited to the selection of means (including constitutive means) to given ends: cf. Tuozzo, Thomas “Aristotelian Deliberation Is Not of Ends,” in Essays on Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 4: Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Anton, J. P. and Preus, A. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991)Google Scholar. The question, however, is whether Aristotle would allow for practical reasoning about final ends.

10 MW 14:146.

11 “Growth“: MW 14:194. “The cultivation of interests“: LW 7:208. “Coordination or unified organization“: TOV 49, LW 13:234.

12 I refer to Weber's contrast between Wertrationalität and Zweckrationalität in Economy and Society 1.2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 24-26.

13 In Aufgeklärtes Eigeninteresse (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), n. 36, Stefan Gosepath notes that Weber's initial definition of Zweckrationalität in Economy and Society 1.2 allows for weighing ends against each other.

14 Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 242.Google Scholar

15 The material in this section revisits some points made in my Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Section 23.

16 See, for example, The Quest for Certainty, LW 4:124, 222-28; TOV 40-50, LW 13:226- 36.

17 First published in New Leader, October 21, 1939; reprinted in PW 205-6.

18 Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 272.Google Scholar

19 Dewey develops this notion of an end-in-view in TOV and HNC.

20 By itself, then, the context-embeddedness of deliberation does not rule out, for example, natural-law views of human ends, which might simply hold that all rational ends-in-view are contextualized specifications of essential human goods. That abstractions are allowed and indeed indispensable despite contextuality is well argued by O'Neill, Onora in Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 HNC 274, MW 14:187-88.

22 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1139a35-b4. For good reason, Dewey departs from Aristotle in suggesting that even productive actions may be treated as activities valuable for their own sake: see HNC 271, MW 14:186.

23 HNC 269, MW 14:184.

24 See my “Beyond Good and Right: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24 (1995): 108-41.

25 HNC 226, MW 14:156.

26 HNC 226, MW 14:156.

27 I develop these distinctions more at length in Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Section 7, and interpret the relevant text of Aristotle, in “Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 327-52.Google Scholar

28 HNC 236, MW 14:162.

29 HNC 223-24, MW 14:154-55.

30 I argue this point in Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Part 4.

31 HNC 232, MW 14:159.

32 Cf. Misak, C.J.Truth and the End of Inquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Chapter 1Google Scholar.

33 Cf. Putnam, HilaryPragmatism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), Lecture 1Google Scholar.

34 See, e.g., Rorty, RichardThe Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

35 Dewey, Ethics (1908): MW 5: 259.Google Scholar

36 HNC 287, MW 14:198.

37 HNC 293, MW 14:202.

38 HNC 283, MW 14:196.

39 See my “Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle” for an interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics along these lines.

40 I modify the sort of interpretive suggestion made by Rachels, James in “Dewey and the Truth about Ethics,” in New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Cahn, Steven M. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1977), 149-71.Google Scholar

41 Dewey himself was hostile to the linguistic turn of mid-century Anglo-American philosophy. Cf. Welchman, JenniferDewey's Ethical Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 1.Google Scholar

42 Honneth, Axel “Between Proceduralism and Teleology: An Unresolved Conflict in Dewey's Moral Theory,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34 (1998): 689-711.Google Scholar

43 Dewey's reluctance to admit any role for ultimate ends thus explains why he was not able to embrace the sort of “constructive ethical pragmatism” for which I argue in “Beyond Good and Right.“

44 The tensions mentioned in this paragraph are well set out by Diggins.

45 I am indebted to Elijah Millgram for the thought in this paragraph. See also Dreier, James “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality,” in Ethics and Practical Reason, eds. Cullity, Garrett and Gaut, Berys (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 81–99.Google Scholar

46 I develop the case against the presuppositions of this worry in Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Sections 20 and 29, in the course of defending the importance of coherence.

47 Dewey's tendency to proceduralism is emphasized by, e.g., Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, and Honneth, “Between Proceduralism and Teleology.“

48 I draw my description of Lippmann from Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, esp. 331-42Google Scholar.

