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Party Elites, Voters and Political Attitudes: Testing Three Explanations for Mass-Elite Differences*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Ian McAllister
Ian McAllister
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales
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Abstract

The extent of differences in mass-elite political opinion and their theoretical implications have long been a source of interest to democratic theorists. Early classical democratic theorists saw education as the solution to mass-elite political differences, with an educated mass public displaying the same support for democratic institutions as their elite counterparts. By contrast, the later democratic elitists saw little that would reduce mass-elite differences. More recently, modern elite theorists have argued that elites are more polarized on political issues than mass publics, and that political conflict can be moderated by the ability of elites to downplay potentially divisive issues. Using Australia as a case study, these three approaches to mass-elite political differences are analyzed using a matched survey of voters and candidates conducted at the Australia 1987 federal election. The results show little support for education as a factor reducing mass-elite differences and point to the democratic elitists' argument that mass-elite political differences are fixed and enduring. In line with modern elite theories, the results also confirm the existence of more intense issue polarization among elites than among voters, and elites' ability to control the issues that reach the political agenda.

Résumé

Les théoriciens de la démocratic se sont intéressés depuis longtemps aux différences entre les opinions des masses et celles des élites, et aux conséquences théoriques de ces différences. Les théoriciens classiques de la démocratic ont regardé l'éducation comme une solution pour ces différences, suggérant que des masses instruites et leurs contreparties dans les élites donneront le même appui aux institutions démocratiques. Par contraste, les théoriciens démocratiques récents des élites ont vu peu d'occasion de réduire ces différences. Plus récemment, les théoriciens modernes des élites ont soutenu que les élites sont plus polarisées que les masses sur les questions politiques, et que les conflits politiques peuvent être modérés par la capacité des élites d'accepter tacitement des compromis sur les questions potentiellement controversées. Avec l'Australie comme exemple, nous analysons ces trois approches aux différences politiques entre les masses et les élites, utilisant des enquêtes par sondage des électeurs et des candidats de l'élection australienne de 1987. Les résultats ne donnent pas beaucoup d'appui à l'hypothèse que l'éducation réduit les différences politiques entre les masses et les élites; et ils soulignent les arguments des théoriciens démocratiques des élites que les différences politiques entre les masses et les élites sont fixées et durables. En rapport avec les théories modernes des élites, les résultats confirment aussi l'existence d'une polarisation parmi les élites quant aux questions politiques qui est plus intense que celle parmi les électeurs, et la capacité des élites de contrôler les problèmes politiques à l'ordre du jour.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 237 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1991

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References

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