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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
This article attempts to illuminate a contradiction at the heart of the notion of natural rights. Natural rights are commonly thought to be both inalienable and the property of individuals. As the right or the law is privatized as my rights, her rights, our rights or their rights, rights come to be viewed as personal properties. A distinction is made between personal possession and private property (which entails the title to alienate what is owned) in order to speak significantly of our possession of inalienable rights. For Locke, we possess an inalienable right to life and liberty precisely because we do not own our lives and liberties. Moreover, we can alienate our person, or our ability to labour, precisely because it is our private property. For Nozick, rights are individual properties. Thus, for Nozick as distinct from Marx, one has the right to sell anything (one's life, liberty, labour or soul) at the market price.
Cet article tente de faire ressortir une contradiction inhérente au concept de droit naturel. On envisage souvent les droits naturels comme inaliénables tout en étant la propriété des individus. Le droit (objectif) paraít impersonnel ou encore propriété collective mais les droits (subjectifs) semblent une propriété personnelle (mes droits, ses droits, nos droits ou leurs droits). L'auteur établit une distinction entre une possession personnelle et la propriété privée (impliquant le droit de l'aliénation). Selon Locke, on a un droit inaliénable à la vie et a la liberté précisément parce que la vie et la liberté ne sont pas la propriété privée. Aussi, on peut vendre sa personne ou sa force de travail précisément parce que c'est sa propriété privée. Chez Nozick, les droits sont des biens individuels. Ainsi, pour Nozick, à la différence de Marx, on a le droit de vendre quoi que ce soit (sa vie, sa liberté, son travail et son âme) au prix du marché.
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