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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
A school of thought has emerged within constitutional and political theory that a middle road exists between liberalism and anti-liberal communitarianism. This road, which the author terms “command liberalism” permits societies that follow it to bypass the obvious inequities of liberalism while still enjoying the benefits of liberal democracy. The existence of this middle road would be but a piece of intellectual trivia were it not for the fact that for the past two decades it has formed the normative basis for constitution-making in Canada. It has been a root cause of constitutional conflict, intergroup animosity, constitutional paralysis and, potentially, the break-up of the country. Command liberalism is well represented in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In addition, largely as a consequence of the Charter, it was the raison d'etre of the ill-fated Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords. For the most part, those who seek to travel this road in Canada do so with good intentions; they point to the appalling conditions of Native reserves, blatant examples of gender discrimination and institutionalized racism and homophobia within liberal democratic society as evidence of the need to construct more pluralistic means of collective representation. But good intentions do not square the circle of command liberalism. Indeed, the problem with this middle road is that it is circular, leading us back to where we started.
Une nouvelle école de pensée, issue de la théorie politique et constitutionnelle, soutient qu'une voie meédiane existe entre le libéralisme et le communautarisme anti-libéral. Cette dernière, qui peut être qualifyée de «libéralisme de commande», prétend que les sociétés qui l'adoptent peuvent échapper aux inégalités incontestables du libéralisme tout en profitant des bénéfices de la démocratic Iibérale. Cette voie intermédiaire pourrait être considéréd comme une fadaise intellectuelle si elle n'avait constitué la base normative de I'évolution constitutionnelle au Canada, au cours de deux dernières décennies. Elle a éteé la cause première du conflit constitutionnel, de l'animosityé entre groupes et de la paralysie constitutionnelle et elle constitue un facteur potentiel de démantèlement du pays. La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, qui est une incarnation éloquente du «libéralisme de commande», a été à l'origine de l'échec des accords du Lac Meech et de Charlottetown. La plupart de ceux qui dépendent cette voie au Canada le font avec de bonnes intentions; ils déinoncent les conditions épouvantables des réserves autochtones, la discrimination fondée sur le sexe, le racisme institutionnalisé et l'homophobie au sein de la société démocratique libérale comme autant de preuves de la ne'cessiti de créer des moyens de représentation collective plus pluralistes. Mais les bonnes intentions ne changent pas le caractère tautologique du «liberalisme de commande». En effet, le problème avec cette voie intermédiaire c'est qu'elle tourne en rond, nous ramenant constamment au point de départ
1 The liberal tradition can be traced to thinkers such as John Locke, James Madison, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and John Rawls. The communitarian school has a long anti-liberal tradition. Stephen Holmes traces the intellectual origins to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Joseph de Maistre and later thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche (Holmes, Stephen, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993]).Google Scholar
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23 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, chap. 4.
24 This must be qualified by the usual liberal caveat that no right is absolute, and that, therefore, pursuit of the good life cannot come at the expense of the individual rights of others.
25 Ibid., 84.
26 Ibid., 76. See also Van Dyke, Vemon, “Justice as Fairness: For Groups?” American Political Science Review 69 (1975), 607–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).Google Scholar
27 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 84–86.
28 Polyethnic rights constitute minor exemptions to universal rules on the basis of cultural sensitivity. The well-known petition on the part of Sikh officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to be able to wear their turbans instead of more traditional RCMP headgear would be an example of such rights (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 31).
29 Taylor, Charles, “Shared and Divergent Values,” in Laforest, Guy, ed., Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 155–186.Google Scholar
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31 Tully, James makes a similar claim with respect to Aboriginal rights (“Diversity's Gambit Declined,” in Cook, , ed., Constitutional Predicament, 149–198).Google Scholar
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33 Green, Leslie, “Internal Minorities and Their Rights,” in Baker, Judith, ed., Group Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 100–117.Google Scholar
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35 Ibid., 108.
36 Ibid.
37 Walker, Brian, “Plural Cultures, Contested Territories: A Critique of Kymlicka,” this Journal 30 (1997), 211–234.Google Scholar
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39 Ibid., 232.
40 Ibid., 233.
41 Ibid., 233–34.
42 Young, Lisa, “Gender Equal Legislatures: Evaluating the Proposed Nunavut Electoral System,” Canadian Public Policy 23 (1997), 306–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 309.
46 Ibid.
47 See, for example, Young, Iris Marion, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics 99 (1989), 250–274CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Young, I. M., Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990)Google Scholar and Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar. There is an obvious similarity between I. M. Young's argument, and those adopted by advocates of less progressive positions. John C. Calhoun's writings invoked a similar logic for the protection of Southern slave-holders against the majoritarian impulses of Northern abolitionists. I thank Ian Brodie for pointing this out to me. See Safford, John L., “John C. Calhoun, Lani Guinier, and Minority Rights,“ PS: Political Science and Politics 28 (1995), 211–216Google Scholar; and Calhoun, John C., A Disquisition on Government; and Selections from the Discourse, edited by Post, C. G. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953).Google Scholar
48 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 145.
49 Young, “Gender Equal Legislatures,” 312.
50 Ibid.
51 Fierlbeck, Katherine, “The Ambivalent Potential of Cultural Identity,” this Journal 29 (1996), 14.Google Scholar
