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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
I like to say there is no scientific method as such, but rather only the free and utmost use of intelligence.
P.W. BridgmanIt is generally believed—see, for example, Lakatos, Dorling, Koertge, Gellner, and Finnocchiaro—that Feyerabend is committed to the view that science is an essentially irrational enterprise. In this paper, I argue initially that this is so only if Feyerabend is saddled with an unreasonable notion of rationality. Next, I point out, first, that there is a reasonable notion of rationality which is compatible with Feyerabend's non-method ‘anything goes’; and, second, that unless coupled with some form of rationalism this non-method is obviously and trivially false.
1 Bridgman, P. ‘How far can scientific method determine the ends for which scientific discoveries are used?’, Social science 22 (1947), p. 206.Google Scholar
2 Lakatos, I. ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, 1970, p. 178;CrossRefGoogle Scholar ‘History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1971), p. 116; and ‘The Role of Crucial Experiments in Science’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 4 (1974), p. 324. Dorling, J. British journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (1972), p. 189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar N. Koertge, ibid 23 (1972), pp. 274f. E. Gellner, ibid. 26 (1975), pp. 331f. Finnocchiaro, M. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 3 (1973), pp. 357f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hargreaves, P. in a review of Against Method in Telos (Spring, 1976), p. 234,Google Scholar says that Feyerabend ‘openly welcomes the charge of irrationalism, and he declares himself to be its champion’. The text he quotes however indicates no such thing.
3 Feyerabend, P. Against Method, London, 1975.Google Scholar
4 Kuhn, T. ‘Notes on Lakatos’ in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1971), p. 148.Google Scholar
5 Kuhn, T. Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, Chicago, 1970, p. 186.Google Scholar See also ‘Notes’, p. 184.
6 I. Lakatos, ‘History’, p. 100.
7 Ibid., p. 104. Italics in the original.
8 Kuhn is disinclined to talk about this, but see his ‘Notes’ section V. Also in this regard, see Finnocchiaro. For Lakatos see his papers referred to above.
9 Here and in what follows I use ‘CS’ to refer to Feyerabend, P. ‘Consolations for the Specialist’, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, 1970.Google Scholar
10 On occasion, and particularly when confronting objections, Lakatos suggests that he is interested not in programme-acceptance but in the ‘presentation of the history of disembodied science’ (‘History’, p. 105). But if so, what he has to say throws no light on the issue under discussion and it becomes difficult to see how he can claim to have provided an account of scientific rationality (ibid., pp. 115-6), to see rational change where Kuhn and Feyerabend fail to see it (ibid., p. 118), or to be following and improving Popper's philosophy of Science (‘Falsification’, p. 183). For more on these issues see P. Quinn, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 3 (1971), pp. 135-9.
11 N. Koertge, p. 280. E. Gellner in his review of Against Method, p. 334, makes a similar point.
12 This close identification occurs in AM, p. 48 and p. 53 and especially in Feyerabend, P. ‘Irme Lakatos’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
13 Mill, J.S. ‘On Liberty’, in Cohen, M. (ed.) The Philosophy of john Stuart Mill, New York, 1961, p. 200.Google Scholar
14 I. Lakatos, ‘History’, p. 105.
15 Ibid., p. 126, footnote 58.
16 For Lakatos, see his ‘History’, p. 118; for Kuhn, see his ‘Reflections on My Critics, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, 1970, p. 264.Google Scholar But on Kuhn, see in addition the next footnote and the accompanying text.
17 T. Kuhn ‘Reflections’, p. 264. Kuhn views his own position in the same way. See also his ‘Notes’, p. 139.
18 For a clear endorsement of the view that the aim of science is to explain in order to understand the world, see Popper, K.R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, 1959.Google Scholar For a clear statement of Feyerabend's position concerning the aim of sciences see CS, p. 210. In his essay ‘Against Method’, in Radner, and Winokur, (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 4, Minneapolis, 1970, p. 90,Google Scholar Feyerabend explicitly recognizes that his preferred aim may conflict with the aim of enhanced understanding.
