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Doing something intentionally and knowing that you are doing it

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Barry Stroud
Barry Stroud*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, 314 Moses Hall, Berkeley, CA, 94720-2390, USA
*
* E-mail: barrys@berkeley.edu
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Abstract

A defence of the idea that an agent's knowledge that he is intentionally doing such-and-such is not ‘based on’ or ‘derived from’ any ‘experience’ of the agent or any item or state he is aware of in acting as he does. The explanation of agents' knowing, in general, what they are intentionally doing lies in the capacity for self-ascription and self-knowledge that is a required for being a subject of any intentional attitudes, and so for competent intentional agency.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , 2013 , pp. 1 - 12
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2013

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References

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1959. Intention, Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1982. Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stroud, B. 2009. Scepticism and the Senses. European Journal of Philosophy, 17(4): 559–570.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stroud, B. 2011. “Seeing What Is So”. In Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, Edited by: Roessler, J. Eilan, N. and Lerman, H. 92–102. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar