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What do Constitutional Equality Rights Project Canadians Against?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Rainer Knopff
Rainer Knopff
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Abstract

It is frequently argued that section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be interpreted to protect Canadians not only against intentional discrimination based on the prohibited grounds, but also against “systemic discrimination.” Since systemic discrimination against one group can always be described as intentional discrimination against another, this approach seems redundant in the context of an open-ended list of prohibited grounds. It may be explained as a way of promoting discrimination against unlisted groups upward on the scale of scrutiny, thus expanding the range of policy-making in inherently contestable areas that is subject to judicial determination or oversight. This article explores the political and institutional ramifications of this interpretation.

Résumé

On considère souvent que l'égalité des droits, enchâssée à l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, devrait être interprétée non seulement dans le sens d'une protection contre toute discrimination directe, intentionnelle, définie à partir des motifs prohibés, mais aussi en direction d'une protection contre la prétendue « discrimination systémique ». Puisque la discrimination systémique contre un groupe peut toujours être envisagée comme une discrimination intentionnelle contre un autre groupe, cela paraît répétitif dans le contexte d'une liste ouverte de motifs prohibés. On peut expliquer cela comme une façon de contrecarrer le tendance prédominante à soumettre les motifs non-mentionnés de discrimination à une surveillance plus relâchee—en réalité à faire grimper cette sorte de discrimination dans l'échelle de la surveillance lorsqu'elle recoupe les motifs énumérés. Une telle promotion accroîtrait considérablement l'étendue du processus décisionnel public dans des secteurs essentiellement contestés, relevant de la supervision ou de la détermination judiciaire. Cet article explore les conséquences politiques et institutionnelles de cette interprétation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 265 - 286
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1987

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References

1 The Queen v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321Google Scholar.

2 Ibid., at 372.

3 Edwards Books v. The Queen, December 19, 1986, unreported. The same approach was used by the majority of the Court in Jones v. The Queen, unreportedGoogle Scholar.

4 Section 15(2) permits “affirmative action”: “Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”

5 Black, William, “Religion and the Right of Equality,” in Bayefsky, Anne F. and Eberts, Mary (eds.), Equality Rights and The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), 132–33Google Scholar.

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7 Ontario Human Rights Commission and Theresa O'Malley Vincent v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; K. S. Bhinder and the Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Canadian National Railway Company, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561.

8 Ibid.

9 O'Malley, 549–50; Bhinder, 566–67, 586.

10 In its response to this report, the government is not clear as to whether it considers the overcoming of systemic discrimination to be required by section 15, or whether it is one of the things that governments should do to promote equality and social justice over and above what is constitutionally required of them. In any case, it is clear that the government thinks systemic discrimination ought to be overcome. See, Toward Equality: The Response to the Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1986), 3–4Google Scholar.

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28 Ibid., at 369. For a rejection of Strayer's interpretation, see Kask v. Shimizu, Doe, Bloggs and Charles Camsell Hospital (1986) (Alberta Court of Queens Bench), unreported.

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44 Cases that have raised such “regime” issues include the infamous Dred Scott case in the United States, and the Guibord case in Canada. For a discussion of the latter case, see Knopff, Rainer, “Quebec's ‘Holy War’ as Regime Politics: Reflections on the Guibord Case,” this JOURNAL 12 (1979), 314–31Google Scholar.

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51 Such a “veteran's preference” exists in the Public Service Employment Act R.S.C., 1970 Ch. P32. See Juriansz, Russell G., “Systemic Discrimination and Special Programs,” in Human Rights (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1983), 13Google Scholar. For an American case bearing on this question see Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)Google Scholar.

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54 This does not mean that policy-making by the more political institutions will always be better. In an executive-dominated parliamentary system such as Canada's, policy is often made with less than adequate public discussion and balancing of the affected interests. Nevertheless, the political policy-making process can be improved without undermining its political nature. Courts, on the other hand, can become better policy makers only at the cost of becoming less judicial. Such politicization of the courts is inevitable under the Charter, but the question is whether it should be carried farther than necessary. If good policy-making is the goal, the wiser course is surely to reform the political policy-making processes.

55 Equality For All, 9–13Google Scholar.

56 Ibid., 18.

57 Ibid., 45–46.

58 Ibid., 47.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., 49–57.

61 Ibid., 61–62.

62 Ibid., 90–91.

63 Ibid., 91.