19 This view is not new. It is discussed by Black, M. in his Problems of Analysis, Ithaca, 1954, pp. 12F.Google Scholar
20 For a discussion of the trememdous struggle required to establish the ‘truism’ that observation provides our best access to the world see E. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, Oxford, 1961, pp. 116-9. As is well known, in the nineteenth century Cuvier, Compte, and many other questioned the value of experimenting on living things. They thought that life was too delicate for the crude techniques found in the laboratory.
21 McEvoy, J. Philosophy of Science 42 (1975), p. 64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar McEvoy also complains that Feyerabend provides no alternative system, ibid. If what I say here is correct this is by no means obvious.
22 It is important to note in the present context that the acceptance of a theory involves the willingness to defend, publish, and teach it. Propaganda (and violence) can presumably only play a role in the defense of a theory and in getting others to accept it. This point, which is important, seems to have been underappreciated.
23 E. Gellner, p. 340.
24 George Sorel is perhaps an exception. See his Reflections on Violence, Glencoe, 1950. Feyerabend, however, does not mention him and would certainly wish to distinguish his views from Sorel's, especially given the close resemblance between these and some of the more virulent views of Mussolini.
25 J. Hargreaves, p. 231, who argues this way, actually identifies ‘anything goes’ with counterinduction.
26 R. Bhaskar, New Left Review, Nov.-Dec., 1975, p. 44, Gellner, p. 336, and Lakatos, ‘Crucial Experiments’, p. 324.
27 J.S. Mill, p. 251. The whole paragraph from which this quote comes is worth considering in the present context.
28 J. McEvoy, p. 65; E. Gellner, p. 335.
29 l. Lakatos, ‘Crucial Experiments’, p. 324.
30 N. Koertge, p. 284; E. Gellner, p. 339.
31 E. Gellner, p. 337.
32 Ibid., p. 339.
33 Watkins, J. ‘Normal Science’, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, 1970, p. 26.Google Scholar Watkins remarks that during periods of Kuhnian normal science the scientific community behaves as an essentially closed society. For a discussion of the notions of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ societies refer to Popper, K.R. The Open Society and its Enemies, Princeton, 1963, vol. I, p. 173.Google Scholar
34 For a somewhat different way of organizing science see China: Science Walks on Two Legs, New York, 1974.
35 I refer here to the Asilomar decision. A report on the conference appears in Science News, March 22, 1975.
36 The phrase is Mill's. See ‘On Liberty, p. 249.
37 This quote, which appears in the last paragraph of the book, of course, further belies the charge of irrationality against Feyerabend. See also Feyerabend's remark that a commitment to a particular profession should be ‘the result of a conscious decision’ (AM, p. 218).
38 Feyerabend's call for a general education also provides an important first premise for ‘deschooling’ society. Cf.Illich, I. Deschooling Society, New York, 1970.Google Scholar It is perhaps worth remarking here that Illich while calling for a process analogous to deschooling in the case of family life, politics, security, faith, and communication fails to mention that science might profit from a similar process as well. See Deschooling Society, pp. 3-4.
39 N. Koertge, p. 280, footnote 1, claims that this sentence is inconsistent with the rest of Feyerabend's essay ‘Against Method’. Whether or not this is so — and it seems to be doubtful — it is not inconsistent with the rest of Against Method, the book. In particular, d. AM, p. 189.
40 Gellner is worried by Feyerabend's citation of facts to ward off criticism. Feyerabend makes a similar move when considering the window-jumping problem (AM, p. 221) and when considering whether the adoption of his views would lead to a breakdown of technology (AM, pp. 299-300). It is this latter which particularly worries Gellner.
41 For a brief discussion of these and other varieties of anarchism see Runkle, G. Anarchism, Old and New, New York, 1972,Google Scholar chapter 1. Note also in the present context that Feyerabend does not deny the need for a government. See, e.g. AM, p. 309.
42 For a lively discussion of some of the difficulties of On Liberty see Himmelfarb, G. On Liberty and Liberalism, New York, 1974.Google Scholar P. Hargreaves's criticism of Feyerabend for failing to realize that individual freedom is a myth in a class dominated society does not touch Feyerabend's epistemological thesis, but only the thesis combined with Millian liberalism. (See Hargreaves, p. 232.) Nevertheless the issues Hargreaves raises certainly do need to be studied by anyone who wishes to place Feyerabend's epistemological views in a broader setting.
43 In writing this paper I have benefited from the comments of Sandra Harding and Kai Nielsen.
