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A Comment on Professor Macpherson's Interpretation of Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
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C. B. Macpherson a qualifié d' « Epitaphe au libéralisme » l'ouvrage de Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. Il rejette l'apologie du marché, faite par Friedman, en allégant que la liberté du marché n'a rien à voir avec la liberté individuelle, que la liberté politique ne postule pas le capitalisme et que la thèse de Friedman sur la valeur éthique du capitalisme n'est pas fondée. Le présent article examine les faiblesses de l'analyse du professeur Macpherson.
Celui-ci conteste que la position de Friedman soit basée sur les postulats de la théorie microéconomique. L'incapacité ou le refus de Macpherson d'admettre ces postulats constitue l'une des principales raisons pour lesquelles il rejette l'argumentation de Friedman. Or, les points essentiels de cette argumentation reposent précisement sur de telles hypothèses, relatives à la perfection des marchés et à la distribution de la richesse. Sitôt que ces hypothèses sont infirmées, alors apparaissent, ainsi que le reconnait Friedman, des raisons d'affirmer le rôle de l'Etat, prenant pour acquis qu'on peut prouver que ce dernier est plus à même que les individus de prendre les décisions appropriées aux circonstances.
Macpherson n'ayant pas centré sa critique sur le degré avec lequel les mécanismes capitalistes, dont la distribution de la richesse, influencent la capacité de décision des individus, il n'a pas louché sauf à la périphérie, les aspects les plus vulnérables de la position de Friedman; plutôt, il a développé des idées connexes, axées sur diverses interprétations de termes et d'affirmations empiriques erronées. Macpherson n'a pas discuté des assises de la pensée de Friedman et sa critique porte à faux: Friedman parlait de critères d'efficacité, Macpherson lui a opposé des considérations d'ordre éthique.
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- Information
- Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 1969 , pp. 256 - 261
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- Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1969
References
1 Macpherson, C. B., “Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's Freedom,” this Journal, I, 1 (March 1968), 95–106.Google Scholar (Page references in the text refer to this article).
2 Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, 1962Google Scholar).
3 This concept of “cost” is not meant to imply money outlay, but rather the economic concept of “opportunity cost,” viz., the alternatives that must be given up or foregone.
4 Adler, Mortimer, The Idea of Freedom (New York, 1958), I, 26Google Scholar; cf. Ward, B., Elementary Price Theory (New York, 1967), 13–16.Google Scholar
5 Rationality, in this context, simply implies that the individual will act consistently in maximizing his own welfare.
6 An effective, but easy-to-read, explanation of Pareto optimality is contained in Ferguson, C. E., A Macroeconomic Theory of Workable Competition (Durham, NC, 1964Google Scholar), chap. 1. (References to more rigorous explanations are cited in Ferguson.) Credit for the idea that one cannot relax even one of the assumptions of Pareto's model without losing the “optimality” characteristic of the solution is usually attributed to James Meade; however, my colleague, K. Stegemann, has pointed out that this should more correctly be attributed to Clark, J. M., “Toward a Concept of Workable Competition,” American Economic Review, XXX (1940), 241–56.Google Scholar ( Stegemann, K., “Workable Competition nach Zwanzig Jahren,” Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts — und Gesellschafts politik (1964), 239.Google Scholar The more recent refinements have been based on the rigorous formulation contained in Lipsey, R. F. and Lancaster, K., “The General Theory of Second-Best,” Review of Economic Studies, XXIV (1956–1957), 11–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 This need not be true. If the social scientist is studying sufficiently large groups, Becker has demonstrated that inconsistent behaviour will be randomly distributed about a mean which is the rational decision. Becker, G. S., “Irrational Behaviour and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy, LXX (1962), 1–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 Cf. n. 3.
9 Cf. Coase, Ronald H., “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, III (1960), 1–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
10 For example, cf. Schultz, T. W., “Investment in Human Capital,” American Economic Review, LI (1961), 1–17.Google Scholar
11 See especially Friedman's arguments dealing with “externalities” in chap. 2 and his scheme for subsidizing education consistent with his role of government in chap. 6. This is the so-called “merit good” case.
12 Coase, Ronald H., “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, IV (1937), 386–405CrossRefGoogle Scholar, argues that the corporation exists because its costs are less than the costs of individual transactions in the market.
13 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 122.
14 Of course, this discussion is not concerned with the case of “pure public goods” which, by their nature would not be provided by the private sector and hence must be provided by the public sector.