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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
This study explores two conceptions of justice and their radically different implications for mandatory retirement. The author argues that the case against mandatory retirement rests on a conception of justice which ignores the fact that a society is composed of different generations. Yet the neglect of this seemingly trivial fact leads to serious problems of intergenerational justice; and the note considers both how these problems can be accommodated within a theory of liberal justice, and the implications of that theory for mandatory retirement. The note then considers which of these two conceptions of justice is embodied in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It argues that to ignore considerations of intergenerational justice in mandatory retirement cases amounts to a denial of the equal protection and the equal benefit of the law guaranteed by the Charter.
Cette note étudie deux notions de justice et explore les différences radicales de leur portée pour la retraite obligatoire. L'auteur avance que les arguments contre la retraite obligatoire s'appuient sur une notion de justice qui ne tient pas compte du fait qu'une société est composée de plusieurs groupes d'âges. Ce désintérêt à l'endroit d'une considération apparemment insignifiante engendre plusieurs problèmes pour la justice entre les groupes d'âges. Le texte examine à la fois comment ces problèmes peuvent être incorporés dans une théorie libérale de la justice et quelles sont les conséquences de cette théorie pour la retraite obligatoire. La note considère ensuite quelle est, des deux notions identifiées de justice, celle qui est incorporée dans la Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés. L'auteur soutient enfin que le manque d'égards à la justice entre les groupes d'âges sape l'égalité de tous face á la protection de la loi qu'assure la Charte.
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