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The real and the quasi-real: problems of distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jamie Dreier
Jamie Dreier*
Affiliation:
Brown Philosophy Department, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
*
Email: James_Dreier@brown.edu
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Abstract

This paper surveys some ways of distinguishing Quasi-Realism in metaethics (and I hope also in other areas) from Non-naturalist Realism, including ‘Explanationist’ methods of distinguishing, which characterize the Real by its explanatory role, and Inferentialist methods. Rather than seeking the One True Distinction, the paper adopts an irenic and pragmatist perspective, allowing that different ways of drawing the line are best for different purposes.

Keywords

Quasi-realismmetaethicscreeping minimalismpragmatisms
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 3-4: Special issue: Representation and Evaluation , 2018 , pp. 532 - 547
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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