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Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

C. L. Ostberg  and
Matthew Wetstein
C. L. Ostberg
Affiliation:
University of the Pacific
Matthew Wetstein
Affiliation:
San Joaquin Delta College
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Abstract

While prior studies have applied schema theory to belief systems in the mass public, it has yet to be used to assess attitudes held by elites in society. This article uses schema theory to suggest that justices of the Supreme Court of Canada employ an information processing model when deciding search and seizure cases. Specifically, it implies that the justices have a schema, or an organized set of attitudes, that are triggered by the factual and legal circumstances in particular search and seizure cases. The belief that justices would use such a heuristic device makes sense, given that they are expected to resolve disputes in a quick and efficient manner as well as maintain consistency in the law. The study uses factor analysis to provide evidence that there is an underlying structure to the attitudes that Canadian justices use in these cases (1984–1994). It adds to the prior research in this area, because it moves schema theory beyond the study of mass belief systems, and it represents a unique way of assessing the judicial decision-making process of Canadian justices since the adoption in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Résumé

Alors que les études antérieures ont appliqué la théorie schématique aux systèmes de croyance des masses, cette théorie n'a pas encore été employée pour évaluer les attitudes affichées par les élites de la société. Cet article utilise la théorie schématique pour soutenir que les juges de la Cour suprême du Canada emploient un modèle de renseignements lorsqu'ils se prononcent sur des cas relatifs aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies. Plus spécifiquement, l'article explique comment les juges adoptent un schéma, ou des attitudes organisées, qui sont le fruit des circonstances légales et factuelles. La croyance selon laquelle les juges utiliseraient une telle approche heuristique semble prudente étant donné que ces derniers sont censés résoudre les litiges d'une manière rapide et efficace tout en maintenant le caractère cohérent de la loi. L'étude utilise l'analyse de facteur pour mettre en évidence l'existence d'une structure fondamentale concernant les attitudes que les juges canadiens affichent dans les cas retenus (1984–1994). Elle ajoute aux recherches antérieures dans ce domaine dans la mesure où elle va au-delà de la théorie schématique appliquée au systèmes de croyances des masses. Elle met de l'avant une façon unique d'évaluer le processus de prise de décision judiciaire depuis l'adoption en 1982 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , December 1998 , pp. 767 - 787
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1998

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References

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11 A list of the cases used in the study is provided below in the appendix.

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14 Segal, “Supreme Court Justices as Human Decision Makers” and Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model.

15 We have borrowed much of the description of the data and variables from a prior study (Ostberg, C. L. and Wetstein, Matthew, “Search and Seizure Cases in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending an American Model of Judicial Decision Making Across Countries,” unpublished manuscript, Stockton, California, August 1997Google Scholar).

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17 Our newspaper ideology score focused on news accounts in The Globe and Mail (Toronto) because a search of a Canadian newspaper index revealed that only The Globe and Mail published consistent stories on the appointment of justices to the Supreme Court. Moreover, The Globe and Mail is widely regarded as a newspaper of record in Canada. When we conducted the content analysis of the stories, we searched for statements that clearly identified the ideological position of the appointed justice. For example, when we found descriptions of a justice as “progressive” or “liberal” or “liberal minded,” we categorized that appointee as a very liberal justice (1.0). Justices described as “moderate-liberal” or as “moderate” and having been affiliated with the Liberal party in the past, were placed in a moderate liberal category (0.5). When we encountered phrases such as “moderate” or “middle of the road,” we classified the justice as a moderate justice (0.0). In the absence of any ideological commentary, we also categorized the justices as moderate, working on the assumption that in most cases ideological commentary would have been published if the justice had a clear political leaning. The full coding scheme for the justices is listed below:

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21 R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945; R. v. Tessier, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 687; R. v. Erickson, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 649; R. v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768; and R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20.

22 R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945; and R. v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768.

23 R. v. Genereux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259; R. v. Hammill, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 301; R. v. Thompson, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111; R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980; and R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223.

24 In R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, police initially conducted a perimeter search of a home without warrant, then used that information to obtain a warrant to search the house for drugs.

25 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627; Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425; Kourtessis v. M.N.R., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53; and Comite Partitaire de L'lndustrie de La Chemise v. Potash, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406.

26 R. v. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755; R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495; R. v. Jacoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548; and R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. Although Collins was not a border search, it had a moderately high loading on Factor 3 because the case involved an invasive drug search, and, like the other three, no warrant had been obtained prior to the search, and it was deemed unlawful by the Court.

27 R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36; R. v. Boersma, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 488; and R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140.

28 R. v. Sieben, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295; R. v. Hammill, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 301; R. v. Genest, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59; R. v. Tessier, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 687; and R. v. Gimson, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 692. R. v. Sieben and R. v. Hammill involved searches by police on the basis of a writ of assistance under the Narcotic Control Act rather than a warrant, and that portion of the statute had not yet been struck down by the Court at the time of the search.

29 R. v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621; R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62; R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257; R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527; and R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615.

30 R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527.

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34 Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model.