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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
Political coalitions have been studied by many authors, but few of them have shown that the presence or action of rivals or neutrals, outside the coalition, is an important factor in its formation or evolution. A structural approach is proposed, which underlines the cohesion requirements in the coalition formation and evolution. Then five research propositions are formulated, the last three of them bearing upon the political usefulness of rivals. The propositions are applied to the events related to the failure of the electoral system reform in Québec. This application leads to conclude that the propositions have a certain heuristic capacity but that some of them have to be altered for more appropriateness in future research.
Les coalitions politiques ont fait l'objet de nombreuses études, mais peu d'entre elles ont montré que la présence ou l'action des rivaux ou encore des neutres, à l'extérieur de la coalition, est un facteur non négligeable de la formation ou de l'évolution de celle ci. Après avoir proposé une approche structurale, qui insiste sur les exigences de cohésion dans la formation ou le maintien des coalitions, nous formulons cinq propositions de recherche, dont les trois dernières portent sur l'utilité politique des rivaux. Un premier test de ces propositions, à propos de l'échec de la tentative de réforme du mode de scrutin au Québec, montre qu'elles ont une certaine fécondité et suggère quelques modifications à apporter en vue de tests ultérieurs.
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