49 PW33.

50 Ibid., 35.

51 Putnam, Pragmatism, 69–70Google Scholar.

52 Dewey, Logic 160Google Scholar, LW 12:162; emphasis Dewey's.

53 Welchman, Dewey's Ethical Thought, note 5.

54 Dewey, Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude (New York: Rhinehart, 1945 [1917]), 7Google Scholar; as quoted in Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 262f.Google Scholar

55 This pair of distinctions is well laid out by Velleman, J. David “The Possibility of Practical Reason,” Ethics 106 (1996): 694–726CrossRefGoogle Scholar, note 721. Velleman's lucid article spurred my thinking at many points, often ones at which I disagree with him.

56 Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 227Google Scholar, citing Dewey, Experience and Nature, 87- 89, and The Logic of Inquiry (New York, 1938), 8.

57 I say “truth” rather than “truths” or “true beliefs” in order to signal that the idea of truth has some structure, to which I will come shortly. The aim is not a quantitative one of amassing atomistic truths. The role of this end is rather that of orienting and regulating than of describing something to be maximized. For parallel reasons, I would speak of “the good” rather than “good actions.” On the regulative function of final ends, see my Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Section 7.

58 Cf. Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 229Google Scholar. I give conceptual (not textual) grounds, below, for thinking that a good Deweyan would not elide truth with that of which the evidence warrants the assertion.

59 Cf., e.g., Putnam, Hilary “Realism and Reason,” in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 123-40Google Scholar; Davidson, Donald “The Structure and Content of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 279–328.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

60 This point is well set out by C.J. Misak in Truth and the End of Inquiry.

61 Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical Reason,” note 706. Velleman is confident that truth, otherwise understood, can serve as a substantive end for theoretical reasoning. He does not, however, explain his alternative interpretation of truth.

62 In Pragmatism, 20f., Putnam suggests that this combination of anti-scepticism and fallibilism is pragmatism's most distinctive feature.

63 Dewey, Logic 178Google Scholar, LW 12:179; emphasis Dewey's.

64 Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, esp. Chapters 4 and 10.

65 Cf. Broadie, SarahEthics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 198.Google Scholar I criticize Broadie's view in Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, 194, 217.

66 See note 9 above.

67 I defend this interpretation of the N.E. in “Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle.“

68 I defend this judgment in “Beyond Good and Right.“

69 That the specification could have been undertaken in a practical setting, and not just in the philosopher's armchair, I argue in Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Section 32.

70 Putnam, HilaryReason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

71 I here aim to close a gap in the argument of Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, at p. 267.

72 My thoughts in this paragraph owe a long-term debt to Putnam's Reason, Truth, and History.

73 See, e.g., Horwich, PaulTruth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).Google Scholar

74 Brandom, Robert B.Milking It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994),Google Scholar xiv and passim.

75 See my “Beyond Good and Right.“

76 See, e.g., Cohen, Joshua “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy,” Ethics 97 (October 1986): 26–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Habermas, JürgenBetween Facts and Norms, trans. Rehg, W. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Estlund, David “Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strategic/deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence,” Texas Law Review 71 (1993): 1437-77Google Scholar; and my “Democratic Intentions,” in Deliberative Democracy, eds. Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 349-82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

77 I defend this claim in “Democratic Deliberation about Final Ends,” in progress.

78 Dewey, Logic 178, LW 12:179.Google Scholar

79 Compare Dewey's, view of the social good as the “substance” of the most inclusive good: e.g., Ethics (1908), MW 5:261.Google Scholar

80 Dewey, PP 208.Google Scholar

81 Putnam, Pragmatism, 72–74.Google Scholar

82 Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 193.Google Scholar

83 Ibid., 192.

84 I argue this point in “Democratic Intentions.”

85 Warren, Mark E. makes this case persuasively in “Deliberative Democracy and Authority,” American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

86 Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Chapter 8.

87 In Dewey's Ethical Thought, 185-89, Welchman argues that the plumbing of emotional responses is the principal role of imaginative rehearsal, which hence was intended to respond to Lippmann's charge that pragmatism made insufficient place for the emotions. She concludes, partly on this basis, that imaginative rehearsal is not the only method of deliberation that Dewey recognizes.

88 Cf. Honneth, “Between Proceduralism and Teleology,” citing the 1932 Ethics, LW 7:163, 165f.Google Scholar