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An Argument for Utilitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Yew-Kwang Ng  and
Peter Singer
Yew-Kwang Ng
Affiliation:
Monash University
Peter Singer
Affiliation:
Monash University
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Extract

Many utilitarians accept Bentham's view that to argue for the principle of utility is as ‘impossible as it is needless'. They take utilitarianism as a first principle which one either accepts or does not. They do, of course, defend utilitarianism against objections, and make objections to other ethical positions; but the principle of utility itself, they hold, must stand on its own merits. In this article we use a different approach. We introduce a principle, which we call ‘Weak Majority Preference', which we believe likely to be accepted by many who do not consider themselves utilitarians. We then show that from this principle it is possible to derive the general principle of utility.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , June 1981 , pp. 229 - 239
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

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References

1 One of us has shown elsewhere that we may even have intransitivity of preference for choices involving multi-dimensions. See Ng, Yew-Kwang ‘Sub-semiorder: A Model of Multi-dimensional Choice with Preference Intransitivity’, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 16 (1977) 51–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 J.C. de Borda, ‘Memoire sur les Elections au Scrutin’, Memoires de l'Academie Royale des Sciences, 1781, English translation by A. de Grazia, Isis, 1953; Edgeworth, F.Y. Mathematical Psychics (London: Kegan Paul 1881) 7ff, 60ff.Google Scholar

3 Strictly, this formulation covers only cases in which n, the number of individuals, is even. If n is odd, we would require that, instead of individuals preferring x toy, at least individuals prefer x to y, and at least another individuals's utility level has not decreased.

4 Strictly speaking, we have to assume that social welfare is a continuous function of individual utilities. This is however a very reasonable assumption, stating merely that social welfare does not Jump as the utility of an individual changes by an infinitesimal amount.

5 This conclusion is established formally in Ng, Yew-Kwang ‘Bentham or Bergson? Finite Sensibility, Utility Functions and Social Welfare Functions’, Review of Economic Studies 42 545–569 (1975) 545-69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Though this paper was Jointly written, credit (or blame?) for its central idea must go to Ng.- P.S.