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On Always being Right (about What One is Thinking)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Finn Spicer
Finn Spicer*
Affiliation:
University of Bristol, BristolBS8 1TH, UK
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Extract

There are a number of strands to the knowledge we have of our own minds; two strands are these: we often know with ease what we are thinking and we often know with ease what it is we believe. This paper concerns the knowledge of what we are thinking; it pursues questions as to what kind of judgment subjects make about their own thoughts, how those judgments are formed and why they constitute knowledge; it also asks how these judgments relate to the judgments subjects make about their own beliefs when they know with ease what they believe. It focuses on the account developed by Tyler Burge (1988, 1996, 2003) as part of his project of reconciling externalism about thought content with privileged self-knowledge. Burge's account is well known and influential; as such it is a fitting target for examination and criticism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 137 - 160
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2009

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