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Why C-luck really is a problem for compatibilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

S. B. Schoonover Jr.  and
Ivan Guajardo
S. B. Schoonover Jr.
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Wittenberg University, Springfield, OH, USA
Ivan Guajardo
Affiliation:
Humanities Department in the School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Virginia Western Community College, Roanoke, VA, USA Department of Philosophy and Religion, Virginia Western Community College, Roanoke, VA, USA
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Abstract

Some philosophers have recently argued that luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists and libertarians alike. But conceptual ambiguity regarding deterministic luck at the time of decision – henceforth C-luck – has obscured recognition of the problem C-luck poses to compatibilism. This paper clarifies C-luck and distinguishes it from present luck, showing that the former arises from contingent factors at the time of decision instead of presupposed free will requirements. We then argue that empirical findings confirm the existence of C-luck thereby raising a fundamental challenge to compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility.

Keywords

Luckcompatibilismmoral responsibilitydecision-biasesnudgingreasons-responsivity
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 48 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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