Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-nmvwc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-26T19:40:47.032Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Acts of Commission and Acts of Omission: Legal-Historical Research and the Intentions of Government in a Federal State

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Michael Howlett
Affiliation:
Queen's University

Abstract

Interpretation of the intentions of government in policy matters is a crucial, if normally implicit, aspect of policy analysis. Canadian policy analysts enjoy a significant advantage in having at their disposal a large body of legal-historical evidence of policy conflict between levels of government, which, if properly interpreted, can aid the process of determining the intentions of government policy. Using an example of conflicting interpretations of government intentions contained in the literature on Canadian political economy, it is argued that the use of legal-historical records can aid policy analysts by providing evidence of policy alternatives not only in the case of policy decisions, or “acts of commission,” but also in the case of nondecisions, or “acts of omission.”

Résumé

L'interprétation des intentions gouvernementales en matière de politiques est un aspect primordial, bien qu'ordinairement implicate, de l'analyse des politiques. Les politicologues canadiens ont le grand avantage d'avoir accès à une quantité énorme de témoignages juridico-historiques des conflits entre les divers niveaux de gouvernement. Ces témoignages, s'ils sont bien interprétés, peuvent aider dans le processus de détermination des objectifs des politiques gouvernementales. Les documents traitant de l'économie politique canadienne donnent un exemple des interprétations divergentes des objectifs gouvernementaux. D'après cet exemple il est suggéré que les archives juridico-historiques fournissent aux politicologues des preuves de l'existence de choix réels, non seulement dans le cas de décisions, ou « actes de commission », mais aussi dans celui de non-décisions, ou « actes d'omission ».

Type
Notes
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Naylor, Tom, “The Rise and Fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence,” in Teeple, Gary (ed.), Capitalism and the National Question in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 142.Google Scholar

2 This theme is explored in Naylor, Tom, The Banks and Finance Capital, vol. 1 of The History of Canadian Business, 1867-1914 (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975).Google Scholar

3 McIvor, R. Craig, Canadian Monetary, Banking and Fiscal Development (Toronto: Macmillan, 1958), 101Google Scholar. See also Brecher, Irving, Monetary and Fiscal Thought and Policy in Canada, 1919-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 The Bank Act (1871) and its decennial revisions are exceptions. For a history of these changes see Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1933), 6169.Google Scholar

5 For McIvor, this inaction is excused by lack of knowledge. This sort of argument, in fact, is implied in the orthodox interpretation of the role of the Canadian state in the depression. Against supporters such as Curtis and Knox. who argue the state acted in an objective, rational manner, critics such as Plumptre argue only that the government failed to adopt Keynesian policies as quickly as it should have. See Curtis, C. A., “Credit Control in Canada,” in Canadian Political Science Association. Papers and Proceedings 2 (1930), 101–22Google Scholar; F. A. Knox, Dominion Monetary Policy, 1929-1934. Study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 1934); and Plumptre, A. F. W., “Canadian Monetary Policy.” in Plumptre, A. F. W. and Innis, H. A. (eds), The Canadian Economy and Its Problems (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1934), 159–69.Google Scholar

6 See McWilliams, R. F., “The Constitution and Banking,” The Canadian Banker 46 (1939), 279–87Google Scholar; and Lederman, W. R., “Division of Powers to Incorporate and Regulate Financial Institutions,” The Canadian Banker 76 (1969), 1214.Google Scholar

7 Canada, Department of Justice, A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1983).

8 Ibid.

9 For a discussion of these powers see Forsey, Eugene, “The Disallowance of Provincial Acts, Reservation of Provincial Bills, and Refusals of Assent by Lieutenant-Governors Since 1867,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 4(1938), 4759CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a summary of federal-provincial interaction in these areas, see Canada, Department of Justice, Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation, Forest, G. V. La (ed.), (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955).Google Scholar

10 For a record of these cases, see Canada, Department of Justice, Decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Relating to the British North America Act 1867 and the Canadian Constitution 1867-1954, Olmsted, Richard A. (ed.), (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954)Google Scholar.

11 See Canada, Department of Justice, Correspondence, Reports of the Ministers of Justice and Orders in Council Upon the Subject of Dominion and Provincial Legislation 1867-1895 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1896).Google Scholar

12 For the period 1867-1914, the best source is Canada, Dominion-Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1867-1926 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951).Google Scholar

13 The best description of federal-provincial conflict over subsidies is found in Maxwell, J. A., Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments of Canada (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 These acts ranged from an 1868 Ontario bill concerning provincial bankruptcy laws to an 1893 New Brunswick bill dealing with the regulation of banking in that province. Primarily, however, the federal government consistently objected to provincial attempts to regulate interest rates or to allow municipalities or joint stock companies to issue bills of exchange.

15 Both reserved bills and two of the disallowed bills dealt with provincial attempts to regulate banking, including two attempts by the government of Quebec to incorporate banks. The two remaining disallowed bills dealt with provincial attempts to set interest rates.

16 These were: Bank of Toronto v. Labe [1887] 12 A.C. p. 577, in which federal banking powers were upheld but provinces allowed to tax bank property: Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada [1892] A.C. p. 459, which ruled federal banking powers superseded provincial powers over property and civil rights; and Royal Bank v. Rex [1913] A.C. p. 283, which held the provinces could not legislate within federal banking jurisdiction.

17 A good example of this is provided by federal disallowance of Manitoba legislation allowing the City of Winnipeg to both borrow and lend money: [1889] 52 Viet. Ch. 45 (Man.).

18 The limitations of provincial restrictions over federal banking powers established in Bank of Toronto v. Lambe were clearly demonstrated in Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada [1939] A.C. p. 117.

19 It is true, of course, that the government did not have a Keynesian monetary and fiscal policy until after the First World War. In the final analysis this may be all McIvor is saying.